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  Abstract 
 
        Examining Dehumanization Through the “Political Brain Perspective”: 
        Towards a Minimal Neuropolitical Theory for Hyperdiverse Societies   
 
  Liya Yu 
 
 
What cognitive conditions need to be in place in order for cooperation, and potentially, 
solidarity, to exist in hyperdiverse societies? What aspects of our social human brain are 
indispensible when it comes to achieving shared goals in divided liberal democracies? This 
dissertation singles out the dehumanized perception and categorization of out-groups as one of 
the most decisive disruptors of political cooperation. I develop an interdisciplinary model – the 
“Political Brain Perspective” (PBP) – that combines political theory, political science and social 
neuroscience insights to advance my argument about dehumanization in both domestic and 
International political contexts. 
I argue that dehumanized perception at the brain level is politically troublesome because 
it disables an important social brain function called mentalizing, which is foundational for both 
basic political transactions and more complex feelings such as empathy. I show how this is 
relevant in regard to the neuropolitical duties public representatives owe to their constituents in a 
diverse liberal democracy, and further, how various liberal traditions such as social contract, 
multiculturalism and human rights theories have hitherto ignored dehumanization as a 
fundamental disruptor to any political cooperative process. 
At the international level, I examine the potential for dehumanization within civilizational 
discourses in history, with a particular focus on the post-Cold War distinction between 
“civilized” and “barbarians”. I show that in the international context of genocide, intergroup 
conflict and identity politics, dehumanizing categories not only diminish the cognitive reasoning 
and mentalizing abilities of the dehumanizer, but also have an intense impact on the 
dehumanized, in the form of reciprocal dehumanization and retributive violence. 
Based on the epistemological premises of the PBP, I contend that a minimal 
neuropolitical theory of cooperation ought not to prioritize an ontological concept of human 
dignity but instead treat the ascription of humanness as an interpersonal brain mechanism. The 
brain data, in other words, can only tell us what our brains do when engaging in politics, not who 
we are as political beings in an essentialist way. 
In sum, this dissertation highlights the need for political scientists to pay attention to the 
neuronal mechanisms underlying dehumanization, and to distinguish it from other forms of 
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1. Introduction: Towards a “Political Brain Perspective” 
             
                 
 At present, neuroscience is a collection of facts still awaiting an over-arching theory. 
 
 Gary Marcus and Jeremy Freeman, The Future of the Brain 
 
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind (…) from this 
equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attainment of our Ends. 
 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
 
In any event, we must remember that it’s not the blinded wrongdoers who are primarily   
responsible for the triumph of evil in the world, but the spiritually sighted servants of the 
good. 
 
Fyodor Stepun, Foregone and Gone Forever  
 
1.1. So Much Brain Data, So Little Theory 
In 2012, a research team at Oxford University consisting of people from 
experimental psychology, psychiatry and practical ethics wanted to find out whether the 
ingestion of a commonly used medication for treating heart conditions would lower racial 
bias in individuals (Terbeck et al., 2012). In their study, they asked White participants to 
ingest the beta-blocker medication ‘propranolol’ and tested for racial bias towards non-
White faces. Propranolol had no strong effect on explicit racial bias, but when tested for 
subconsciously held biases through the ‘Implicit Association Test’ (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), propranolol appeared to significantly reduce participants’ 
negative biases towards non-Whites. As expected, the media quickly absorbed these 
explosive findings through sensationalist headlines such as “A Pill That Could Prevent 
Racism?”, “Blood Pressure Drug Reduces ‘In-Built Racism’”, and “Feeling Racist? 
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Blood Pressure Drug Propranolol May Open Hearts and Minds”1. One of the 
investigators of the study was Julian Savulescu, a leading philosopher of bioethics and 
director of Oxford’s Center for Neuroethics, who had previously held controversial 
positions on selective embryonic procreation, infanticide, and euthanasia in the context of 
disability and comatic patients (Savulescu, 2006; Kahane and Savulescu, 2011; Persson 
and Savulescu)2. In the press statement accompanying the 2012 propranolol study, 
Savulescu however stressed that “propranolol is not a pill to cure racism”, even though 
“such research raises the tantalising possibility that our unconscious racial attitudes could 
be modulated using drugs, a possibility that requires careful ethical analysis [because] 
biological research aiming to make people morally better has a dark history.”3. 
Apart from the glaring ethical problems that the potential development and usage of 
an ‘anti-racism pill’ would entail, the 2012 study left some crucial questions unanswered: 
Did propranolol influence implicit racial bias directly or was the reduction of racial bias a 
side-effect of the pill’s lowering of participants’ heart rates? Did propranolol completely 
change racial attitudes or did it affect specific brain regions known to be implicated in 
implicit racial bias, and if so, which ones? In order to answer these questions, the 2012 
research team conducted a follow-up study in 2015 that used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine which brain regions exactly (if at all) were 
affected during exposure to non-White faces after ingestion of the drug (Terbeck et al., 





2 See also works by philosopher Peter Singer (1979), Savulescu’s doctoral father, on similar controversial 
issues within medical ethics. For a sophisticated argument in favor of “cognitive enhancement”, and the 
relationship between neuroscience and human rights, see Cohen (2015). 
3 http://www.neuroethics.ox.ac.uk/latest_news/propranolol_racism  
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2015). Back in 2012, the research team hypothesized that the reduction of implicit bias 
might have been due to propranolol’s effect on the brain’s amygdala activity – a brain 
region that had previously been shown to be impacted by propranolol (Talmi, Hurlemann, 
Patin, & Dolan, 2010), and that moreover had been connected to negative racial attitudes 
(Phelps et al., 2000; Hart et al., 2000) and emotional arousal in general. 
However, the 2015 study yielded unexpected results: instead of acting on the 
amygdala, propranolol changed the way how initially threatening Black faces were 
processed as less threatening in the fusiform gyrus area, a brain area which also includes 
the fusiform face area (FFA), responsible for face recognition. In other words, the drug 
directly modified particular brain activity related to threatening face-perception and 
implicit racial bias. The fMRI results therefore confirmed a direct effect of propranolol 
on the neurobiological mechanisms underlying racial bias and ruled out the possibility 
that the phenomenon was a mere side effect of the drug. The pill and the brain were 
indeed connected4.  
The propranolol studies sum up everything that is intriguing and exciting, but also 
unnerving and troubling about current interdisciplinary research at the nexus of the 
cognitive and neurobiological sciences, and socio-political phenomena. Despite their 
dazzling results, what is striking about the propranolol studies is how little they can 
actually tell us what to do about racism at the political or societal level, to the point that 
one of the principal investigators warns that the findings do not imply that propranolol 
should be seen as a medical cure for racism – even though at first glance this is exactly 
what the results seem to imply and that is how the media interpreted them. 
                                                 
4 For an in-depth, book-length discussion of these two studies and medical “cures” against prejudice see 
Terbeck (2016).  
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Although other studies on out-group exclusion, prejudice and racial bias in the 
relatively novel field of social neuroscience (Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett, 2006; 
Todorov, Fiske, and Prentice, 2011; Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan, 2015) and its even 
newer offspring, political neuroscience (Jost, Nam, Amodio, and Van Bavel, 2014), 
might not appear as striking or controversial compared to the propranolol studies, I argue 
that a similar uncertainty about the political, normative and moral implications is 
pervasive in many of these studies. Despite an ever-growing abundance of ‘social brain 
data’ that is being churned out by these disciplines – consider for example that in 2001, a 
Google search for ‘social cognitive neuroscience’ generated only 6 hits, compared to 
52,000 hits in 2009 (Lieberman, 2010, p.144) and 3,160,000 hits in 2016 – the vast 
amount of this ‘social brain data’ remains undigested by the social sciences and the 
humanities, and is barely incorporated into political theorizing, quantitative models, 
policy debates or course syllabi at the research and teaching level in political science 
departments. 
That being said, there exists within the social sciences a small but burgeoning 
subfield of promising interdisciplinary work on cognition and emotions in political 
processes (Redlawsk, 2006; Marcus, 2013) and international relations (Crawford, 2009), 
the biological conditions underlying politicians’ decision-making (Wiegele 1985; 
McDermott, 2008), the evolutionary and genetic foundations of the political animal 
(Hatemi and McDermott, 2011), the relationship between political ideologies and 
cognitive mechanisms (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford, 2014; Huddy, Feldman, & Lowns 
2014); neuroscience’s influence on legal theory and new types of evidence presented in 
the court room (Pardo and Patterson, 2013), the socio-cultural implications of 
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neuroscience studies (Choudhury and Slaby, 2011), and the implications of 
neuroscientific revelations for political theory (Vander Valk, 2012) and political science 
more generally (Blank, Hines and Funke, 2014). This small subfield is driven by a 
growing number of political scientists, policy researchers and political philosophers who 
are intrigued by how brain data can reveal how our brains operate in social settings and 
interpersonal interactions. They realize that the brain data might be able to buttress or 
even confirm more speculative assumptions held by political scientists about the 
motivating reasons underlying human social perception and decision-making; likewise, 
new revelations about how our social brains function might also contradict hitherto 
entrenched beliefs about the nature of the political animal, serving therefore as a 
corrective tool with which political scientists can begin to reconceptualize and reframe 
existing political theories and models. 
Despite the fact that this subfield is still in its infancy, and that therefore a 
comprehensive incorporation of ‘social brain data’ at the research and teaching level has 
yet to fully materialize within political science, a ‘new biological turn’ has slowly but 
steadily been taking place within the social sciences more broadly over the last three 
decades. Maurizio Meloni (2012) describes how various disciplines – including 
psychiatry, sociology, philosophy and political theory – have recently begun to overcome 
the strong anti-naturalist sentiment that emerged immediately after the Second World 
War, which back then was an initial reaction to the biological and evolutionary theories 
that had supported and justified horrendous atrocities such as the Holocaust, eugenic 
policies, and medical experiments carried out on the disabled and other vulnerable 
groups. The ensuing “mistrust and outright hostility” (Franks and Smith, 1999) that 
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defined the “relationship between the biological and the social in the twentieth century” 
(Meloni, 2012, p.27) was re-examined in the latter half of the century, starting with E.O. 
Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) and Richard Dawkin’s The Selfish Gene (1976). 
What followed were attempts at “re-alignment of the human social sciences with the 
life sciences” (Benton, 1991, p.25): through a revival of biological foundations for 
defining humanness (Richards, 1987; Degler, 1991; Laland and Brown, 2002), a revival 
of a biologically grounded concept of human nature (Arnhart, 1998; Masters, 1991; 
Konner, 2002), a new take on ‘embodied political agency’ in which the ‘layered’ 
dimensions of political thinking are acknowledged (Connolly, 2002; Thiele, 2006). 
Further to this there are more specific attempts at linking socioeconomic inequalities with 
white brain matter volume (Gianaros et al., 2013), linking cross-cultural mentalizing 
abilities with outcomes in International relations (Franklin, Stevenson, Ambady, & 
Adams, 2015), exploring the genetic basis and neurocognitive correlates for political 
orientations and party affiliations (Amodio et al. 2007; Alford and Hibbing, 2008; Alford, 
Smith and Hibbing, 2014)5, and attempts by ‘new feminism’ to engage findings in 
genetics and neuroscience with a more materialist and embodied idea of female identity 
(Rippon, Jordan-Young, & Fine, 2014; Schmitz & Höppner, 2014), amongst other 
initiatives and trends. 
Yet despite this ‘biological turn’ within the social sciences more broadly, there is 
much uncertainty (and little debate) about concrete implications of neuroscience for core 
issues in Western political theory, such as the social contract, deliberative democracy, 
                                                 
5 For an excellent piece of criticism of genopolitics, attacking it both for its potential methodological and 
normative pitfalls, see Charney (2012). 
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human rights, multiculturalism, nationalism, or the politics of identity difference6. By this 
I mean for example specific insights about how studies on implicit bias against other-race 
faces would impact assumptions about inclusiveness held in multiculturalist theory, how 
the situational and precarious conditions under which rational decision-making takes 
place would affect social contract scenarios imagined by political theorists, or how our 
cognitive tendency to only fully humanize in-group rather than out-group members 
would alter strategies of persuasion in human rights education and dialogue. 
In order to reach this level of concreteness, I suggest that political theorists who wish 
to draw meaningful conclusions and devise persuasive neuropolitical theories from the 
huge (and messy) array of brain data need to pay attention to the following four points: 
1. Political theorists should engage in a critical and substantial examination of 
the neuroscience methodology employed in the brain studies that they wish 
to incorporate in their neuropolitical theories; asking, for example, what 
exactly an fMRI scan can and cannot tell us in regard to specific political 
questions and scenarios. 
2. Brain data should not be treated as self-evident but be carefully 
contextualized and adjusted to the assumptions, ideas and language within 
the respective field of political theory to which political theorists wish to 
apply the data. 
3. Political theorists should aim to develop a new neuropolitical language out 
of the brain data, especially in cases where certain brain insights seem to 
reverse or completely contradict the respective assumptions within a political 
theory. An awareness of the complexity of the actual political world into 
which this new neuropolitical language is potentially applied is crucial. 
4. Finally, insights into our social brains and how they navigate the social world 
should be used in expanding and adjusting larger philosophical ideas about 




Despite some existing efforts, the extent to which ‘social brain data’ is seriously and 
substantively incorporated into political theorizing and policy-related debates in the 
                                                 
6 For first attempts in this direction see Vander Valk  (2012) on the relationship between political theory 
and neuroscience. 
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academic field is still very small; the manner in which this is carried out often lacks focus 
and suffers at times from conceptual sophistication and clarity. I contend that it is 
insufficient to broadly claim that ‘emotions matter in politics’ (McDermott, 2004), ‘affect 
influences rational decision-making’ (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000)7 or indeed – 
in reference to the propranolol studies mentioned at the beginning – to jump to the 
conclusion that a racism pill could solve the causes of systemic racism. Meanwhile, it is 
too reductionist and sweeping to explain in-group membership and political activism 
primarily through the ‘mirror neuron system’ (Keestra, 2012; Newman-Norlund, Burch, 
and Becofsky, 2013), to ascribe voting behavior exclusively to certain brain mechanisms 
(Westen, 2008; Cory, 2004) or to establish a fuzzy link between the fluidity of globalized 
identities and brain plasticity (Malabou, 2008). 
This dissertation is an attempt at contributing to this burgeoning field of critical and 
thoughtful political theorizing about our human brains. It aims to offer a detailed 
neuropolitical theory about the effects of everyday dehumanized perception in the context 
of a hyperdiverse body politic. It begins with the premise that no social brain research, no 
matter how insightful or groundbreaking, is self-evident in terms of its implications for 
political reasoning and application in the political world. As the propranolol studies 
showed, in order for neuropolitical theorizing to be persuasive, we cannot jump to 
conclusions by replacing political judgment with the brain data itself. If we want to avoid 
broad claims and over-simplified applications, the brain data needs to be carefully and 
painstakingly adjusted to the complexity of socio-political phenomena, especially when it 
involves normative implications. 
                                                 
7 This is not to deny that there exist excellent interdisciplinary explorations about the implications of 
neuroscience research on emotions for the humanities, see for example Reddy (2001). 
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Moreover, no amount of social brain research can offer a complete source for 
political theorizing for us – the point here is that we are not looking for the brain data to 
fulfill an ontological purpose of defining who we are as political beings, but foremost 
help us understand how our brains function and what kind of underlying mechanisms are 
at play when we engage in politics with other human beings. This, of course, is grounded 
on an even more basic premise that when it comes to the study of politics, brain processes 
and mechanisms matter fundamentally in the first place. In order to forge tenable political 
theories as well as potential policy recommendations out of social brain research, I argue 
that we need to take all of the above into account. 
This dissertation is aimed at theory building rather than trying to claim causal 
relationships between brain mechanisms and particular political behaviors. The kind of 
neuropolitical theory building that I attempt is minimal, in that I try to identify those 
cognitive mechanisms and brain capacities that I deem most threatening to the stability of 
the hyperdiverse body politic (and therefore most essential to identify and aiming to 
overcome), which I narrow down in this dissertation to one specific social brain capacity: 
dehumanized perception of the other. A detailed description of dehumanized perception 
from the social neuroscience viewpoint and the various manifestations of dehumanization 
in the form of animalistic, mechanistic, explicit and implicit dehumanization will follow 
shortly below – as well as an examination of the effects of dehumanizing others on one’s 
own brain and the political effects of feeling dehumanized by others in turn. 
 
1.2. The ‘Political Brain Perspective’: Why Brain Mechanisms Matter for Politics 
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In this section I want to develop what I call the Political Brain Perspective (PBP): an 
interdisciplinary perspective that allows us to analyze political phenomena through the 
lens of the social brain. I specifically call the PBP a perspective because I do not wish to 
make a causal or systematic point here; rather, what I wish to offer is a distinct 
perspective, thoughtfully and critically grown out of relevant brain data for the political 
question at hand, which allows us to access crucial brain mechanisms relevant for 
political analysis, and which enables us to theorize about the stability of political societies 
based on the cognitive abilities and limitations of its political actors. Adopting a PBP is 
therefore a vital first step before any neuropolitical theorizing can take place. Indeed, 
precursors of the PBP have been present throughout the history of Western and non-
Western political thought, from Aristotle’s preoccupation with psychology and biological 
taxonomy in De Anima and with the nature of human senses in Parva Naturalia, the 
Daoist philosopher Zhuang Zi’s epistemological investigation into the fallacies of human 
perception and its consequences for constructing social reality; the dilemma facing the 
human mind and its passions in the context of social actions and going to war in the 
Ancient Hindu text Bhagavad Gita, Baruch Spinoza’s protobiological reflections about 
affect and actions in the Ethics, Thomas Hobbes’ concern in Leviathan and De Cive with 
the psychological conditions present in the state of nature and under the rule of a 
sovereign, and David Hume’s search for empirically grounded empathetic sentiments in 
the Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, to name a few. 
In particular, Hobbes’ employment of a PBP in trying to understand how to 
overcome the religious and social divisions of his time serves as an important guideline 
for this dissertation project. Hobbes’ analysis of the senses, as well as the capacities and 
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fallacies of human imagination in Part I of Leviathan should be understood as a crucial 
strategic move: by deliberately placing his investigation of the cognitive, affective and 
physiological conditions of political ‘subjects’ before his discussion of the state of nature 
and the creation of a commonwealth based on peace in Part II, Hobbes makes clear that 
we cannot construct a political theory of the modern state – and for that matter, social 
cooperation and peace between divided social groups – without having an extensive 
understanding of the human mind’s limitations and capacities. If Hobbes tried to build his 
political argument on a materialistic theory of the mind with the limited knowledge on 
human cognition available to him in the 17th century (Johnston, 1986; Tuck 1991), how 
would he have reacted to the proliferation of neuroscientific and psychological data in the 
20th and 21st century? One can only speculate that Hobbes would have been intensely 
curious and eager to understand the groundbreaking insights into the workings of the 
social brain, whilst also being careful to apply these insights to the politics of the 
commonwealth in the same meticulously differentiated and innovative way as he did in 
Leviathan8.  
One of Hobbes’ main aims in regard to overcoming certain cognitive conditions of 
his subjects was to free them from unnecessary fear. In Part IV of Leviathan, for 
example, he warns us of dangerous mental constructs stemming from misinterpretation of 
religious scriptures, such as superstitions and hallucinations, which can threaten the 
stability of the commonwealth. His underlying assumption was that the human mind was 
                                                 
8 One might object here that Hobbes’ was skeptical of the experimental method, as transpired in 
his exchange with Robert Boyle, see Shapin & Schaffer (1985). It is important to realize though 
that the 17th century idea of scientific experimentation differed considerably from today’s brain 
imaging experiments, and that therefore, Hobbes’ disagreement with Boyle does not necessarily 
mean that he would reject today’s brain data insights. 
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naturally flawed in identifying threats in a rational manner, which for him had significant 
consequences for ensuring political stability between different religious and social groups 
over time. Most important, an “absence of any objective standards by which to measure 
what was right and wrong, or even what was beneficial or harmful to a human being”  
(Tuck, 1991, p. xxvi) led Hobbes to establish that the true nature of conflict was first and 
foremost “a conflict of belief” (ibid.). In De Cive he states: 
“For if the patterns of human action were known with the same certainty as the 
relations of magnitude in figures, then ambition and greed, whose power rests on the 
false opinions of the common people about right and wrong, would be disarmed, and 
the human race would enjoy such secure power that (apart from conflicts over space 
as the population grew) it seems unlikely that it would ever have to fight again.”  
(De Cive, Epistle Dedicatory 6) 
 
What transpires from this quote is Hobbes’ recognition of the potentially destructive 
psychological forces driving social human interaction and thus the inherent fragility of 
social bonds. Moreover, he acknowledges that uncovering the cognitive and affective 
mechanisms behind these forces is a necessary first step in establishing a peaceful 
commonwealth. One could argue that Hobbes’ search for certainty in regard to the 
destructive mechanisms underlying political action is a clear sign of skepticism towards 
more benevolent or optimistic accounts of ‘human nature’ (Slomp, 2000). Instead of 
venturing into the long-standing discussion of whether Hobbes was a pessimist of human 
nature, what is significant here for the PBP is that Hobbes, through his search for 
certainty regarding the destructive psychological forces driving social human interaction, 
is setting the bar for where politics begins at a very high point. 
What do I mean by this? Hobbes understood that the stability of his utopian 
Leviathan as the “Mortal God” and “Artificial Man” rests on the psychological regulation 
and self-control of its individual members. The cognitive capacities of the individual 
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members, however, are not necessarily ideal when it comes to mutual contractarian 
cooperation under a shared sovereign: Hobbes outlines in detail in Part I of Leviathan 
how human vision, sense, speech and imagination are all flawed when it comes to making 
decisions free from fear and based on reason alone. Indeed, reason itself, unlike sense or 
memory, is “attained by industry” and not biological inheritance (Part I, Chapter 5), 
meaning that humans have to prudently learn how to regulate their imagination and 
passions – only then will they be able to leave the state of nature, and politics in the form 
of peaceful cooperation can begin. 
Hobbes’ search for more objective cognitive standards of predicting when and 
how human beings will form stable and peaceful political unions is taken up again by 
political scientists in the 20th century, indirectly first by the behavioralist movement. 
Although I stress in the subsequent chapter that the cognitive revolution of the 1950s was 
a deliberate departure and stood in clear opposition to the ‘behaviorism’ school that 
preceded it, it is worth noting some shared goals in terms of theorizing political actions. 
David Easton’s piece on The Decline of Modern Political Theory (1951) is 
significant here: Easton, who bore major responsibility for introducing the behavioralist 
sciences and systems theory into political science in the mid-20th century, argued that 
current political theory had failed to take on the “task of building systematic theory about 
political behavior”. Easton’s search for recurring patterns and a more comprehensive and 
generalizable theory building surrounding the capacities and behaviors of political actors 
resonates with Hobbes’ own endeavors. In the U.S.’s mid-20th century political science 
environment (particularly at the University of Chicago), WWII European émigrés such as 
Leo Strauss (1953) and Eric Voegelin (2000[1952]) lead the attack on Enlightenment 
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optimism about scientism and the idea of historical progress. Easton cautiously reacted 
against this with his search for a new empiricism for political science, which despite its 
focus on scientific methods and models was driven by profound normative concerns 
(Gunnell, 2013, p.197). Even though behavioralists such as Easton were not particularly 
interested in accessing political processes at the brain level, it is worth noting his shared 
desire with one of the PBP forerunners, Thomas Hobbes. Both tried to understand more 
deeply embedded patterns and universal mechanisms underneath the messy reality of 
political phenomena. 
In this sense, developing the PBP for political theory analysis within this 
dissertation is only a natural extension and deliberate transformation of previous attempts 
within political science (Lasswell, 1936; Merriam, 1945; Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 
1965) to uncover meaningful and crucial determinants of political perception and 
decision-making, and understand which inherent human abilities undermine the stability 
of a political community. In this dissertation, the PBP serves the purpose of establishing a 
minimal standard for when politics begins, in the Hobbesian sense of politics as peace 
and security from mutual destruction, but also as the ability of individuals to recognize 
each other as equally human and cooperate with each other on this crucial basis. The PBP 
differs from other, non-cognitive perspectives in that it puts the cognitive abilities and 
limitations of political actors at the core of any political analysis. 
There is a reason why the PBP is not called the ‘Political Mind Perspective’: the 
PBP recognizes the physical human brain as the center of the political individual’s 
emotions, perception, attitudes, beliefs and behavior, in so far as that the neurobiological 
manifestations of emotions, perception, attitudes, beliefs and behavior – as measured 
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through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), brain lesion studies and other methods – are 
treated as significant and fundamental for understanding some aspects of political 
phenomena. However, the PBP is not reductionist in that it does not claim to understand 
completely or explain exclusively all aspects of political phenomena through 
neurobiological processes, but merely pointing out one (albeit fundamental) layer of 
bricks within a complex house structure.  
In the philosophy of mind, dualists believe in the distinction between mind and 
brain (or mind and body) because for them, these are two radically separate entities. 
Dualism postulates that the mind is independent from the reality of the physical world 
(including the physical human brain), in that mental states such as thoughts, beliefs, 
desires and imagings exist separately from any neurobiological processes (Descartes, 
1996 [1641]; Swinburne, 1986; Robinson, 1982, 2016; Hodgson, 1988; Herbert, 1998). 
By placing the ‘brain’ instead of the ‘mind’ at the center of its perspective, the PBP is 
making a decidedly non-dualist statement here but not an anti-dualist one: the PBP does 
believe that neurobiological processes matter and are linked to mental experiences but the 
PBP does not insist that all mental concepts can be mapped in their entirety at the brain 
level. 
The PBP does not intend to weigh in on the long-standing debate within the 
philosophy of mind between ‘intentional realists’ (Fodor, 1987; Dretske, 1988) and 
‘intentional eliminativists’ (Churchland, 1981; Dennett, 1987), on whether commonsense 
psychology (or folk psychology) is able to capture a level of reality about our mental 
lives that modern scientific theories are unable to access. This debate is linked to the 
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general debate within philosophy of mind on mental representations, and the famous 
challenge that philosopher Thomas Nagel (1974) posed to cognitive science, in claiming 
that the latter will never uncover what it feels like to be inside the mind of a bat. I will 
return in chapter 2 to this epistemological challenge on how cognitive science is unable to 
fully access phenomenological experiences of mental processes, and to which extent this 
is politically relevant. I wish to stress here that the PBP is non-reductionist in that it does 
not claim to capture all aspects of our mental experiences and processes – even though it 
does believe that including fundamental brain processes in the political analysis of 
specific political phenomena (especially those that involve interpersonal social 
perceptions and dynamics) is necessary in order to understand an important part of 
political reality. 
In addition, the PBP takes a non-determinist stance towards the genetic causation 
of brain processes and human behavior. Edmund T. Rolls, the director of the Oxford 
Center for Computational Neuroscience, discovered that only about 15% of our genes 
determine brain connectivity (i.e. roughly 2,000-5,000 genes out of a total of 30,000 
genes that each human being carries) (Rolls and Stringer 2000), which means that “genes 
can only specify some of the general rules of brain wiring” and that therefore the 
“connectivity of the brain must be specified by self-organizing processes including 
learning from the environment” (Rolls, 2012, p.5). In other words, much of the way in 
which our social brains are structured and function is determined by how they adapt to 
particular environments and circumstances. 
From an evolutionary viewpoint, any genes influencing specific goals ought not 
affect behavior too strongly because animals and humans have to adapt the goal of their 
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reward according to environmental availability (e.g. food, water, shelter, sex); thus the 
determinist effect of genes should not be overestimated. Perhaps the most crucial way in 
which genes influence our brains is that they “adapt our minds to make certain stimuli, 
events, and interactions rewarding or punishing” (ibid., p. 4). In addition, there exist 
individual differences in humans’ sensitivity to various rewards and punishments. At the 
brain level, this translates as ‘noise’ in the form of the randomness related to neuronal 
firing times (Rolls and Deco, 2010). 
In the context of social and political interactions, this can include the rewarding 
aspects of in-group belonging (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001; Isobe, 
Nakashima, & Ura, 2013), out-group pain (Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014), 
partisanship (Knutson et al., 2006) and the winning of one’s own in-group team 
(Bornstein, Sagiv, & Halevy, 2008), as well as the punishing experience of being 
ostracized from one’s in-group (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), and feeling 
victimized (Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) and dehumanized (Kteily, Bruneau, & 
Hodson, 2016) by others. Genes are unable to determine towards which stimuli exactly 
our brains will react to, but they can predispose us to seek certain rewarding social 
experiences (and avoid punishing ones) that solidify our sense of in-group belonging. 
This can manifest politically for example in nationalism (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 
2011) or partisanship and party affiliation, but with variation within the population. 
At its core, the PBP is an attempt to bridge the chasm between the physical reality 
of the brain and the phenomenological experience of political conflict (and cooperation) 
between different groups of individuals. The PBP is necessary because the empirical data 
depicting physical brain processes is not self-evident, therefore requiring a distinct 
 18 
political language to translate brain insights into political concepts, which can then be 
applied to the realm of politics in a convincing and justifiable way. This political 
language is necessary and even indispensable because the brain data itself (as presented 
in social neuroscience and psychology papers) cannot be applied directly to political 
problems – as we have seen in the propranolol study – without the help of a conceptual 
and linguistic ‘bridge’ (i.e. the PBP). The purpose of this ‘bridge’ is to articulate the 
pragmatic, analytic and normative implications that might arise when the brain data is 
applied to complex political problems, and offer an interdisciplinary framework in which 
these implications can be explored. 
 
1.3. Towards a Minimal Neuropolitical Theory 
The aim of this dissertation is to sketch out the beginnings of a neuropolitical theory 
for hyperdiverse societies. For this we need to identify and understand the fundamental 
cognitive mechanisms that can threaten the peaceful co-existence and political 
cooperation between different social groups. The first question has to be: ‘What is the 
political question that we are bringing to the brain science?’ The conscious formulating 
of an interdisciplinary political question is vital for laying the foundation of a minimal 
theory. The point here is not to simply treat the brain science as an exciting new tool that 
is then applied to a political problem picked from a traditional list of long-standing issues 
within political science (such as voting behavior, decision-making, ethnic conflict etc.). 
The way to integrate the brain data should not consist in merely treating it as a novel 
independent variable for quantitative political scientists, or as empirical evidence for 
confirming political commitments and philosophical beliefs of political theorists.  
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By applying a neuropolitical perspective to politics, I argue that we are 
fundamentally changing the way we conceptualize politics itself – indeed, this is 
inevitable if we want to formulate sensible political questions that can absorb the brain 
data in a meaningful way. In the social sciences (as in all sciences) researchers always 
rely on certain paradigms – about human cognition and behavior, for example – to 
construct their hypotheses about the world. By not taking for granted the paradigms 
underlying long-standing political problems, I propose a different kind of neuropolitical 
theorizing where we are willing to ask anew what are the cognitive conditions of 
individuals entering politics and what is the threshold of when politics can begin. This 
kind of approach might change what kind of political questions we are asking and 
possibly how we conceptualize politics itself. 
Thomas S. Kuhn, who famously examined the inherent dynamics of paradigm 
changes within natural sciences, wrote in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970 
[1962]) about exactly this issue, stating that each scientific revolution 
“produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in 
the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an 
admissible problem (…) each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we 
should ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which 
scientific work was done [emphasis added]” (p. 6).  
 
According to Kuhn, paradigm shifts – of which the PBP aspiring to be one – lead not 
only to changes in people’s previous world view but most important, to significant 
changes in the kind of questions and problems we want to answer and tackle. The 
question, therefore, of ‘What is the political question that we are bringing to the brain 
science?’ is an acknowledgement of the necessity to readjust and revisit more 
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fundamental ways in which we conceive of political phenomena, and what the puzzle 
within that phenomenon is. 
Kuhn warned that “in the absence of a paradigm (…) all of the facts that could 
possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally 
relevant” (ibid., p.15). This is the current state a majority of interdisciplinary theorizing 
on the political brain has found itself to be in – by neither fully committing to previous 
paradigms about human cognition nor to a new paradigm of the political brain, all brain 
facts seem equally relevant. 
For example, this becomes evident in the field of the study of emotions and politics: 
on the question of emotions’ influence on rational decision-making, if the political 
question that we bring to the data is not consciously and specifically formulated to 
operate within an interdisciplinary framework, then any kind of genetic or 
neurobiological data on emotions can appear as equally significant. The point here is not 
to simply replace our old assumptions about the role of emotions with the new brain data, 
but to reformulate our most fundamental political questions by taking into account the 
brain data and the complexity of the political problem in equal measure. 
In this vein, the PBP tries to formulate a distinct language for theorizing about 
politics, primarily by looking at how the language of brain data (and the language used by 
neuroscientists to explain this data) maps onto the existing language within political 
theory. The aim is not to just replace one language with the other but to formulate 
concepts and a mode of debating about these concepts that is located exactly at the 
interdisciplinary nexus of neuropolitics. I argue that this is in the interest of cognitive 
scientists because many normative questions that arise from the brain data cannot be 
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answered through the linguistic and conceptual tools of social cognitive neuroscience 
itself; meanwhile, this is also in the interest of political theory, since even if political 
theory wanted to acknowledge the existence of brain mechanisms in politics, many 
insights into these cognitive mechanisms would not be empirically and linguistically 
available to it without the inclusion of PBP. In other words, both disciplines need each 
other in creating a currently absent space where the brain data is digested, critically 
reflected upon, and transformed into a theory and language that can be applied to debates 
within political theory and political science more widely. 
 
1.4. Vulnerable Brains: Why Dehumanization Matters for Hyperdiverse Societies 
The neuropolitical question that this dissertation explores is ‘What are the minimal 
cognitive conditions for living together in a hyperdiverse body politic?’ In particular, the 
focus of this dissertation is to develop a PBP based on the recent psychological and 
neurobiological evidence on dehumanized perception of out-groups (Abelson, Kinders, 
Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Leyens et al., 2001; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2005; Haslam, 
2006; Harris & Fiske, 2006, 2007; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
& Jackson, 2008; Vaes & Paladino, 2010; Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014; Waytz, Hoffman, 
& Trawalter, 2013; Kteily, Waytz, Bruneau, & Cotterill, 2015), and to discuss what 
effects this kind of dehumanization has on politics at the domestic and international level. 
The picture that is emerging on dehumanization and its relation to social cognition is 
that dehumanizing other humans is an everyday, often subtle phenomenon (Leyens et al., 
2001) that we all engage in as part of how we function socially (Cameron, Harris, & 
Payne, 2016). Although dehumanization has been studied within social psychology at the 
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behavioral for over a couple of decades, exploring the neural underpinnings of 
dehumanization is a relatively novel endeavor. What is significant here is that human 
beings can switch extremely quickly and often effortlessly between humanizing an in-
group member or even anthropomorphizing non-human objects around them, and 
dehumanizing members from other social, cultural and political groups (Harris & Fiske, 
2009). In Invisible Mind: Flexible Social Cognition and Dehumanization (2017), Lasana 
T. Harris treats the automatic and spontaneous ability of human beings to deny 
humanness to others as part of what he calls our ‘flexible social cognition’ system. 
‘Social cognition’ is understood here as our ability to imagine and infer the mental states 
(mental state inference) of other individuals, thus one fundamental, neural aspect of 
dehumanization is the inability to infer someone’s else’s mental state. I will discuss in the 
subsequent chapters how this ability to infer someone else’s mind is part of a wider, more 
established field that studies mentalizing and ‘Theory of Mind’ (Frith & Frith, 2005), and 
is further understood to be the building foundation for more complex emotions such as 
empathy and compassion (Singer & Klimecki, 2014).  
Socially and politically – based on the insight into these neurocognitive mechanisms 
– dehumanization can be viewed as facilitating disastrous events such as intergroup 
aggression, torture and mass atrocities (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Harris & Fiske, 
2011), or have more subtle political effects, such as in the form of neglect of vulnerable 
out-groups ([SCM behavioral study]), rejection of refugees (Dalsklev & Kunst, 2014), 
support for stronger retributive punishment in the legal context (Capestany & Harris, 
2014) and hostility towards social welfare programs (Huddy, Feldman, & Lowns 2014).  
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 As a result, I treat the evidence on dehumanization as a highly significant kind of 
out-group categorization and exclusion, and therefore as a pivotal game changer for 
political theory. I argue that the recent psychological and neuroscience data on 
dehumanization is highly relevant for theorizing about politics in hyperdiverse societies, 
to the point that any minimal theory of social cooperation needs to be aware of it. Unlike 
other, more novel social neuroscience topics that are almost completely dependent on the 
recent availability of brain scanning and mapping methods, such as the ‘mirror neuron 
theory’ (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Ramachandran, 2011) or the 
concept of ‘neuroplasticity’ (Maguire et al., 2000; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009), 
dehumanization has been a long-standing topic within social and political psychology for 
several decades (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Bar-Tal, 1989; Staub, 1989; 
Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). Although the theory of 
dehumanization is not devoid of its own methodological and normative controversies, 
one benefit of employing this theory as the basis for a minimal neuropolitical theory is 
that it is still far less controversial and possibly more tenable than other, more novel, 
brain-based theories of social cognition.  
This being said, what can a neuropolitical theory of dehumanization offer to the 
existing political discourse on prejudice, exclusion and racism, for example? Why do we 
need to establish a brain-based foundation for making sense of socio-political phenomena 
such as racial exclusion? One reason for this is that a neuropolitical theory of exclusion 
can add the dimension of a tangible, physical and neurobiological reality to the 
phenomenon of identity exclusion. Why does this matter? 
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W.E.B. DuBois, the great American sociologist and philosopher of race, insisted at 
the turn of the 20th century (and at the height of the New Imperialism) in his The 
Conservation of Races (1897) that race had no scientific foundation, yet he also believed 
that the experience of race and racism was nonetheless very real. Du Bois rejects the 
practice of delineating race difference along “color, hair, cranial measurements and 
language”, pointing out how all of these features have been intermingled amongst social 
groups across human history. Yet Du Bois is not willing to give up the concept of race, 
chiefly for political reasons. For DuBois, the yet unaccomplished attainment of equality 
for oppressed Black people living in the U.S. is a clear indication that the division of 
political power and social resources along racial lines is still alive and very real. It is for 
this reason that “Negro people [have to] (…) maintain their racial identity until [these 
questions of policy and right] (…) and the ideal of human brotherhood has become a 
practical possibility”. 
Coming from a different point of analysis but indirectly making a similar point, Jean-
Paul Sartre, in his piece Anti-Semite and Jew (1948) describes (or caricatures) the liberal 
“democrat” of his time for whom no racial categories exist but only the universal idea of 
mankind. Sartre rejects the “democrat’s” denial of racial and social group difference for 
similar reasons to Du Bois because he contends that in order for Jewish people to be truly 
liberated, a “Jewish consciousness” and group identity is a necessary first step to achieve 
this; the “democrat’s” viewpoint simply de-politicizes and denies the very real existence 
of exclusion based on group identity and difference. Similarly, Hannah Arendt, in an 
interview from 1964 in which she reflects on her escape from Nazi Germany and political 
activism on behalf of Jews during the WWII, says “If one is attacked as a Jew, one must 
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defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man, or 
whatever.” (Gaus, 28 Oct 1964).  
Du Bois, Sartre and Arendt are all trying to make a similar point within the discourse 
on exclusion and identity: none of them supports the oppression of one identity group in 
society by another, yet all of them stress the need to acknowledge the very real 
occurrence of the denial of humanness of one group by another, as well as the visceral 
experience of racial exclusion experienced by both the excluder and the excluded. Stating 
this aspect of social reality might be painful, which is perhaps why Sartre’s “democrat” 
tries to deny it, but necessary in order for systemic and genuine political change to take 
place. 
A neuropolitical theory of exclusion can strengthen this particular point Du Bois, 
Sartre and Arendt are trying to make: by helping to establish the ‘realness’ of social 
exclusion and dehumanization through locating exclusion at both the neurological level 
of the excluder and the experience of the excluded. A neuropolitical theory of exclusion, 
in other words, can add a biologically grounded aspect of reality to the multifaceted 
phenomenon of identity exclusion, without aiming to reduce or deny the interpretative, 
phenomenological and subjective complexity or structural inequity of the phenomenon 
itself. This kind of theory in form of the PBP can help buttress claims that racism, 
sexism, colonialism, dehumanization and other forms of oppressive exclusion are in fact 
very real – from the viewpoint of our brains and how our universally shared excluding 
brains affect social cognition, emotions and behavior. The PBP can become an 
empowering tool for excluded groups to establish the neurobiological manifestation of 
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exclusion and prejudice as a tangible reality, and from this vantage point, to make a more 
materialist and empowered argument about recognition and equality.  
By locating a significant explanatory basis of exclusion in our brains – in the case of 
dehumanized perception, in the brain of the excluder – we might also be able to 
destigmatize, on a biological level, the human tendency for bias and flexible 
dehumanization of others. This does not mean that we have to accept this biological fact 
without any boundaries and conditions in the political realm (i.e. many behavioral or 
attitudinal manifestations of dehumanization should be rejected politically), or that we 
fatalistically surrender to our neurobiological preconditions of bias and exclusion. On the 
contrary, only by going through the painful realization that the vulnerable, dehumanizing 
brain is a fundamental part of all social humans and that none of us is morally or 
biologically superior in terms of our cognitive preconditions, can we actually begin to 
effectively tackle political and social instances of exclusion and the destabilizing effects 
everyday dehumanization can have on a political polity9. 
Related to this, Frantz Fanon in White Skin, Black Masks (1967) argues that 
colonialism’s influence on the colonized person’s sense of self and her internalized sense 
of inferiority should not chiefly be pinned down to the colonized person’s individual 
neurosis – as a classic psychoanalytic analysis in the line of Freud, Jung, Adler and Lacan 
would attempt – but to the general social condition and the colonizer. The PBP thus 
allows an externalization of the experience of political and social exclusion, by making 
sense of the cognitive mechanisms and abilities of the excluder’s brain, yet treats these 
                                                 
9 Social Psychological Answers to Real-Word Questions “do-tank” (SPARQ) at Stanford 
University (https://sparq.stanford.edu/).  
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excluding and dehumanizing capacities as an integral part of who we are as political 
beings. 
The uncomfortable fact is that out-group exclusion is not just perpetrated by the 
selective few but that dehumanized perception is integral to how we navigate ourselves 
socially and politically. Svetlana Aleksievich, in her oral history book Secondhand Time: 
The Last of the Soviets (2016), in which she tries to capture the complex history of the 
Soviet Union’s rise and endurance through the stories of historical witnesses and 
participants, particularly by drawing out the conflicted ambiguities of human behavior in 
the face of revolutionary fervor, totalitarian submission and interpersonal relationships. 
She cites Fyodor Stepun, himself a survivor and witness of totalitarianism, who warns 
that the causes for evil in the world are often not just a few, misguided perpetrators but 
potentially also those who contend that their political actions are morally infallible and 
superior due to the noble nature of their beliefs – again, Sartre’s “democrat” who believes 
to have transcended the phenomenon of racial exclusion through his abstract commitment 
to universal values comes to mind. 
Here it becomes important to point out that dehumanized perception can also be 
necessary or even beneficial in certain social settings, such as in the medical sector when 
surgeons are able to dehumanize the patients they are operating on, in order to carry out 
their tasks most efficiently and with complete focus on the operating procedures, without 
the involvement of their personal emotions of empathy (Haque & Watyz, 2012; for a 
comprehensive review on this see Leyens, 2014). This goes again to show that the mere 
brain data on our flexible, dehumanizing minds is insufficient in its ability to offer direct 
political answers and frameworks for our most pressing questions concerning the 
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recognition, cooperation and solidarity between different groups in hyperdiverse 
societies. Our vulnerable, dehumanizing minds are neither morally or politically ‘evil’ or 
‘bad’ per se, but they have the potential to disturb and destabilize various political 
projects and social relationships. The task of this dissertation is to identify which these 
are, how exactly the brain data would apply in the form of the PBP, and how our 
awareness and concrete measures can aid to overcome some manifestations of 
dehumanization that are politically unacceptable. 
 
1.5. Chapter Overview 
 
 Chapter 2 offers a political history of the ‘cognitive revolution’, which 
contributed to the birth of social neuroscience, and subsequently, political neuroscience. 
The chapter argues that two key historical events – WWII and the Civil Rights Movement 
– were crucial in spurring the need to redefine ‘human rationality’ in socio-political 
contexts, as well as to find alternative methods to access implicit racial bias and 
prejudice. The purpose of providing this historical backdrop is to contextualize the PBP 
in the intellectual, multidisciplinary history out of which social and political neuroscience 
grew, showing its relevance for major political theory questions asked at the same time in 
20th century history. Showing how a sophisticated and complex self-critical discourse 
developed within social cognitive science about neuroscience epistemology and 
methodology also helps to humanize cognitive scientists to those political theorists who 
fear that they are dealing with a crude reductionist and determinist opponent10. Chapter 2 
                                                 
10 See Fiske & Dupree (2014) for a study on how non-scientists often stereotype scientists as non-
trustworthy, even though they might be viewed as competent. 
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combines historical contextualization with a ‘political philosophy of science’ analysis of 
the current brain imaging techniques used in experimental neuroscience research. 
The main argument there is that the brain data cannot tell political theorists who 
we are as political beings in terms of ontology, but rather, allows us to make claims about 
what our brains do when they engage in politics in terms of their cognitive mechanisms. 
The PBP therefore favors a ‘brain mechanism’ over a ‘brain ontology’ framework; which 
is subsequently applied in Chapter 4 when redefining the concept of “human dignity” in 
human rights and multiculturalism debates. Exposing the methodological possibilities and 
limitations behind the brain sciences for explaining political phenomena, as well as 
taking a clear epistemological stance in favor of a brain mechanism-based approach are 
both necessary for the arguments in the subsequent chapters and the wider objective of 
this dissertation to convincingly hold together and make sense to the reader. 
In Chapters 3 to 5, I apply the PBP to various political theories and real-world 
political scenarios in which an insight into the brain capabilities for humanizing other 
groups and individuals is vital. This dissertation focuses on the political relevance of 
dehumanized perception at the brain (and partially behavioral) level. Chapter 3 sets out to 
define some basic neurocognitive responsibilities public officials such as elected 
politicians, judges and law enforcement officers ought to fulfill in order to justifiably and 
effectively represent diverse constituencies in liberal democracies. One of these 
neurocognitive responsibilities is defined as mentalizing, which plays a crucial role in 
perspective taking, humanization and empathy for others. Furthermore, Chapter 3 studies 
the role of mentalizing for public representatives in two different frameworks of politics 
in the liberal democratic state, where the actual cognitive time allotted for public 
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representatives to overcome potential dehumanization of constituents plays a decisive 
role. From a more theoretical viewpoint, Chapter 3 examines how the everyday and 
flexible aspect of dehumanized perception fits into previous political theories about 
human rationality, arguing that both liberal and Marxist thought have overlooked 
dehumanized perception as a fundamental way of how our social brains try to navigate 
themselves in the political world. This in turn has implications for theories about the 
politics of recognition, multiculturalism, and social contract theories. 
Chapter 3 is intentionally broad in its scope, trying to show the relevance of 
dehumanization through the PBP for a multitude of political issues within various liberal 
democratic theories about cooperation, recognition and solidarity in divided and 
hyperdiverse societies, as well as for those public representatives who operate in these 
societies. 
Chapter 4, in contrast, dissects one topic in particular, namely that of the idea of 
‘human dignity’ in liberal universalist human rights theories and within current 
multiculturalism debates. Chapter 4 returns to the brain ontology vs. mechanisms debate 
that Chapter 2 touched upon, working through it in greater detail and with a clear focus 
on the ‘dignity’ concept. In a nutshell, Chapter 4 argues that ‘human dignity’ should not 
be construed as an ontological essence but as an interpersonal, neurocognitive ascriptive 
process where dignity can be ascribed flexibly in terms of (de)humanized perception of 
the other. Furthermore, by bringing in evidence from cultural neuroscience, the chapter 
argues that the effortless switching between different cultural identities within bicultural 
individuals shows that the current monocultural, predominantly Western individualist 
idea of ‘dignity’ needs to be updated for culturally hyperdiverse societies.  
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Finally, Chapter 5 applies the dehumanization argument to IR theories of 
civilizationary progress and clashes in world politics. This chapter looks at the political 
effects on intergroup conflict when a group feels dehumanized by another, arguing that 
current “civilizationary clash” theories that pit “civilized” nations against “barbaric” ones 
fuel the dehumanization of so-called barbaric groups and potentially encourage 
retaliatory and violent reciprocal dehumanization by those very groups. The chapter 
illustrates its point by examining various case studies, such as the use of the barbaric 
concept in Antiquity, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Bosnian genocide, and the 
civilizationary rhetoric used by present-day right-wing parties in Western Europe. 
 Chapter 6 offers brief conclusionary remarks about the epistemological, empirical 
and normative insights gained in having applied the dehumanization argument through 
the PBP in this dissertation. It concludes by reflecting about what an understanding of the 
social human brain in terms of its flexible and innate ability to humanize others can offer 
us when devising political theories about cooperation in hyperdiverse societies, with a 




















2.1. Adding Brain-Based Methods: What is There to Gain (and Lose)? 
 
 This chapter outlines how social neuroscience methods and techniques matter for 
long-standing questions in political science, as well as for the more specific aim of this 
dissertation: building a minimal neuropolitical theory for cooperation in hyperdiverse 
societies. However, brain imaging methods and techniques did not suddenly appear out of 
a vacuum space; they were created and contested through contentious and contingent 
historical trajectories across different disciplines, and continue to be debated and refined 
within the current fields of social and political neuroscience. 
Rather than making a tight causal argument, the purpose of this chapter is to offer 
a discursive account of the political history of the ‘cognitive revolution’ and how it 
impacted epistemological and methodological outlooks in multiple fields. This chapter 
aims to draw attention to the complex social and political driving factors behind the 
development of brain imaging techniques in social neuroscience, and show how 
intimately they are connected to similar endeavors in the political theory field in the 20th 
century and beyond. Whereas Chapter 1 presented an analytic defense of the PBP, the 
point of this chapter is to defend the PBP through contextualizing it in the intellectual 
history of both cognitive science and political theory – both kinds of approaches are 
necessary for a comprehensive theory building of the PBP. 
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Most important, this chapter engages in a detailed discussion about 
methodological opportunities and pitfalls inherent in fMRI and other kinds of brain 
imaging techniques, particularly when it comes to application to political problems. The 
level of detail and seriousness dedicated to the technical aspects of brain imaging 
methodology in this chapter is necessary in order for the application of the PBP to more 
concrete political problems in the subsequent Chapters 3 to 5 to make sense.  
At least since the middle of the 20th century, political science has borrowed 
methods and concepts from psychology to explain various political phenomena, ranging 
from the analysis of authoritarianism and political personalities, political ideology, voting 
choices and media influence on the electorate, to revolutions and rebellions, interpersonal 
conflict and violence, and ethnic and cultural identity politics (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Tetlock, 1983; Simon, 1985; Long, 1981; Lau & 
Sears, 1986;  Elster, 1993; Green & Shapiro, 1994; Winter, 2000; Deutsch & Kinnvall, 
2002; Jost & Sidanius, 2004; Huddy, Sears, & Levy, 2013). John Jost and Jim Sidanius 
posit that political psychology has become a “dynamic subfield that addresses the ways in 
which political institutions both affect and are affected by human behavior [original 
emphasis]” (Jost & Sidanius, 2004, p.1). This is echoed by another recent definition, 
which states that 
“At its core, political psychology concerns the behavior of individuals within a 
specific political system. Psychology alone cannot explain the Holocaust, intractable 
conflicts, war, or most other behavior of states or collective political actors in 
complex environments. Individuals do not act within a vacuum. Their behavior 
varies with, and responds to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, 
leadership styles and social norms.”  
(Huddy, Sears, & Levy, 2013, p.3) 
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Both of these definitions highlight how political psychology is primarily 
concerned with the behavioral aspect of politics, not so much the cognitive and 
neurobiological part. This could be credited to more circumstantial factors, such as the 
lack of availability of brain-based methodologies when political psychology first took off 
mid-20th century, but possibly irrespective of historical circumstance, the focus on 
‘behavior’ might be a conscious choice for a majority of political psychologists up until 
today. On various levels, this makes sense: an individual’s behavior is the most obvious 
and tangible manifestation of the inner workings of their mind, and has the most direct 
consequences for political interactions and transactions. 
However, behavior is only one component on a scale of ‘mind manifestations’, 
which can range from behavior, opinion, belief, attitude, affect, social cognitive processes 
and implicit bias, to the interplay of hormones and genetic factors, amongst many others. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain what the Political Brain Perspective (PBP) and its 
focus on social cognition at the brain level can contribute to political analysis, in addition 
to what more traditional psychological methods (such as behavioral and survey-based 
measures) offer political scientists already. I argue that the insights derived from using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography/event-related-
potentials (EEG/ERPs) and brain lesion studies can be helpful in illuminating particular 
aspects of political phenomena that might otherwise be missed or ignored. 
 This chapter examines the benefits, drawbacks and reliability of these methods 
for political science, both from an epistemological and normative perspective. In 
particular, I assess to which extent the brain-based insights into implicit bias, 
dehumanization and ‘flexible social cognition’ (Harris, 2017) can contribute to a minimal 
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neuropolitical theory of cooperation and wellbeing for hyperdiverse societies. What can 
an fMRI scan about the denial of humanness contribute to existing political theories 
about intergroup conflict, recognition, and dignity? How do EEG studies on the rapid and 
automatic nature of implicit racial biases affect the way we conceptualize the political 
salience of time (e.g. exposure and contact of police with racial minority groups, time 
framework within which different racial groups interact regularly, etc.) during conflict? 
Further, how do fMRI and EEG/ERP techniques that gauge neuronal electric activity and 
blood flow changes at the brain-level alter the way we conceptualize social cognition and 
political perception, compared to behavioral and attitudinal methods more commonly 
used by political psychologists and quantitative political scientists? In the same vein, how 
do these neuroscience techniques alter the way we conceptualize the political self and the 
hyperdiverse body politic, compared to theoretical speculations and normative theorizing 
usually carried out by political theorists? How do these different levels of analysis of the 
same empirical political phenomenon or theoretical problem compare and contrast with 
each other, and can they possibly be complementary? 
Based on the PBP, I firstly argue within this dissertation that brain data should not 
be treated as information about the ontology of the political self, meaning that 
quantitative brain data (no matter how much we accumulate now or in the future) cannot 
tell us who we are as political beings. Instead, brain data tells us what our brains do when 
engaged in certain social and political processes and in response to specific stimuli, 
revealing the neurobiological and cognitive mechanisms involved. Methodologically, this 
is reflected in how this dissertation employs brain data to compare it with assumptions 
made in existing political theories and to draw normative conclusions: the aim here is not 
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to delineate the ontology or ‘essence’ of the political self (or political mind), but to use 
the insights into social brain function to construct a plausible minimal theory of 
cooperation and wellbeing in hyperdiverse societies. 
Secondly, recognizing that there exist universally shared brain functions amongst 
humans can become a compelling basis from which to establish which cognitive 
responsibilities different political actors owe to each other, irrespective of differences in 
status and group membership. For example, do different political actors need to humanize 
each other at the brain level before they can enter the social contract, and if they do not, 
how does this affect the stability of the social contract over time? Recognizing that there 
exist universally shared brain functions amongst humans also allows us to make more 
informed distinctions between who exactly needs to be in command of their cognitive 
(de)humanization abilities the most: whereas ideally, it would be desirable if all citizens 
and public representatives would be equally able to command and control their 
(de)humanization abilities, the realities of power inequalities (both in terms of sheer force 
and political power inequalities) between public representatives such as elected 
politicians, law enforcement officers, judges, etc. and ordinary members of the political 
community such as private citizens, undocumented immigrants, migrants and refugees 
suggest that the main burden, politically speaking, of avoiding dehumanization and 
encouraging humanization of others within one’s brain lies with public representatives 
rather than the ordinary members of the political community (even though the latter have 
responsibilities as well). I expand on this discussion in Chapter 3. 
The point of this chapter is to examine how we can justify the usage of methods 
from experimental neuroscience to make political arguments, to understand where and 
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how the ‘cognitive worldview’ emerged historically, how it fits in with more traditional 
methodologies hitherto employed in political science, and finally, how the PBP – which 
this dissertation is developing conceptually – can take advantage of the benefits that 
cognitive neuroscience methods offer, whilst also trying to avoid its inherent drawbacks 
and pitfalls. This chapter will defend in particular social neuroscientists’ John Cacioppo 
and Penny Visser’s (2003) commitment to a “multilevel integrative analysis”, which aims 
to acknowledge the various levels of analysis – of which the neural level is only one of 
many – that contribute to a complete understanding of social cognition. “Multilevel 
integrative analysis” is a particularly helpful framework for addressing (and potentially 
overcoming) methodological controversies inherent in neuroscience research, such as 
reductionism and determinism, and for uniting a variety of cross-disciplinary 
explanations of social cognition under a wider research objective.   
 
2.2. Back to the Beginnings: From the ‘Cognitive Revolution’ to Social Brains 
George A. Miller, one of the founders of the ‘cognitive revolution’ that led to the 
emergence of what we today consider the field of cognitive neuroscience, dates its 
conception back to the specific date of September 11, 1956, where a symposium held at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by the ‘Special Interest Group in Information 
Theory’ brought together experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics and the 
computer simulation of cognitive processes (Miller, 2003, p.143). During that 
symposium, Miller recounts, the usual boundaries between these disciplines were set 
aside to make space for a novel vision of the human being: one in which invisible mental 
processes and the internal life of the mind were considered the foundation of our actions 
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and behavior, and which moreover were assumed to be grounded in a biological and 
measurable reality. This was a radical departure from behaviorism – the dominant theory 
at the time that rose to popularity since the 1920s – that had hitherto firmly denied the 
significance of mental processes, unless they were manifested in observable behavior 
(Watson 1913; Skinner 1953, 1974; Graham 1984; for a review see Johnson and 
Erneling, 1997). For behaviorists, the ‘black box’ of the human mind was irrelevant if it 
was not directly linked to behavior, in the sense that any ‘internal’ psychological 
hypothesis had to correspond to ‘external’ behavioral data in order to be considered 
valid11. In this sense, behaviorism’s impact on the psychological sciences of its time was 
that it defined it as a science of behavior, not as a science of the mind, and that therefore, 
it was ultimately assumed that human behavior could be described and explained without 
final references to internal mental states (Graham 2015; Zuriff 1985). Regarding theories 
of the socio-political world this meant that social behavior had to be explained based on 
the behavior itself, and not by tracing the actual cause of behavior back to individual 
perceptions or beliefs. In the words of behaviorism’s most famous proponent, B.F. 
Skinner, “the objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not 
relevant in a functional analysis” (Skinner, 1953, p.35). 
The ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1950s therefore positioned itself in direct 
opposition to behaviorism’s dismissal of the mind’s relevance in understanding social 
behavior, even though explaining complex social or even political behavior was not yet 
on the radar of the revolution’s pioneers. Rather, as linguist Noam Chomsky, a prominent 
anti-behaviorist at the time remarked laconically, defining psychology as the science of 
                                                 
11 For a more nuanced discussion of different schools within behaviorism see Graham (2015).  
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behavior was like defining physics as the science of meter reading (Chomsky & 
Rajchman, 2006). There had to be more to the internal processes of our minds than the 
speculative mystery surrounding it, yet in order to buttress such a claim, the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ needed to assume that representational and computational capacities of the 
human mind existed, and that furthermore, these were structurally and functionally 
realized in the human brain, and come up with concrete evidence to prove it (Miller, 
2003, p.144). In other words, the brain’s ‘black box’ had to be assumed to have an 
underlying, discernible and measurable structure and pattern that could be cracked; the 
human mind and its intricate workings had to be placed at the center of the inquiry into 
human behavior in a social world. 
In the U.S., the involvement of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 1976 was a turning 
point for what came to be known as ‘cognitive science’, as well as for its arguably most 
prominent subfield, neuroscience. According to some of the main actors on the cognitive 
front at the time, at least six disciplines were involved in establishing ‘cognitive science’: 
psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, anthropology, computer science, and philosophy. 
(Keyser, Miller, & Walker, 1978). These disciplines in turn cross-pollinated each other, 
resulting in eclectic interdisciplinary subfields such as cybernetics, psycholinguistics, 
computational linguistics, and evolutionary anthropology, amongst many others. Indeed, 
the Sloan Foundation’s main goal was to unify differing disciplines towards the shared 
goal of bridging the gap between the mind and the brain. Even though the Sloan 
Foundation initiative did not carry on beyond the 1980s, its impact was lasting and 
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started an ongoing, multidisciplinary effort into deciphering and explaining mental 
processes12. 
In the case of cognitive neuroscience, this effort was premised on uncovering the 
neural basis of perception, affect, language understanding, decision-making and memory 
(McClelland and Ralph, 2015; Bennett and Hacker, 2013). The discipline had its major 
breakthrough in the 1990s with the increasing availability of electroencephalography 
(EEG), facial electromyography (fEMG), positron emission topography (PET) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methods, which for the first time allowed 
social psychologists to access the neural mechanisms underlying mental processes. 
It is important to note that in the U.S. research context, access to these hitherto 
‘hidden’ neural mechanisms coincided with the Civil Rights Movement and its aftermath, 
in the course of which social norms prohibiting the overt and explicit expression of racial 
prejudice began to emerge (Harmon-Jones and Winkielman, 2007, p.4). Social 
psychologists therefore became increasingly interested in using novel methods to detect 
implicit and unconscious biases, since explicit self-reporting methods were potentially 
hiding and obscuring people’s social prejudices. The initial research, using physiological 
measures such as sweat gland activity and skin-to-skin contact, focused on Black-White 
racial relationships, as well as the faster automatic nature through which Black people 
were perceived and judged negatively (Cooper and Siegel, 1956; Rankin and Campbell, 
1955; Vidulich and Krevanik, 1966); more recent research used fMRI methods to observe 
                                                 
12 See Vauclair and Perret (2003) for an alternative historical account of the ‘cognitive revolution’ from a 
European perspective. The authors contest Miller’s (2003) exclusively U.S.-based account and point out 
Europe’s contribution in pushing for a developmental perspective of the human mind and brain, based on 
the work and efforts of psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky.  
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White participants’ distinct brain activity when perceiving Blacks (Hart et al. 2000; 
Phelps et al. 2000; Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, and Devine, 2006). 
In contrast, within Europe, what came closest to the Civil Rights Movement in terms 
of socio-political saliency was the stupendous success of European fascism and the 
Holocaust. Social theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno, a Jewish-German émigré who 
returned to post-War Germany to establish the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, 
used innovative psychological methods to determine what kind of personality type would 
facilitate the rise of fascism, eventually coining the concept of the “authoritarian 
personality” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950). Adorno wanted 
to understand why a large swath of Germany’s population completely submitted and 
subserviently devoted itself towards a single dictator and his party, and moreover, how 
the population could turn into helpful accomplices in executing the chilling plan of 
exterminating its fellow Jewish citizens. However, Adorno’s return to Europe after WWII 
was unusual, and indeed a considerable part of his research was developed during his 
exiled time in California with U.S. psychologists such as Nevitt Sanford (Altemeyer, 
2004, p. 85). Subsequent research expanded the inquiry into the “authoritarian 
personality” by looking at right-wing authoritarian personalities and the role of 
domineering personality traits in politics (Altemeyer, 1981; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1976; 
Christie and Geis, 1970), as well as submissiveness and obedience to authority (Milgram, 
1974; Blass, 1999; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). 
Overall, the majority of the pioneering research inspired by the genocidal and fascist 
events in Europe took place largely in the U.S., with some few exceptions such as Henri 
Tajfel’s contributions to experimental social psychology in the U.K. (Tajfel, however, 
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was a Jewish refugee from Poland). Amongst U.S. social psychologist who studied the 
interpersonal and cognitive dynamics behind mass atrocities, there were a considerable 
number of Holocaust second-generation or child survivors, such as Herbert C. Kelman 
(1989) at Harvard, Ervin Staub (1989) at Stanford, and Peter Suedfeld at Illinois 
University (before moving to the University of British Columbia), whose research 
questions were driven by the quest to uncover the mental dispositions and mechanisms 
behind the socio-political catastrophes they themselves and their families had survived. 
The point I wish to make here is this: when we trace the historical path from the 
‘cognitive revolution’ to the birth of social neuroscience, we need to be aware that even 
though the ‘cognitive revolution’ provided breakthrough methodologies such as fMRI in 
accessing internal mental processes and, most importantly, ushered forward a paradigm 
shift following behaviorism’s grip on the social and psychological sciences, it is 
impossible to truly understand the birth of social neuroscience in the U.S. context without 
taking into account the two major historical events that drove the initial moral and 
political concerns behind the social brain research, namely the Civil Rights Movement 
and – more indirectly through the experience of Jewish European refugees – fascism and 
the Holocaust. In this worth noting here that in this sense, social neuroscience shares a 
pivotal historical backdrop with 20th century Western political theory and its post-War 
(Adorno 2005 [1951]; Arendt 1951; Strauss 1953; Habermas 1981, 1992; Rawls, 1971) 
and post-Civil Rights Movement authors (Appiah, 1996; Koppelman, 1996; Kymlicka, 
1995; MacKinnon, 1987; Marshall, 1965; Nussbaum, 2002b; Shelby, 2005; Taylor, 1994; 
Waldron, 2000; Wu, 2002). This suggests that an interdisciplinary rapprochement 
between social neuroscience on the one hand, and ongoing debates initiated in 20th 
 43 
century political theory on identity, diversity and rights on the other, is a potentially 
fruitful endeavor. 
The beginnings of social neuroscience were not aimed at reductionism of the social 
world but marked by an acute awareness of the significance of watershed events, and 
what they revealed about interpersonal dynamics, group identity and racial norms. It is 
important to keep this in mind when we apply social neuroscience results to questions 
within political theory. Although political theorists are justified to proceed with a healthy 
dose of skepticism and caution towards the brain sciences, social neuroscience as such – 
both in its initial beginnings and in its current research questions – is not a purely 
reductionist or determinist enterprise that tries to diminish the complexity of the social 
world around us. Social neuroscience emerged not simply because of the availability of 
new innovative methodology, but as a reaction to and absorption of the moral, normative 
and psychological questions raised by salient socio-political events. 
As much as the ‘cognitive revolution’ had paved the path for social neuroscience, the 
stress on ‘social’ by the latter discipline was also a clear move away from the cognitive 
revolution’s idea of the human brain as a solitary computer. Critics of the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ prior to and during the 1990s had pointed out that the locating of all meaning-
and decision-making, as well as understanding and language acquisition within the 
individual was problematic, and that we needed instead to approach these mental 
processes as social achievements (Erneling, 1997, p.275). 
For example, psychologist Jerome Bruner, in his book Acts of Meaning (1990), 
criticized the ‘cognitive revolution’ for overlooking the role of culture in meaning 
making, and further pointed to its inability to explain variation in meaning making in 
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different societies. Social neuroscience therefore tried to overcome the ‘social’ blind spot 
within the initial ‘cognitive revolution’ through an expanded idea of the individual. One 
of the founders of social neuroscience, John T. Cacioppo, in his preface to the reader 
Social Neuroscience: People Thinking About People (2006), puts it poignantly like this: 
“The dominant metaphor for the scientific study of the human mind during the latter 
half of the twentieth century was the computer, a solitary device with massive 
information-processing capacities. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, this 
metaphor seems dated. (…) Just as computers have capacities and processes that are 
transduced through but extend far beyond the hardware of a single computer, the 
human brain has come to be recognized as having evolved to promote social and 
cultural capacities and processes that are transduced through, but that extend far 
beyond, a solitary brain.”  
(Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett, 2006, p.xi).  
 
However, even though social neuroscience consciously adopts a non-reductionist 
awareness of the social complexities underlying individual mental processes and 
decision-making, the discipline is also defined by a clear commitment to a non-dualist 
worldview – something that might not sit comfortably with political theorists and 
philosophers of mind who believe in a dualistic notion of the mind/brain (Descartes, 
1641/1996; Berkley, 1710/1998; Hume, 1739/2000; Penelhum, 1970; Foster, 1991; 
Penrose, 1990; Chalmers, 1996; Swinburne, 1997, 2014). In other words, social 
neuroscience unapologetically contends that all mental processes are part of our physical 
and biological world, whereas dualists believes that mental processes and biological 
processes can belong to different realities, or consist of different ‘substances’ (as in 
‘substance dualism’ as first defined by Descartes). Social neuroscience instead tries to 
expose the neurobiological underpinnings of social information processing, perception 
and decision-making, always assuming that this neurobiological reality exists and is to a 
large extent measurable. 
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That being said, social neuroscientists would concede that the uncovering of this 
neurobiological reality often does not offer a complete or absolute explanation as to why 
and how social phenomena occur. In this light, consider the following: 
“Social neuroscience is an integrative field that examines how nervous (central and 
peripheral), endocrine, and immune systems are involved in sociocultural processes. 
Social neuroscience is nondualist in its view of humans, yet it is also 
nonreductionistic and emphasizes the importance of understanding how the brain 
and body influence social processes, as well as how social processes influence the 
brain and body. [It is a] comprehensive attempt to understand mechanisms that 
underlie social behavior by combining biological and social approaches.”  
(Harmon-Jones and Winkielman, 2007, p.X) 
 
The concept of the social brain is therefore as much an outgrowth of the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ as it is a repudiation of the ultraindividualist and computer-metaphor-driven 
beginnings of this very revolution. The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology (Colman, 2006) 
mentions a 2001 conference held at the University of California, Los Angeles, as a 
founding moment for social neuroscience, where this new field moved away from a 
hitherto health-and-animal focused research agenda that had primarily analyzed how the 
social world affected the peripheral nervous system and other bodily systems (Cacioppo, 
1994; Berntson, Sarter, and Cacioppo, 1989; Insel and Winslow, 1998; Panksepp, 1998). 
Instead, the new field of “social cognitive neuroscience” (Lieberman, 2000; Ochsner & 
Schacter, 2000) steered towards a more socially informed research agenda that began to 
tackle topics such as intergroup dynamics and interactions, social perception and 
inference, mirroring, empathy, racism, sexism, stereotyping, social rejection and self-
processes, amongst others (for reviews see Amodio & Frith, 2006; Blakemore, Winston, 
& Frith, 2004; Harris, Fiske, & Todorov, 2006; Lieberman, 2010; Ochsner, 2007). If “the 
brain’s default focus is social”, then 
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“who we are as humans has a lot to do with what happens between our ears. What 
happens between our ears has a lot to do with the social world we traverse, engage, 
and react to. The former has been the province of neuroscience and the latter the 
province of social psychology for nearly a century. Recently, scientists have begun 
to study the social mind by literally looking between the ears using the tools of 
neuroscience. Social cognitive neuroscience uses the tools of neuroscience to study 
the mental mechanisms that create, frame, regulate, and respond to our experience of 
the social world. On its worst days, social cognitive neuroscience is phrenological, 
cataloguing countless brain regions involved in the vast array of social processes. On 
its best days, social cognitive neuroscience enhances our understanding of the social 
mind as well as any other method.”  
(Lieberman, 2010, p.143) 
 
On the methodological challenge of whether social neuroscience methods are capable of 
illuminating a truth about the social mind that might be escaping psychologists and social 
scientists, John Cacioppo and his colleagues further add to Lieberman’s above claims that 
“theory and methods on social neuroscience can draw upon evidence from the 
neurosciences to constrain and inspire social psychological hypotheses, foster 
experimental tests of otherwise indistinguishable theoretical explanations, and 
increase the comprehensiveness and relevance of social psychological theories”  
(Cacioppo, Lorig, Nusbaum, & Berntson, 2008, p.399) 
 
What transpires in the above assessments by social neuroscientists of their own 
field is that implicit, automatic social cognitive processes that were hitherto considered 
invisible, inexistent and (most importantly) unmeasurable by political psychologists and 
social scientists can actually be measured through fMRI and EEG techniques, and hence 
contribute to understanding the nature of the phenomenon itself. Lasana Harris, Susan 
Fiske and Alexander Todorov (2006) call this the dual-process perspective (Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999), in which one is aware of both deliberate and explicit social cognition 
processes as well as implicit and automatic ones – effectively understanding social 
cognition as an interplay between both deliberate and non-deliberate, implicit responses 
at the brain and behavioral level. Social neuroscience’s conceptualization of the human 
mind thus offers political scientists a more complete, dual-process-based idea of the 
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political self in relation to itself and others, in which the multiple strands of an 
individual’s cognitive, affective, nervous, endocrine and immune experiences at both the 
explicit and implicit level are acknowledged in their entirety. Methodologically, social 
neuroscience offers additional clarification on this relationship, by being able to show 
how implicit processes sometimes affirm but also often contradict what is being 
expressed at the explicit level (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Chiao et al., 2009).  
In addition, in Harris, Fiske and Todorov’s opinion (2006, p.76), social 
neuroscience in the beginning was significantly more influenced by developmental 
psychology than social psychology, in that the first attempts at studying the neural 
models of social cognition began within the field of primatology rather than social 
psychology (Brothers, 1990; Gross et al., 1972; Perrett et al., 1982), and further, that 
initial research by burgeoning social neuroscientists (Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 
1999) first drew from important insights into the development of social cognition features 
such as ‘Theory of Mind’ during childhood (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and from the 
methodological advantages of brain lesion studies – two areas that social psychology has 
not traditionally show much conceptual or methodological interest in. 
In summary, the ‘social’ turn of the ‘cognitive revolution’ offers political 
scientists and theorists a more organic (i.e. incorporating developmental social cognition 
during childhood and adolescence) and more complete (i.e. studying both explicit and 
implicit social cognition) idea of how we function as social beings. This is made possible 
through new methodological techniques available to us, which come with benefits and 
drawbacks, both of which shall be examined later in this chapter. The challenge for 
political scientists here is to judge where and how social neuroscience’s more sterile, 
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laboratory-tested concept of social cognition can help enlighten empirical and normative 
problems in the messiness of the political world.  
 
2.3. Political Neuroscience: Have We Finally Arrived? 
Political science is no stranger to biology and the life sciences. In the 1980s, 
Thomas Wiegele founded the Center for Biopolitical Research and the Association for 
Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS) at Northern Illinois University, from where two 
notable students, Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines Jr., continued the initial work 
through interdisciplinary publications (Blank and Hines, 2001; Hines, Funke, Losco, 
Stewart, & Blank, 2014). However, attempts at bridging the two disciplines remained 
largely confined to a few authors, and research initiatives in this new field were not 
widespread and significant enough to change methodologies, concepts or paradigms 
within the political science field over the last decades as a whole. 
One could argue that this lack of interest might be a reaction to the sinister 
outcome coming out of the merging of politics and biology during colonialism and 
slavery (McCarthy, 2009), as well as to global eugenics and genocidal programs during 
the 20th century (Benz, 1999; Hansen & King, 2013; Ihrig, 2016; Tatum, 2010). These 
historic events had made political scientists cautious to adopt interdisciplinary biological 
approaches that use evolutionary theories, behavioral genetics or neuroscience methods 
to explain the outcome of political behavior, especially when this entails moral and 
normative implications. John R. Hibbing and Kevin B. Smith, two political scientists who 
have been trying to advance a closer relationship between political science and the life 
sciences, attest that 
 49 
“virtually the entire research agenda in political science is isolated from the vast 
biological knowledge base that has built up over the course of the past fifty years. 
Most political scientists continue to be environmental determinists, believing that 
human behavior is entirely the product of environmental forces. From this 
perspective, political attitudes and political behavior are driven by parental 
socialization, campaign messages, conversations at work, and idiosyncratic 
experiences. Political science gives biology virtually no role in answering the 
questions it seeks to address. In the extant literature of mainstream political science, 
biological independent variables are extremely rare, and biological theory rarely is 
used to generate hypotheses and insights.”  
(Hibbing & Smith, 2007, p.6-7) 
 
Hibbing and Smith believe that one reason for the lack of interest in biology is the 
particular way in which most current political behavior is couched in “the structure and 
organization of mass-scale social life”, which “seems so uniquely human, so cerebral, 
and so rational, [that therefore] scholars of politics are prone to conclude that it somehow 
transcends biology” (ibid., p.8). It is this mass-scale aspect of modern politics that poses a 
challenge to more simplified explanatory models of social behavior within the biological 
sciences, including social neuroscience. 
It is worth noting here that Hibbing and Smith juxtapose what they consider the 
“unique humanness” and “rational” character of modern politics against the purportedly 
animalistic and irrational aspect of human biology – a commonly drawn dichotomy by 
political scientists. I claim that this is a misleading dichotomy and wrongly caricatures 
human biological behavior as one-sidedly brutish, unrefined and lacking rationality, 
whereas in fact, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters, (de)humanizing fellow human 
beings is an innate social cognitive capacity that we all share, and which has underlying 
“rational” incentives in the evolutionary context of cooperating and competing in small 
groups (Pagel, 2012). If political science wants to embrace the ‘biological turn’, it might 
have to critically revisit previous assumptions about what constitutes human rationality 
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and rational political behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and how they relate to 
modern mass politics.  
In Hibbing and Smith’s opinion, the most persuasive way to convince political 
scientists to adopt biological concepts and methodologies is to produce “original 
empirical research”. However, as we shall see in the methodological discussion to follow, 
the solution is not that straightforward. As I argue in Chapter 1, the brain data itself is not 
self-evident in terms of its implications for empirical political research and theory-
building. Although producing original interdisciplinary empirical data is doubtless the 
most fundamental, indispensable basis for building a new subfield such as political 
neuroscience, mere production of raw data does not guarantee the interest or acceptance 
by more mainstream disciplines within social science. In fact, if a brain-based method 
such as fMRI is presented as the ultimate and superior way to access human cognition 
and behavior, then as a result, social scientists using different methods might reject the 
newcomer altogether, not least out of a sense of threat to their own methodological 
commitments and research identities (Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012, p. 28). In order to 
overcome “reflexively dismissive” reactions by political scientists towards neuroscience, 
there needs to be an “interaction of the two levels” (i.e. political psychology and 
neuroscience) and not claims of superiority of neuroscience above the rest (ibid.). This is 
echoed by calls to use neuroscientific contributions to “build on rather than substitute for 
the extant theory and methods in political psychology” (Cacioppo & Visser, 2003, p.655). 
Aside from cross-disciplinary defensive reactions amongst researchers 
themselves, there are other, intellectually serious reservations voiced by political 
scientists worth considering (Tingley, 2006; Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012), next to more 
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enthusiastic voices that support the emergence of ‘political neuroscience’ as a new field 
(Fowler & Schreiber, 2008; Jost, Nam, Amodio, & Van Bavel, 2014; Lieberman, 
Schreiber, & Ochsner, 2003; McDermott, 2004; 2009). I shall now turn briefly towards 
the position of the latter camp, before moving on to the problematic methodological 
issues surrounding the interdisciplinary merging between social neuroscience and 
political science. 
In a recent review of political neuroscience as a subfield, John T. Jost and his 
colleagues (2014) at NYU describe the state of the field as the “beginning of a beautiful 
friendship” – a departure from John Cacioppo and Penny Visser’s (2003) less optimistic 
diagnosis of the relationship between political psychology and social neuroscience as not 
being quite yet “comrades in arms”. A decade after this diagnosis, Jost et al. express 
excitement at being able to use neuroscientific methods to access the neuronal basis for 
political partisanship, ideological affiliation, decision-making and voting behavior 
(Knutson, Wood, Spampinato, & Grafman, 2006; Marcus, 2000; Westen, Blagov, 
Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann, 2006; Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Zamboni et al. 
2009; Roy, 2016). In addition, political neuroscience draws heavily on social 
neuroscience studies on interpersonal perception, prejudice, racial bias, and exclusion 
(for reviews see Cunningham & Van Bavel, 2009; Derks, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2013; 
Kubota, Banaji, & Phelps, 2012).  
Methodologically, Jost et al. believe that neuroscientific methods can offer greater 
objectivity by avoiding social desirability and self-representational biases that frequently 
occur with self-report and survey-based methods, both of which are commonly used in 
political psychology and political science research. Apart from being able to access 
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politically and interpersonally relevant neuronal mechanisms through fMRI and other 
neuroscience methods in the context of specific tasks or situations, Jost et al. discuss the 
wider project of political “brain mapping”, which consists of detecting correlations 
between region-specific brain activation and particular political behaviors or attitudes. 
For example, the amygdala and insula are implicated in racial perception 
(Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Hart et al., 2000; Kaplan et al., 2007; Phelps 
et al., 2000), with greater amygdala activity in Whites’ responses to Black than same-race 
faces (Krendl, Macrae, Kelley, Fugelsang, & Heatherton, 2006; Ronquillo et al., 2007; 
Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). Meanwhile, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) are active during impression-formation of others, mentalizing, 
“Theory of Mind” and self-referential processing – politically speaking, this can translate 
into heightened mPFC and TPJ activity when politicians violate voters’ expectations 
because it requires voters to mentalize the politicians’ intentions behind the violation 
(Cloutier et al., 2011). In another study, the TPJ is more active during collectivist (vs. 
individualist) concerns because of the need to consider the perspective of fellow society 
members (Zamboni et al., 2009). In a study on political candidate preferences, the 
‘ventral striatum’ brain area emerges as relevant during reward and value processing 
(Gozzi et al. 2010; Tusche et al., 2013), whereas the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is 
both implicated in partisanship (Kaplan et al., 2007; Westen et al., 2006) and greater 
sensitivity to conflicting information and tolerance of ambiguity in liberals (Amodio et 
al., 2007; Kanai et al., 2011). 
In the larger context of a political “brain mapping” project, one can imagine that 
the above studies could tempt researchers to treat specific brain regions as the ‘ideology 
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brain area’ or the ‘partisan brain region’, or even claim that we can draw a distinction 
between a “conservative brain” vs. a “liberal brain” – which is exactly what Hibbing, 
Alford and Smith (2014) proposed in their controversial paper on the conservative 
“negativity bias”. Based on the vast evidence on preconscious and implicit biases, as well 
as the psychological and physiological differences along individuals’ political orientation, 
Hibbing et al. claim that there exists a cognitive “negativity bias” amongst conservatives, 
which primes them to respond more strongly and with higher sensitivity to negative 
stimuli and events. As a consequence, conservatives will try to evade new, potentially 
threatening information (Castelli & Carraro, 2011; Shook & Fazio, 2009) and ambiguity 
(Young, 2009), focus on negative information (Dodd et al., 2012), endorse public policies 
that minimize threats, support strong political authority figures (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996), 
resist change and defend social traditionalism (Jost et al., 2003; Schwartz, Caprara, & 
Vecchione, 2010). 
The clear-cut alignment of political orientation with more deep-seated 
psychological, neuronal and physiological individual features seems alluring but also 
potentially highly problematic on many levels. Indeed, in the open peer commentary on 
Hibbing et al.’s paper, skeptical voices abound: Cacioppo, Cacioppo, & Gollan (2014) 
point out problems in how the “negativity bias” is conceptualized, namely that it 
conflates multiple potential causes that are producing the bias; Evan Charney (2014) 
believes that the authors’ definition of ‘conservatism’ lacks the distinctive political and 
economic features that usually distinguish conservatives from liberals, thus rendering 
their claims about the cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives 
meaningless; similarly, Huddy & Feldman (2014) question Hibbing et al.’s single-
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dimensional characterization of political ideology along left-right or liberal-conservative 
lines, stressing the multidimensional and diverse origins of political ideology; Olivola & 
Sussman (2014) argue that many behavioral tendencies ascribed to ‘conservatives’ are in 
fact malleable and bear no connection to negativity; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2014) 
point out that a presumed liberal person’s failure to avoid a negative stimulus is not the 
same as approaching a positive one; and finally, cultural neuroscientists 
Pornpattananangkul, Cheon, & Chiao (2014) draw attention to the heterogeneous nature 
of negativity bias across cultures and its domain-specificity, based on their own fMRI-
based research on the relationship between “social dominance orientation” and empathy 
(Chiao et al., 2009). 
What transpires in these responses by leading political psychologists and 
neuroscientists is a cautious attitude towards political “brain mapping” projects that make 
ontological claims (e.g. “this is who conservatives are at the brain-level”) and attempt to 
reduce a complex phenomenon such as an individual’s ideological commitment to a 
single bias trait. It is worth noting that a large majority of the 26 open peer comments 
applaud Hibbing et al. for their interdisciplinary hypothesizing overall, support their 
attempts at showing the “limitations of the rational view of the political mind”, and agree 
with the need to demystify and destigmatize ‘conservative’ political attitudes by 
understanding their underlying biological and cognitive motivations. 
Cracking the ‘black box’ of the political brain therefore has to be embarked on 
with methodological and conceptual caution, and any “brain mapping” project has to 
refrain from over-simplification of political phenomena for the sake of less ambiguous 
“mapping results”. Political neuroscientists also need to be transparent about the fact that 
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no single brain region is responsible for one sole task, affect or attitude, but that we need 
to focus on the neuronal networks (and hence multiple brain regions) implicated in any 
one task (Faingold & Blumenfeld, 2014). Additionally, just because we know that a 
certain brain region is usually engaged in a certain function, this does not automatically 
imply that activation of this brain region must mean the presence of a particular mental 
process (also called ‘reverse inference’) (Poldrack, 2008). 
With all these caveats in mind, I argue that the new field of political neuroscience 
still holds immense potential and excitement for political scientists and theorists alike. 
Political thinkers have been wondering since antiquity about the cognitive abilities and 
mechanisms underlying political behavior, resting their assumptions on religious and 
spiritual beliefs, speculative theories about the human nature of the political animal, and 
more recently, behavioral observation and attitudinal data collection methods. With 
neuroscientific techniques, we can start to gain an unprecedented glimpse into how the 
human brain works in specific social and political situations, even though this glimpse is 
(and might forever remain) incomplete in terms of grasping the global entirety of social 
brain functions. 
The most important issue for political scientists is that we must be clear about 
what kind of political question we are bringing to the brain data, because the latter is not 
self-evident in its political meaning and implications for implementation in the political 
world. In order not to lose epistemic, conceptual and normative sovereignty over 
interdisciplinary endeavors at the nexus of neuroscience, the life sciences and political 
science, it is crucial that political scientists and theorists are able to formulate the unique 
political question that they want to have answered through brain-based techniques such as 
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fMRI, and be aware of both the capacities and limitations of these techniques for their 
specific political objectives. 
Earlier, Cacioppo and Visser (2003) mentioned the need for a multilevel 
integrative analysis, which doubtless is a vital cornerstone for successful interdisciplinary 
empirical and theoretical work done in political neuroscience. Echoing this, political 
scientists Alexander Theodoridis and Amy Nelson contend that the 
“(…) future role of neuroscience in political psychology need not be viewed as a 
higher standard of proof looming on the horizon that will transform work done to 
date into early theoretical building blocks. Rather, we believe neuroscience has the 
potential to be integrated into political psychology primarily as a window into a 
different level of analysis”  
(Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012, p.28) 
 
In addition to this I argue that we also need to be very clear about the relationship 
between these different levels of analysis, and exactly how the neuroscientific level can 
help address the political question we bring to the table. This stands somewhat in 
contradiction to Hibbing et al.’s (2007) belief that what political neuroscience needs in 
order to be accepted by the discipline of political science as whole is simply the 
production of more experimental data. I argue instead that until we have not figured out 
how the brain data can relate in epistemic, conceptual and normative terms to the distinct 
political aspect of the question we are asking, the mere production of more brain-based 
data does not guarantee acceptance by political scientists and theorists. Developing the 
PBP for this is a first step towards clarifying the relationship between the two fields. 
Before we move on to further methodological discussion, below is a summary of the 
brain-based techniques in question. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Social Neuroscience Methods: EEG, fMRI, and Lesion Studies 
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The story of Phineas Gage is possibly the most prominent case in the history of 
neuroscience, and was decisive towards the development of present-day neuroscience 
techniques such as lesion studies and fMRI. Gage, a young U.S. railroad construction 
worker from New Hampshire, had a tamping rod violently blown through his eye and 
skull during a dynamite blast accident in 1848, which in turn severely damaged the 
orbitofrontal and ventromedial cortex sections his brain13. His doctors did not expect him 
to survive, even less to ever regain consciousness again. However, in the course of a year, 
Gage seemed to initially be able to resume his former life, returning to work and 
engaging in relationships with his friends and family. The brain damage that he suffered 
in the above specified regions however changed his behavior and personality; friends 
reported that the formerly friendly and reliable Gage had become irresponsible, antisocial 
and arrogant, even though from a motor-sensory viewpoint he was functioning as before 
the accident (Cacioppo et al., 2003; Damasio et al., 1994; Harlow, 1868; Macmillan, 
1992). Gage’s brain injury was the obvious explanation for this shift in personality, 
which subsequently allowed scientists to make causal inferences about the involvement 
of certain damaged brain regions’ in executive decision-making, impulse control and 
perspective taking. 
Gage’s case was the first compelling example in the recorded history of 
neuroscience where a specific brain region could be ascribed to cause certain behavior. 
Although this inference might seem obvious to us today, Gage’s case was a powerful 
proof against fluid-based theories of brain function and the nervous system that circulated 
                                                 
13 However, because no immediate autopsy was carried out after Phineas Gage’s death, the exact damaged 
brain regions are somewhat disputed. See Macmillan, 1986. 
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up until the mid-19th century (Finkelstein, 2014; O’Shea, 2005), as well as against 
phrenological theories espoused by Franz Joseph Gall (Macmillan, 1992). 
Methodologically, Phineas Gage paved the way for the brain lesion studies of 
today, which examine living individuals with brain damage in particular areas, and look 
at the ensuing psychological and behavioral effects. The most important advantage of 
lesion studies over fMRI is that researchers are able to draw solid causal inferences 
between specific brain regions and psychological states (Lieberman, 2010; Mazziotta, 
Toga, & Frackowiak, 2000).  
Another 19th century brain injury case that is even more directly related to brain 
imaging techniques such as fMRI, but less famous than Phineas Gage, is that of the 
Italian peasant Bertino (Raichle & Snyder, 2000). Bertino had suffered a head injury 
where parts of his frontal lobes became exposed. His doctor, Angelo Mosso (1881), 
observed a curious phenomenon: every time the church bells rang, Mosso saw an increase 
in the magnitude of pulsation over the frontal lobe, which was unrelated to Bertino’s 
heart rate or general blood flow. Mosso probed Bertino further by asking him questions 
about his emotional state and to solve mathematical problems, all of which elicited 
increased brain pulsations. The case of Bertino set the stage for hemodynamic (i.e. blood-
flow based) measurements of the brain such as fMRI (Cacioppo et al., 2003; Raichle & 
Snyder, 2000). 
Other discoveries, such as for example by Luigi Galvani and Alessandro Volta in 
the 18th century on the role of electricity in operating the nervous system – which they 
studied through experimenting with frog muscles (Piccolino, 2013) – later enabled the 
development of EEG techniques, which measures electrical activity from neurons firing 
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in the outer cortex. Both fMRI and EEG are two of the most commonly used brain-based 
measures in social neuroscience today (in addition to less frequently conducted lesion 
study experiments). 
It is beyond the purpose of this chapter to give a complete account of the history 
of the development of neuroscience methods and techniques, but the selective cases 
above illustrate the often contingent and accidental nature through which breakthroughs 
in neuroscientific discovery and methodological advancements were made. Most 
important, methodologies were developed out of and in accordance with the limitations 
and restrictions of actual human subjects. Today, even though neuroscience methods and 
insights have advanced immensely since Phineas Gage and Bertino, researchers still face 
the ‘human subject limitation’ challenges, i.e. how to justify generalizations made based 
on one’s sample subjects, how to ensure that subjects adhere to the experiment script, 
how to prevent subjects from preempting the researchers’ study motives, how to ensure 
that subjects receive a shared stimuli in the same fashion, how to pursue research 
questions without violating ethics codes and subjects’ privacy, etc. (Lieberman, 2010). 
Political scientists who are skeptical of neuroscience or psychology-based methods need 
to be aware that neuroscientists face a wide array of methodological constraints and 
humbling challenges before and during experiments, as well as afterwards, during data 
analysis and when drawing theoretical conclusions. 
So finally, what is ‘functional magnetic resonance imaging’, also known as 
fMRI? The simple answer is that fMRI measures differences in blood flow to brain 
regions during specific tasks or exposure to stimuli. Blood oxygen level-dependent 
(BOLD) fMRI is based on the idea that blood flowing to an active region is more 
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oxygenated than blood in inactive regions, and that further, oxygenated blood has 
different magnetic properties than deoxygenated blood in terms of its hydrogen 
molecules (Lieberman, 2010; for reviews see Faro & Mohamed, 2006; Heeger & Ress, 
2002; Jezzard, Matthews, and Smith, 2001). FMRI takes advantage of the intrinsic 
magnetic moment of these hydrogen molecules (which behave like small magnets when 
placed in a magnetic field) by introducing a second magnetic field that oscillates at a 
particular frequency, which in turn causes the hydrogen molecules in the examined brain 
to rotate around the direction of the larger, stable field. It is this rotation that creates a 
detectable signal, which the fMRI machine picks up spatially and reconstructs it into 
three-dimensional brain imaging pictures.  
Unlike MRI, which is primarily used in medical diagnosis in depicting the 
anatomical features of the brain, functional MRI offers brain imaging during dynamic 
processes, i.e. whilst the brain is completing certain tasks or reacting to a string of 
stimuli. The fact that fMRI is a non-invasive technique that can be conducted with 
healthy individuals is perceived as somewhat of a methodological revolution for 
researchers working in the fields of cognitive and psychological sciences: 
“In decades past, studies of the neurophysiological structures and functions 
associated with psychological events were limited primarily to animal models, 
postmortem examinations, and observations of the occasional unfortunate individual 
who suffered trauma to or disorders of the brain. Developments in 
electrophysiological recording, brain imaging, and neurochemical techniques within 
the neurosciences have increasingly made it possible to investigate the role of neural 
structures and processes in normal and disordered thought in humans. The 
importance of these technical developments was underscored by Congress’s 
declaration of the 1990s as the decade of the brain.”  
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992, p. 1020)  
 
The more complicated answer would be that fMRI measurements are in fact not a 
direct reflection of neuronal activity (even though we commonly call the results “brain 
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activity”) since fMRI measures hemodynamic rather than neural responses. However, as 
others have pointed out, hemodynamic responses are strongly reflective of synaptic (i.e. 
neuronal) activity (Roland, 1993), which has been shown through parallel test with 
additional methods such as EEG, local field potentials, multiple unity activity, and laser 
Doppler flow measurement (Cacioppo et al., 2008; Heeger & Rees, 2002). The 
complication therefore lays not so much with the indirectness of neuronal activity 
measurement but in the fMRI procedure and statistical analysis itself. 
For example, although fMRI is excellent in offering a fairly accurate spatial 
picture of where blood flow activity is located, it lags behind on temporal resolution, in 
the sense that hemodynamic response takes about 2-4 seconds to reach its peak in 
response to a stimuli or task, and then another 6-12 seconds to decline, therefore being 
unable to track brain activity on a more detailed, millisecond by millisecond basis 
(Cacioppo et al., 2008). Although fMRI is already offering a great temporal improvement 
to older social neuroscience methods such as Positron Emission Topography (PET) scans, 
which comparatively had far slower temporal resolutions (roughly one aggregate data 
point per minute), fMRI cannot rival EEG in its millisecond-based temporal results of 
brain activity as measured through synaptic electric signals. We shall discuss EEG later 
in this chapter. In addition, the BOLD signal is dependent on the establishment of a 
“baseline” rate of oxygen usage from which to compare changes in blood flow. Others 
have pointed out that this “baseline” or observed “inactivity” in other brain regions does 
not necessarily mean that nothing interesting is happening in these “inactive” brain 
regions (Fox et al., 2005; Martuzzi et al., 2010). In other words, both brain “activity” and 
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“inactivity” need to be interpreted as significant, even though their significance varies in 
regard to the studied psychological reaction in the experiment.  
There are further complications in terms of experimental procedures for fMRI. It 
is important to note that fMRI data is “preprocessed” before the actual analysis, in that 
the raw obtained data has to undergo various procedures before it appears as the colored 
brain imaging researchers print in their research articles (Lieberman, 2010, p.146). fMRI 
studies are commonly conducted with a very small-n number (on average about 10 
subjects). During the scanning process, researchers first have to carry out “realignment” 
of small movements made by subjects’, i.e. recorded brain images have to be corrected 
for any movements so that the same brain region shows up in the same place during the 
whole data collection process. Secondly, researchers have to “normalize” the brain scans 
of all subjects – who naturally have differing brain sizes – into a single coordinate space. 
Finally, spatial “smoothing” has to be applied, in which “voxels” (i.e. three-dimensional 
pixels) from the raw brain scans are averaged through statistical analysis. This is chiefly 
done to strengthen the detection of certain signals that researchers are looking for. 
In this complicated “preprocessing” procedure, one can imagine how many things 
might go wrong. If “realignment” is not carried out correctly, the actual location of 
crucial brain regions might be indicated in error. In the case of spatial “smoothing”, there 
have recently been concerns voiced over the procedure’s statistical reliability and its 
possible overconfidence in detected signal strength (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & 
Paschler, 2009; Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). In other words, neuroscientists who 
use fMRI methods are criticized for presenting to the research community an 
overprocessed, somewhat stylized and oftentimes statistically enhanced picture of “brain 
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activity”. Although these concerns are valid, neuroscientists take them seriously 
(Cacioppo et al., 2003; Lieberman, 2010) and efforts are made in presenting more raw 
data within research reports and point to statistical weaknesses. 
The latest, most stinging critique (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016) about 
faulty statistical software used in fMRI “smoothing” analysis had to retract its initial 
estimate of 40,000 affected fMRI research studies and lowerd it down to about 3,500 
studies. The issue there was a bug detected in a specific software program used by fMRI 
researchers; but more generally, the concern was about the need in the neuroscience 
community to report complete results rather than selective snippets of “preprocessed” 
brain images and to share data more widely with colleagues14. 
Although these criticisms are concerning, other fields in the natural sciences, or 
indeed political science itself, suffer from similar problems in terms of raw data 
transparency and statistical dependability. In the most prominent recent case within 
political science, a publication by political scientists Michael J. LaCour and Donald P. 
Green (2014; retracted 2015) in the eminent natural science journal Science on the effect 
of personal contact with gay canvassers on voters’ support for same-sex marriage had to 
be retracted because of fabricated and manipulated data (Broockman, Kalla, & Aronow, 
2015). Although the lead-author LaCour seems to have caused the actual data 
manipulation and fabrication, the co-author Green (in a more senior research position 
than LaCour) failed to notice this mistake because he never reviewed the raw data 
himself, despite agreeing to co-authorship of the paper (Bohannon, 2015 in Science 
                                                 
14 See discussion of the Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson (2016) article by one of its authors, Thomas Nichols, 
on his Warwick University Blog at http://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/nichols/entry/bibliometrics_of_cluster/ 
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Mag)15. Therefore, if it is common practice amongst political scientists not to necessarily 
seek access to all the raw data available – even if one is a co-author of the very study that 
uses the raw data to make claims – then neuroscience’s problem with raw data 
transparency seems to be more common and widespread. 
It is worth noting that in both the neuroscience and the political science cases 
discussed just now, it was fellow researchers who discovered and pointed out these 
methodological problems. As former Science editor-in-chief and current president of the 
National Academy of Sciences Maria McNutt stated in response to the La Cour and 
Green retraction, “fortunately, science is a self-correcting process: researchers publish 
work in the scholarly literature so that it can be further scrutinized, replicated, confirmed, 
rebutted or corrected. This is the way science advances.” (in Bialik, 2015). This is why 
this chapter argues that fMRI should not be flatly dismissed based on reservations about 
data transparency and statistical reliability. As important as these reservations are – and 
will continue to be brought to light by fellow researchers in the neuroscience community 
and beyond – they are not a powerful enough reason to dismiss the significance and 
insights gained by fMRI altogether. Statistical bugs can be fixed and will continue to 
appear, data fabrication will continue to happen as long as there are bad (i.e. dishonest 
and unethical) apples amongst researchers (which is also exacerbated by the “pressure to 
publish” amongst all fields in research academia), and greater data transparency is a goal 
that the scientific research community is working on.  
An important point here is that as long as political scientists who wish to 
appropriate methods from the neurosciences (or draw conclusions from brain data) are 
                                                 
15 For an interview on research ethics with Donald P. Green, co-author of the study, see 
http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/05/co-author-of-the-faked-study-speaks-out.html 
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aware about methodological problems and pitfalls, it is easier for them to avoid drawing 
unrealistic or unsustainable conclusions. The self-correcting process of science should be 
seen as its inherent strength and a fairly reliable bulwark against methodological mistakes 
made in brain imaging, at least in the long-term. Most crucially, outsiders to brain 
imaging techniques have to analyze and draw conclusions from its data based on the 
premise that fMRI, for example, does not offer causal inferences but only correlational 
ones, and that just because one brain region “lights up” during a specific task, this does 
not automatically mean that activity in other regions is completely irrelevant. Apart from 
these caveats, more practical challenges during fMRI data collection consist in fMRI 
machine conditions that can induce claustrophobia in participants, selectivity bias due to 
the fact that experimental participants are predominantly U.S. undergraduates (bias both 
in terms of age and educational status), and the expensive price label attached to owning 
and running fMRI machines. 
FMRI is not the only technique to measure brain activity. More established and 
economical techniques are electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs). EEG is a “recording of minute electrical changes that occur on the 
scalp” and ERPs are the same signals but “collected in a different paradigm” (Cacioppo 
et al., 2008); ERPs are frequently used in a complimentary way together with fMRI 
studies but also very much independently by itself. The most important difference 
between EEG and ERPs is that for ERPs, a sequence of stimuli is presented to the subject 
and the exact moment when the stimulus is presented can be retraced in the data. During 
ERP recording, subjects wear the characteristic “cap” that is able to record voltage 
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changes in synapses in the outer cortex – allowing more movement flexibility than fMRI 
procedures and a less complicated experimental set-up. 
The great advantage of ERPs is their excellent temporal resolution – being able to 
record signal changes by milliseconds – which is crucial for when a study tries to find out 
exactly when (and how) subjects react to exposure to a political candidate or an other-
race face, especially when survey-based responses do not suffice in answering these 
questions (i.e. did subjects have a certain brain reaction before or during their survey 
responses?). Moreover, EEG was one of the first methods available to social 
neuroscientists with which they could show the existence of vital dissociations between 
social cognitive processes (Cacioppo, Crites, & Gardener 1996) and conduct 
experimental tests on “otherwise indistinguishable theoretical explanations” (Cacioppo et 
al., 2008).  
Particularly in the field of cultural neuroscience (Ames & Fiske, 2010; Chiao & 
Ambady, 2007; Gutchess & Goh, 2013; Han, 2015), where subjects can be bicultural 
(e.g. identifying with both their immigrant and host country identity), the behavioral 
response or self-judgment can often differ from what is experienced at the brain level. 
For example, an Asian-American participant might express behaviorally or in their self-
judgment a preference for being American or Western (e.g. in order to conform to social 
expectations of the host country) in the sense of preferring more individualist styles of 
self-construal, but when studied at the neural level, their cultural self-construal might 
instead be more Asian, in the sense of being more collectivist (Chiao et al., 2009). When 
studying individuals who are bicultural, traditional psychology and social science 
methods can face various obstacles: subjects might not have conscious access to their 
 67 
cultural self-construal style and therefore are unable to answer related questions on 
surveys (Kitayama, 2002; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977); they might be hesitant or 
embarrassed to disclose fully their bicultural identities; or the same survey question could 
be interpreted differently across cultures (Heine et al., 2002). Most crucially, we canot 
take for granted that introspection or self-report are always accurate or able to provide a 
complete picture of the multilayered cultural self. Thus in these instances, fMRI and EEG 
methods are able to draw on a crucial dimension of bicultural reality that other methods 
are unable to access. 
Finally, another method available to social neuroscience is lesion studies. The 
first lesion study in the history of neuroscience was, as discussed earlier, the case of the 
U.S. railroad construction worker Phineas Gage. Lesion studies examine individuals who 
demonstrate damage to certain brain regions and investigate how the damage affects 
psychological processes and behavior (Lieberman, 2010). The most decisive advantage of 
lesion studies over fMRI and EEG is that we are able to make causal inferences, i.e. 
observed psychological deficiencies or a particular behavior can be attributed directly to 
the damaged brain region in question. Liane Young and her colleagues (2010) used lesion 
study methods to examine how damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex impaired 
subjects’ ability to take others people’s perspective (i.e. ‘mentalizing’ – more on this in 
Chapter 3) and therefore led them to make harmful and morally questionable decisions 
towards others. The primary downside of lesion study methods is the availability of 
suitable subjects and that brain damage is usually rarely limited to one region only, 
making it harder to draw confident inferences about specific regions. 
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2.4.2. Methodological Concerns 
One of the most common methodological mistakes made is drawing wrong 
conclusions about brain function during “reverse inference” (Cacioppo & Visser, 2003; 
D'Esposito, Ballard, Aguirre, & Zarahn, 1998; Poldrack, 2006). This occurs when a 
correlation between a particular psychological state and a specific pattern of brain 
activation is established, and when later, in a different experiment, researchers infer from 
the same pattern of brain activation that this particular psychological v must be present 
again – even though it might not be. In other words, we cannot automatically infer 
‘reversely’ about the presence of certain mental states just because the same brain regions 
are activated. Although the field of social neurosciences as a whole is striving towards 
being able to make more confident reverse inferences through ongoing experiments and 
improvement of methods and techniques, it is important to tread with caution in this 
regard. 
Theodoridis and Nelson (2012) warn about this specifically when attempts are 
made at mapping the “political brain” (Jost et al., 2014; Knutson et al., 2006). Political 
processes, they point out, are more complex than social ones in that they are more 
specific and peculiar in their neuronal manifestations – it is “easier to imagine the 
development of distinctly social, as opposed to political, neural processes and brain 
regions” (Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012, p.37). In addition, effects that may seem large in 
the lab with a potentially biased subject population (i.e. easily-influenced college 
undergrads) may be small if tested in the general population and the complex world of 
politics. In his review of lab-based psychological experiments, political philosopher 
Maurizio Meloni (2012) draws attention to the fact that positive interpersonal feelings, 
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such as empathy, detected in lab experiments might only be short-lived and are unable to 
withstand the challenges of committing to long-term help towards refugees in the 
political world, for example. 
Another danger in the brain mapping context is the “category error”, which 
consists in searching for brain centers “for guilt, loyalty, and negative moods, [instead of 
asking] what simple features of these complex psychological functions are being 
processed by specific networks of neural systems” (Cacioppo et al., 2008). In other 
words, the “category error” is based on the assumption that there exist singular brain 
centers for mental and behavioral processes, instead of unique brain networks involving 
various brain regions (Cacioppo et al. 2002; Sarter, Berntson, Cacioppo 1996). This is 
connected to “reverse inference”, in the sense that in order to avoid the “category error”, 
we need to “distinguish between a nonhomogenous brain in which different regions can 
influence different mental or behavioral processes, on the one hand, and the hypothesized 
role of these regions as unique locations of the mechanisms underlying these processes, 
on the other” (Cacioppo et al., 2003, p.653). But is the idea of the nonhomogenous brain 
(Uttal, 2001) not a contradiction in itself? Only perhaps if we understand the human brain 
as a computer – as did some of the initial pioneers of the ‘cognitive revolution’ – instead 
of the picture that has emerged in the last two decades: the human social brain is a 
complex entity that is as much biological as it is social, highly plastic and able to 
reconfigure considerably within a lifetime, and serving a variety of heterogeneous 
purposes in the entangled webs of human social interactions and transactions. 
The best way to avoid the pitfalls of “reverse inference” and the “category error”, 
as well as other methodological mistakes, is to adopt a “multiple integrative level of 
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analysis”, as briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (Cacioppo & Visser, 
2003). The point behind this is the belief that even though all human behavior – including 
political behavior – could be understood biologically, this does not mean that “biological 
reductionism yields a simple, singular or satisfactory explanation for complex behaviors, 
or that molecular representation provides the only or best level of analysis for 
understanding human behavior” (Cacioppo & Visser, 2003, 649f.). The point of 
‘multilevel integrative analysis’ is to acknowledge the complexity of social and political 
phenomena as a starting point, and from there approach these phenomena “from various 
scales or perspectives, such as the neuroscientific, cognitive, social, and political (…) 
[and further use] observations at one level of organization (…) to inform, refine or 
constrain inferences based on observations at another level” (ibid.). 
This echoes the concerns of Theodoridis and Nelson (2012), who warn of the 
dangers of rooting oneself in one methodological paradigm and treat fMRI as an 
exclusive ‘higher standard of proof’, suggesting instead to use fMRI analyses as a 
“window into a different level of analysis” (p.28). Jost et al. (2014) call for a 
“collaborative cross-examination” in order to avoid problems that might arise during 
“reverse inference”, which means that researchers should use data and concepts available 
at the behavioral level to verify the validity of the neural data, resulting in “a decidedly 
anti-reductionistic, collaborative approach to science in which psychological and 
physiological methods and interpretations are regarded as equally indispensable” (ibid., 
p.28). Meanwhile, political scientist Dustin Tingley (2006) argues that interdisciplinary 
neuropolitical research would benefit from reciprocal influence, in that shortcomings in 
neuroscience models on affective and cognitive reasoning, for example, could be partly 
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overcome through borrowing conceptual distinctions from political science from areas 
such as voting behavior and candidate preference theories. 
Last but not least, in the growing field of neurofeminism, neuroscientists and 
gender study researchers have pointed out the gender-biased processes of knowledge 
production in the neurosciences, which includes the setup of categories, experimental 
design, result presentation and analyses of result validity (Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Schmitz 
& Höppner, 2014). Neurofeminists have suggested a review of methodological 
procedures that display gender bias, and try to draw attention to “neurosexism” (Fine, 
2010) and unconscious gender bias in the research design process and execution. This 
call for a greater sensitivity to identity diversity is also made in the aforementioned new 
subfield of “cultural neuroscience”, where cultural neuroscientists question the implicit 
assumptions made by neuroscience researchers in the West, on how Western cultural 
value systems apply to subjects worldwide (or across the West’s own turbulent cultural 
history, see Backman, 2012), and their omission of the complexity and interaction 
between different co-existing identities within individuals who identify as bi-or 
multicultural. 
I would like to dedicate the remaining part of this section to a methodological 
conundrum that I believe is possibly the most profound and perplexing of all the various 
challenges already mentioned, namely that of the “bottom-up” question (Glimcher & 
Rustichini, 2004; Hughes & Churchland, 1995; Kihlstrom, 2006; Mitchell, 2010; Wilson, 
1998). How is brain activity in the form of blood flow and electric signals distinguishable 
from behavior? Does the neural level of analysis make up the “bottom” of more 
comprehensive theories about human social action, and do other levels of analysis such as 
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attitudinal and behavioral ones build on top of the neural level? Or is this kind of 
conceptualizing too reductionist and simplistic in regard to the interactive, possibly non-
hierarchical nature between these levels? 
Critics of the “bottom-up” theory argue for example that by grounding all mental 
processes at the neural level, we end up denying the existence of psychological processes 
that might not be representable at the brain level (Kihlstrom, 2010). In other words, these 
critics maintain that psychological concepts such as desires, beliefs and feelings are 
separate entities in comparison to neurobiological concepts of these phenomena. This is 
in line with the earlier mentioned idea of mind-world dualism, which believes that certain 
(or all) mental processes are grounded in a separate reality from the physical one. For 
political neuroscience, this means that critics of the “bottom-up” approach believe that 
the political brain cannot be understood without the political mind (Theodoridis & 
Nelson, 2012, p.35). 
This dissertation defends the “bottom-up” approach, and develops the PBP based 
on the premise that neural manifestations of mental processes surrounding 
dehumanization, exclusion and mentalizing matter fundamentally for political arguments 
and methodological frameworks. However, defending the “bottom-up” approach does not 
automatically mean that psychological concepts about the political mind are useless for 
making sense of the political brain – in fact, observations made both at the level of 
behavior and the level of the mind are crucial in determining to which extent certain brain 
processes are politically relevant.  The PBP developed in this dissertation contends that it 
is possible to insist on the relevance of the “bottom-up” idea, without succumbing to a 
blanket reductionism of political experience and behavior. To echo a point made by 
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Cacioppo and Visser (2003) – although it might be possible to eventually reduce all 
political behavior to processes at the brain level, this does not necessarily mean that 
brain-level based explanations are the sole or superior level of analysis for understanding 
all political phenomena. What they do offer us is a crucial and fundamental dimension of 
social reality that is too important to ignore in any comprehensive attempt at political 
theorizing about the cognitive conditions for living in hyperdiverse societies. 
Another way of highlighting problems around the neural “bottom-up” theory of 
political behavior is to ask ourselves what exactly is the relationship between implicit 
cognitive processes and explicit behavior – or to be more specific, between implicit 
cognitive biases and explicit discriminatory behavior. How does bias, prejudice and 
exclusion at the brain level lead to behavioral manifestations thereof, if indeed at all? A 
recent study by Patrick Forscher and his colleagues (2016) investigated through a meta-
analysis of over 400 existing studies how implicit bias could be effectively overcome. 
Firstly, they found that procedures that tackled bias by targeting people’s motivations and 
engaged their mental resources were by far more effective than procedures that were 
based on threat or made appeals to people’s emotions and morals. Most importantly 
however, they concluded that changes in implicit bias hardly led to changes in explicit 
bias or behavior. 
It is worth noting that one of the research team members on this study was Brian 
N. Nosek, who together with Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji invented the 
original Implicit Association Test (IAT) and coined the concept of implicit bias. Is one of 
the foremost experts on implicit bias suggesting that implicit bias might not matter 
politically after all, if in fact it often fails to affect actual behavior and explicit attitudes? 
 74 
In a subsequent interview with The Chronicle of Higher Education, Nosek states that 
although the connection between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior seems “very 
weak overall”, the IAT might still be able to predict political candidate preferences and 
other relevant political behavior (Bartlett, 2017). 
Nosek does not discuss the possibility that the failure to detect significant 
correlations between implicit biases and behavior might be due to problems related to 
experimental set-up and limitations of certain psychological concepts of “political 
behavior”. For example, the restricted timeframe of an experiment might make it difficult 
to gauge significant changes in discriminatory behavior simply because it is too short, not 
allowing for a measurement of the effects of incremental bias over time. Also, subjects 
might be succumbing to “acquiescence bias” in avoiding to admit to and display 
explicitly biased behavior (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). Other effects outside of the 
experimental set-up, such as specific events or stimuli that might reinforce an inherent 
implicit bias (e.g. a negative news story about or direct encounter with an out-group) and 
could possibly affect behavior also need to be taken into account. 
In addition, the way how we define politically relevant behavior matters as well: 
if researchers understand “effects on behavior” primarily as changes in very explicit 
attitudes and blatant discriminatory behavior, they might miss the effects of implicit bias 
on more subtle excluding behavior such as microaggressions (Sue, 2009; 2010) and 
subtle dehumanization of out-groups (Leyens et al., 2001). In the field of 
microaggressions in particular, there exists an ongoing, heated debated about the 
challenges of measuring microaggressions accurately and convincingly at the behavioral 
level, since the opaque, ambiguous and subjective nature of microaggressive statements 
 75 
and actions can be difficult to capture through a standardized methodological system 
(Sue, 2017; Lilienfeld, 2017). A parallel debate within behaviorism shows the 
complexities of categorizing behavior: some behaviorists defend the molecular paradigm 
of behavior, which views behavior as discrete and separate units that are linked together 
to make up more complex performances (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner, 1953); 
other behaviorists believe instead in the molar paradigm of behavior, which, based on 
previous theories by John Dewey, Karl Lashley and Gestalt psychologists, postulates that 
all behavior is continuous and organically linked together (Baum, 2002). Social 
psychologists who wish to test correlations and causations between implicit mental 
processes and political behavior need to be aware that political behavior is highly 
complex in its explicit and subtle manifestations, and that the complexity of political 
behavior sets it apart from more simplistic economic models of reward behavior and 
decision-making. This is why a sophisticated conceptualization of what constitutes 
relevant “political behavior” is crucial in experiments, in order to be able to draw 
politically relevant conclusions from them.  
This dissertation contends that exclusionary mental processes that are captured 
more implicitly at the brain level are highly relevant for political behavior, even though 
various experiments reviewed by Forscher et al. might not invite this kind of conclusion 
at first glance. This is another example where the psychological and cognitive data is not 
politically self-evident, and where the PBP can help to illuminate the importance of 
implicit brain processes for politics. Based on the PBP’s “bottom-up” premise, as well as 
additional insights from neuroscience on how repeated mental procedures (in this case, 
daily exercise and reinforcement of implicit bias) can significantly change synaptic 
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functions and even whole brain structures and gray matter (Maguire et al., 2000), this 
dissertation argues that taking into account implicit exclusionary biases against specific 
social out-groups is vital for any socially-oriented political theory, especially one that 
theorizes about how cooperation and solidarity in a hyperdiverse political body politic 
can be attained.  
 
2.5. Theorizing with a Purpose: Mechanism over Ontology 
In Theodoridis and Nelson’s (2012) assessment, political neuroscience currently 
offers “interesting empirical results but [is] light on theoretical implications” for political 
science (p.28). So far, this chapter tried to show that the theoretical implications for 
political science methodology are overall significant and can even be profound for 
redefining what constitutes political behavior, attitudes and implicit mental processes – 
and the way in which they are intertwined. This being said, this chapter also tried to 
address in detail how neuroscience results and the methods through which they are 
obtained cannot be employed without reservations and caveats, and that many 
methodological problems still pertain to the field as a whole. Theodoridis and Nelson 
believe that the main reason why political science should embrace neuroscience is the 
duty to collect as much empirical data as possible (and hope that it might be relevant at a 
future stage), even if the empirical data might not be useful for political science at this 
point. Contrary to them, this dissertation contends that the available empirical data on 
the social and political brain is sufficient to draw meaningful implications for political 
theories about exclusion, cooperation and identity. This why in this final section, I wish 
to summarize why political science in general (and political theory in particular) can 
benefit from neuroscience methods and the insights gained from it:  
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1. Political neuroscience data shows that classic political science methods such as 
survey-based, attitudinal and behavioral measurements can sometimes miss 
another dimension of mental processes detectable only at the neuronal level. 
Neuroscience methods can therefore be useful to political science in gaining a 
more complete picture of the motivations and intentions behind political actions 
and decision-making. It is this multilevel integrative analysis (Visser & Cacioppo, 
2003) that both political neuroscience and political science can help each other 
strive towards, and benefit from mutually. 
 
2. Any political theory that makes abstract and universalist assumptions about the 
political animal and the inner workings of her political mind needs to verify these 
theoretical assumptions, or at least be able to defend them against alternative 
empirical evidence. Given that political theorists throughout history have 
proposed theories about the cognitive conditions underlying political action and 
interests, and that some theorists even attempted to include the scientific evidence 
available to them at the time, it is only natural that political theorists today should 
engage seriously with the evidence emerging from political neuroscience. 
 
3. In this context, this dissertation argues that we are not looking for universalist 
ontology but universalist brain mechanisms: we are not using neuroscience to 
build theories about who we are as political beings (i.e. ontology) but to 
understand what our brains do. This means that we are trying to identify 
fundamental mechanisms underlying social cognition processes that can be 
applied to understanding relevant political phenomena. 
 
4. As a counterpoint to the universalist argument, political theorists should pay 
attention to emerging subfields within social neuroscience such as cultural 
neuroscience, which in an unprecedented way allow us to access subconscious 
and implicit identity dynamics in bi-and multicultural individuals, thus offering a 
crucial insight into the multilayered cultural influences on political perception and 
decision-making in a hyperdiverse world. 
 
5. Leaning on this, political science as a whole is struggling with increasing its 
diversity, and up to date still faces considerable underrepresentation of women 
and severe underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities (Mershon & Walsh, 
2016). If this lack of diversity persists, and yet (mostly Western White, and often 
male) political scientists continue to theorize about the needs and demands of 
minorities, the experience of racism, and the fate of multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism, then at the very least political scientists ought to inform 
themselves about the mental processes of bi-and multicultural individuals – which 
includes the neural level – in order to make convincing and justifiable political 
demands on how hyperdiverse societies should function. 
 
6. Moreover, insights from cultural neuroscience show that cultural self-knowledge 
is not necessarily confirmed at the brain level, meaning that during self-report or 
introspection, minorities themselves might be missing an important dimension of 
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how their cultural identities affect their perception, attitudes and behavior. 
Neuroscience methods can thus help access this dimension and contribute to a 
multilevel analysis of how identity influences politics.  
 
7. We need neuroscience methods in order to understand the underlying neural 
mechanisms that make up hyperdiverse societies (4. and 5.) and to establish a set 
of generalizable, basic mechanisms that drive political beings universally (2. and 
3.). In addition to constructive objectives, we also need to determine which 
cognitive processes are most destructive and debilitating to the politics of 
hyperdiverse societies. Neuroscience methods can help us detect and specify 
implicit, automatic and rapid cognitive processes of exclusion, prejudice and 
dehumanization. Understanding what the most destructive cognitive processes 
are is essential for constructing a minimal neuropolitical theory of cooperation. 
 
8. The new picture of the political brain challenges dominant political science 
concepts of the rational individual. Whereas political science theories about 
human motivations and behavior are still largely defined by hyperindividualism 
and hyperrationalism (Blank & Hines, 2001), insights into the political brain in 
terms of its exceptional sociability and sensitivity to social cues, as well as its 
non-standard “rationality” compel us to reconsider previous paradigms. This 
dissertation treats the political brain’s “flexible social cognition” (Harris, 2017) as 
an opportunity to rethink previous ideas of human rationality, with a particular 
focus on dehumanized perception (7.)  
 
Being able to make a distinction between ontological vs. mechanism-based 
objectives (3.) is crucial for gaining clarity on what kind of neuropolitical paradigm we 
are committing to. This distinction also plays an important role in epistemological 
debates in political science. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, a scholar in international relations 
(IR), outlines how political scientists in IR divide along the lines of “ontology first” 
(Klotz and Lynch, 2007; Patömaki and Wight, 2000; Wendt, 1987; Wight, 2006) and 
those who oppose ontology (Chernoff, 2009; Jackson, 2011), describing the dilemma of 
choosing between the two as follows: “we appear to have a choice between starting with 
the world and conforming our methodology to that world, or starting with methodology 
and thus losing the world as we try to articulate universal standards for scientific 
research” (Jackson, 2011, p.27). Jackson describes ontology in this context as our “hook-
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up” to the world, i.e. the conceptual and philosophical basis on which our claims about 
the political world are made (p.28). An ontological approach to international politics 
therefore consists in presuming certain pre-existing characteristics and conditions about 
the political world, to which one’s chosen methodology has to be adapted; it is a 
commitment to a particular way of believing what the world consist in. For example, 
Alexander Wendt, another IR scholar and proponent of the constructivist school, 
famously argued in his paper on the agent-structure problem that there exists empirically 
unobservable structures in the social and natural world that are nonetheless as real and 
valid (Wendt, 1987).  
Jackson warns that the adaption of methodology to ontological concepts can make 
us “stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the 
object under investigation” (p.27). He believes instead that knowledge production is not 
separate or subordinate to the world, but fundamentally linked to how the world is. 
Jackson singles out mind-world dualism as part of the driving force behind ontological 
commitments – and as a major problem for political science epistemology. He rejects 
mind-world dualism in favor of a more pluralistic account of political phenomena, where 
“there are a variety of claims about our hook-up to the world, and thus a variety of 
philosophical ontologies, each of which holds different implications for how we should 
go about producing factual knowledge about world politics” (p. 32). The biggest 
challenge for Jackson lies in the fact that when confronted with ontological claims about 
the political world – whether they are about agents and structures, or states operating 
under conditions of realist interests, anarchy or global capitalism – there immediately 
arises the “problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and (…) of 
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selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating the claim [original emphasis]” 
(Chernoff, 2009, p.391 cited in Jackson, 2011). I shall return to a detailed discussion of 
the ‘ontology vs. mechanisms’ question in Chapter 4, and selectively also in Chapter 3. 
Suffice to note here that this divide stems from deep philosophical and epistemological 
differences between the two camps, and that the PBP is trying to defend the merits of a 
‘mechanism’ based approach based on insights on the workings of the social human 
brain. 
In a similar vein to Jackson, political scientists Gary King, Robert O. Keohane 
and Sidney Verba propose in Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (1994) that social scientists should give up “parsimony” 
(ontological claims about the composition of the world) for “leverage” (a principle of 
hypothesis-building based on universal principles). The point of “leverage” is similar to 
that of the “bottom-up” approach discussed earlier: how can we theorize from the brain-
level “upwards” to more complex phenomena such as political attitudes and behavior, 
without compromising the integrity of each level of analysis? By choosing “leverage” 
over “parsimony”, King et al. argue for a social science that does not presume properties 
and characteristics about the political world and its inherent actors and structures, instead 
advocating for the construction of testable hypotheses through methodologies that are 
built on more universally accessible standards.  
Critics of the “leverage” approach point out that committing to a single scientific 
methodology runs the danger of intellectual narrowness (Wight, 2006) and that the 
existence of universal standards cannot be defended epistemologically (Jackson, 2011). 
However, based on the internal discourse within social neuroscience outlined earlier in 
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this chapter, these fears might seem unfounded, at least if applied to the field of social 
neuroscience (also, King et al.’s idea of science is focused on political science rather than 
natural science). This chapter showed that social and political neuroscientists are well 
aware of the pitfalls behind extreme reductionism and determinism, and usually try to 
avoid drawing conclusions of this kind. Instead, they largely commit to the paradigm of 
multilevel integrative analysis, which acknowledges the multiple neural, genetic, 
epigenetic, endocrine, physiological, social and political factors and dynamics at play in 
determining the outcome of brain imaging data. 
Further to this, social and political neuroscientists often have a differentiated and 
complex conception of “universality”, usually resisting attempts at making sweeping 
generalizations for the larger social world. In fact, this chapter tried to show that self-
critical and self-correcting reflexes and mechanisms are in-built within neuroscientific 
experimental processes, as well as their subsequent critical examination by fellow 
scientists in peer-to-peer reviewed research journals. Political scientists and philosophers 
who are wary of neuroscience’s potential for reductionist universality need to 
acknowledge that they might be painting their image of neuroscientists and their ultimate 
aims with too broad a brush, to the point of constructing a conceptual and methodological 
enemy who might in fact turn out to be a straw man (at least in some parts). 
The political scientists who were quoted earlier in the chapter and who critically 
engage with political neuroscience advocate unanimously that in order to overcome 
methodological shortcomings in neuroscientific approaches, what we need is a joint and 
interdisciplinary effort where political science can help refine the concepts and 
hypotheses that are tested experimentally through brain scanning methods, as well as 
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specify with greater clarity how exactly certain brain insights might apply to complex 
political scenarios. This is a very different approach to the “reductionist desire [by certain 
political scientists] of planting the findings of genetics, physiology, and neuroscience 
directly into the field of politics”, as Maurizio Meloni points out in his critique of 
replacing a plurality of political frameworks with the intellectual authority of 
neuroscience (Meloni, 2012, p.30). If both sides can agree that the other side is 
indispensable in generating compelling political neuroscience data – as well as 
constructing viable neuropolitical theories about political perception, behavior and self – 
then there is no defensible reason why political scientists or political theorists should 
reject neuroscience completely. 
Robert H. Blank (2014), in his edited volume on the current relationship between 
the life sciences and political science tries to remind political scientists that political 
science as a field has always been a “net-importer” of methodologies borrowed from 
statistics, economics and other disciplines – wondering why political science struggles so 
much to embrace or even just critically engage methods from the life sciences, including 
neuroscience. He warns that the current tendency within political science to center 
debates on a single approach or method for all social research is not tenable and is in 
need of critical self-examination and diversification (Blank, 2014, p.240; also see 
McDermott, 2011; Wiegele, 1979). 
Blank’s accusation might be too sweeping and somewhat unfair, given that 
current developments in political science methodology and field experimentation are 
trying to overcome the “single-method trap” by mixing quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, as well as advancing the scope of field experiments (Druckman, Green, 
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Kuklinski & Lupia, 2006; Humphreys & Jacobs, 2015; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009). 
However, he manages to point to a more deep-seated resistance within political science 
that perhaps cannot be entirely be overcome through the mixing, refining and expanding 
of existing methods alone: namely, a resistance amongst a majority of political scientists 
to reconsider and reconceptualize very fundamental assumptions about human nature and 
motivations in social settings, as well as the cognitive abilities of political actors to 
interact and cooperate with others, based on breakthrough insights from the life sciences, 
in particular the neuroscience of the social human brain. The three following chapters try 
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3. The Rationally Dehumanizing Brain: Outlining Basic 





3.1. Social Cognition’s Role in Political Inclusion and Exclusion 
In this chapter, I attempt to construct a normative, interdisciplinary political 
theory about exclusion that draws on empirical evidence from social neuroscience and 
psychology. I argue that in order to grasp a major dimension in the identity conflicts we 
witness today, as well as in order to put forward truly effective normative guidelines for 
solving these conflicts, we need to understand the social cognition network implicated in 
including and excluding others, as well as more particularly, what kind of psychological 
and neurological mechanisms are at play when the worst kind of exclusion – 
dehumanization of fellow human beings – takes place. 
The following questions drive this inquiry: what if zoon politikon is cognitively 
ill-equipped to handle one of the defining features of our modern world – hyperdiverse 
and hypermobile societies, in which distinct and often opposite identities abound, and are 
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constantly in flux16? Put differently, what if experiencing an excluding reaction to 
someone – to the point of shunning them from our idea of humanity – is in fact an 
integral part of how our brains make sense of their social surroundings? Furthermore, 
what if this cognitive disposition of ours is at odds with the norms of inclusion and 
tolerance required in today’s liberal democracies, where rapidly diversifying 
communities are expected to co-exist peacefully with one another and cooperate on 
complex social issues? What if humanizing others is a distinct cognitive activity which 
actually requires conscious effort and work, but that political theorists so far have not 
paid enough attention to? 
Presently, existing political theories on multiculturalism and the politics of 
difference make various assumptions about the extent to which human beings are able to 
exercise tolerance and inclusive attitudes towards others. Whilst some of them are more 
skeptical towards our innate capabilities of inclusiveness (Barry, 2001; Walzer, 2005), 
many of them assume that the reason for a lack of social cooperation between members 
of different groups is a belief in misguided values (Kymlicka 1995; Nussbaum 2002a; 
Patten, 2014) or a lack of relevant information on the actual benefits of inclusion 
(Kymlicka, 1998). 
I argue in this chapter that many of these assumptions about our cognitive 
capacities for inclusion are misguided, due to being based on what I loosely term the 
“rationalist tradition”. The actual picture that is emerging about our social brain is a 
                                                 
16 One could object here that the phenomena of hyperdiversity and hypermobility took place in 
pre-modern societies as well, such as for example during the Ottoman Empire or Tang Dynasty 
China. However, sociologists (Beck 2007; Castells, 1997) contend that only in modern societies 
are identity struggles pushed fully into the public and global arena, and acknowledged in their 
own right. 
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challenging and deeply concerning one: empathy for and humanization of others is a 
limited resource (Decety and Svetlova, 2012; Vaish and Warneken, 2012; Fiske and 
Harris, 2006); failures of one’s in-group are experienced as painful whereas failures of a 
rival outgroup give pleasure (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011); stereotyping individuals 
along their perceived status and human warmth is a universal phenomenon (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Cuddy et al., 2009); dehumanized perception of others is an 
everyday, rapid and often passive process that once served evolutionary purposes in the 
context of living in groups competing over limited resources (Lee & Harris, 2014; Pagel, 
2012); and finally, neuroimaging studies shows that we are highly sensitive to physical 
markers in others such as skin color (Kaul, Ratner, & Van Bavel, 2014), and are inclined 
to prefer own-race faces to other-race faces (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001). 
This chapter employs the PBP to access the dynamics at play in the politics of 
exclusion – assuming that in order to arrive at a sustainable politics of inclusion, we need 
to pin down the cognitive mechanisms and neurobiological circuitries at play when we 
exclude, reject and dehumanize others. If we do not start from this premise, our 
expectations about the conditions under which people can engage in politics, as well as 
our normative demands of how different identity groups should live and cooperate 
together might at best be too optimistic, and at worst, be based on assumptions that are 
opposite to what our social brains can in fact accomplish. 
This chapter focuses on dehumanized perception firstly because of how it disrupts 
a vital social brain function called mentalizing (which makes up the basis for more 
complex social emotions such as empathy and compassion) and secondly because of how 
its rapid, automatic and often passive nature makes it a politically challenging cognitive 
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capability in the context of building political cooperation and solidarity across different 
groups. I examine how and why the “rationalist tradition” overlooks the potentially 
disrupting effects of dehumanized perception, as well as how it underestimates the 
fundamental role dehumanization plays in basic human social cognition. Hence the main 
aim of this chapter is to show that dehumanization – as studied by social neuroscientists 
and psychologists – matters for political theorizing about cooperation and solidarity, in 
particular within social contract, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism theories.  
A second aim of this chapter is to examine who in particular, in the context of a 
liberal democratic society, needs to avoid dehumanization because of how it could 
disrupt their mentalizing ability. Although it would certainly be desirable if all members 
had awareness and competent command over their spontaneous denial of humanness to 
various groups and individuals, it would be both unjustifiable and unfeasible to demand 
this to the same extent from every single member in a liberal democracy. This chapter 
therefore specifies one group in particular that we can be justifiably demand to mentalize 
and avoid cognitively dehumanize others: public representatives. Public representatives 
such as judges, law enforcement officers, bureaucrats and elected politicians have a 
different cognitive responsibility to other members in society – unlike any other member 
in society, they have a special duty to mentalize and cognitively represent a wide and 
diverse constituency, partly because that is their job requirement and that is what got 
them elected to public office, but also, being in command of the dehumanization 
capabilities that are part of our “flexible social cognition” (Harris, 2017) allows public 
representatives to be more competent, efficient and fairer towards fellow members within 
the liberal democracy whom they are accountable to.  
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The cognitive responsibilities of public representatives further have to be couched 
in the context of political deliberation and power relations, which is why this chapter 
distinguishes between two kinds of politics: the politics of responsive equality and the 
politics of unresponsive inequality. In both cases, functioning mentalizing abilities and a 
lack of dehumanized perception are crucial for the success of deliberative democratic 
practices as well as the prevention of abuses of power in the context of law enforcement, 
for example. 
 
3.2. Dehumanization as Part of Everyday “Rational” Cognition 
Recently, researchers of dehumanization have reached the preliminary conclusion that 
“conceiving of others as less human may reflect a basic, relatively passive, cognitive-perceptual 
process” (Hodson, MacInnis, & Costello 2014, p.90) and that dehumanization is “rooted in 
ordinary social-cognitive processes” (Haslam, 2006, p.252). Only in the last decade has 
dehumanization been considered a subtle, everyday phenomenon that permeates all aspects of our 
social interactions. Previously, social psychologists studied dehumanization in the aftermath of 
WWII and the Holocaust as an unusual and extreme form of exclusion that would result in 
aggressive and excessive behavior (Bandura, Fromson, & Underwood, 1975; Staub, 2010). 
Dehumanization was associated with acts of extreme violence, such as war killings and genocide, 
and was thus expected to occur only in exceptional circumstances (though these acts were thought 
to be committed by ordinary individuals). 
With the groundbreaking work of Leyens and his colleagues (2000) at the turn of 
the century, dehumanization was suddenly recognized as a sweeping phenomenon that 
we all engage in on an everyday basis. They described this subtle and often unconscious 
dehumanization process as infrahumanization, in which we only ascribe uniquely human 
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emotions (‘secondary emotions’) to people whom we consider to be part of our in-group. 
These complex secondary emotions (e.g. embarrassment or optimism) are denied to 
people from out-groups; instead, we are only able to ascribe to them basic, non-secondary 
emotions such as fear and pleasure, which we would also attribute to other animals. 
Moreover, instead of aggression, one behavioral result of dehumanization is neglect. 
Previous studies on prejudice and exclusion showed how belonging to an in-group 
and the mental construction of out-groups is part of how we function socially (Brewer, 
1999; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Krill & Platek, 2009; Tajfel, 1981). Following Leyens’ 
infrahumanization model, researchers examined more closely how we subtly deny 
humanness to others. One important contribution has been Haslam’s (2006) two-category 
model, according to which we dehumanize others along the lines of animalistic or 
mechanistic dehumanization. People who are dehumanized animalistically are denied 
‘human uniqueness’, in that such people are seen to lack refinement, morality, civility 
and rationality (e.g., stereotype of the coarse and uneducated Mexican immigrant); people 
who are dehumanized mechanistically are denied ‘human nature’, in that such people are 
considered to lack interpersonal warmth, agency, emotions and depth (the stereotype of 
the over-achieving and ruthless Asian or Jew, for example). 
Although the categorization of dehumanized perception has important political 
implications for understanding when and how exclusion occurs, I am focusing here on the 
more implicit cognitive processes that precede the explicit categorization of those whom 
we deem to be less than human.  For example, one body of research looks at 
dehumanization as a basic, largely implicit cognitive process (Harris & Fiske, 2011). By 
studying the phenomenon at the neurological level with fMRI techniques, Fiske and 
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Harris (2006, 2007) discovered that dehumanization severely compromises a socially 
vital brain ability called mentalizing or Theory of Mind (ToM) (Wagner, 2015). 
Mentalizing is defined as an individual’s ability to recognize the concept of mental 
activity in others, i.e. the ability to grasp cognitively that people have mental lives, 
beliefs, dreams and desires (Wagner, 2015). The term was first used by primatologists in 
connection to the social behavior of chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and has 
since occupied the research of social neuroscientists who try to map the human social 
brain (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Young & Saxe, 2008). Mentalizing is now considered to 
develop in early infancy in humans (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and to be a cross-
culturally existent ability (Harris & Avis, 1991). 
An absence of mentalizing is correlated with (and in some instances considered to cause) 
questionable moral judgments and utilitarian decisions in contexts that involve other individuals 
(Koenigs et al., 2007). In its clinically pathological manifestation, people with autism are unable 
to execute the ability to mentalize others (Frith, 2001), leading some researchers to conclude that 
“[any] psychopathology almost always involves disturbances of social reasoning and theory of 
mind” (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs 2006, p. 451). The latest research into mentalizing considers 
mental state reasoning to be a “critical cognitive input for behavior explanation, action prediction, 
and moral evaluation” (Young and Waytz, 2013). The capacity for understanding other minds is 
now seen as a capacity that has allowed humans to operate effectively in large social groups 
(Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995; Tomasello et al., 2003). Also, the ability to read other people’s 
minds has now been firmly linked to core interpersonal and social emotions such as empathy and 
compassion. 
The picture that emerges is one where mentalizing is an indispensable social 
cognitive capacity for any individual in any society or culture. It is therefore all the more 
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unsettling, going back to Harris and Fiske’s dehumanization research, that 
dehumanization can severely compromise our mentalizing functions. Politically, 
mentalizing thus emerges as a crucial cognitive activity in the creation and maintenance 
of social cooperation. I will return again to Harris and Fiske’s treatment of 
dehumanization as an implicit cognitive process in my critique of bounded rationality 
theory below. 
3.3. Dehumanization Blindspots 
3.3.1. Dehumanization Blindspots I: Rational Choice 
Dehumanized perception, as understood by social neuroscience and psychology, poses a 
challenge for what I would loosely term the ‘rationalist tradition’ in politics. I argue that in this 
tradition the failure to humanize each other is not considered central as to why social conflicts 
occur. At least two kinds of rationalist traditions come to mind here. One is centered on the 
rational choice paradigm, in which, classically, we expect economic and political decision-
making to conform to a utility-maximizing model. This model was subsequently questioned by 
the empirical work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1974), which highlighted the 
susceptibility of human reason to bias and inconsistency, and subsequently paved the path for a 
new subfield devoted to the study of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1982). 
Although bounded rationality assumes that human behavior and decision-making 
is intendedly rational, it concedes that most of the time, rationality is severely constrained 
by various factors present in the internal and external environment of social actors – such 
as emotions, lack of adequate information, and situational incentives and constraints 
(Jones, 1999). Some theorists of bounded rationality have singled out our “human 
cognitive architecture” as the cause for these instances of rational failure (Ibid., p.298). 
By now, the idea of bounded rationality is recognized to the point that most economic 
 92 
and political scientists accept that cognitive constraints can affect judgment and behavior 
at a significant level.  
One of the most recent publications on this by political economist Johnathan 
Bendor (Bendor, 2010) presents us, three decades after Kahneman and Tversky’s initial 
work, with an expanded picture of the kinds of cognitive restraints bounded rationality 
theorists have managed to narrow down. “What properties”, Bendor asks, “should be on 
any political scientist’s short list of cognitive features to consider when constructing 
behaviorally plausible theories of political decision making?” (Ibid., p.16). He offers the 
following list of six essential properties: 
1. Top-down processing: our perception is overwhelmed by an abundance of 
environmental information, hence we process information selectively based 
on larger schemas and mental constructs. 
2. Conscious thinking and attention is ‘serial’ in nature and cannot be expected 
to happen continuously. 
3. Humans process information more slowly than computers, due to the 
physiological limits of neuronal signal transmission vis-à-vis electrical 
circuits. 
4. Humans are inferior in calculation compared to computers and calculators. 
5. Memory is actively reconstructive, not photographic. 
6. Short-term or working memory is limited in scope, affecting the accuracy of 
long-term memory and thus, information-processing in general. 
 
Except for 4. (the mental activity of calculation), the listed cognitive processes are 
predominantly unconscious and fairly passive cognitive processes; this makes sense, 
since bounded rationalists want to underline the effect of unintended influences in 
decision-making. However, I argue that one crucial, unintended cognitive process is 
missing in this list: dehumanized perception. 
What is important about Harris and Fiske’s establishment of a link between 
dehumanization and mentalizing is their focus on the implicit cognitive processes that 
precede explicit categorization of people into respective dehumanized categories, as well 
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as how their research is able to isolate exactly which mental capacities are affected by a 
lack of humanization. Their work grew out of the stereotype content model (SCM) 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu 2002), which posits that social stereotypes are commonly 
made up along two dimensions, warmth and competence, discovering that only with 
stereotyped groups that elicit a disgust reaction (considered low in warmth and 
competence) does dehumanization occur. The treatment of dehumanization as an implicit 
cognitive-perceptual process (that can only be detected with fMRI scan techniques, 
versus, say, survey methods, which chiefly gauge attitudinal and behavioral 
manifestations of dehumanization, and would therefore be unable to access these implicit 
processes) allows us to argue for the inclusion of cognitive dehumanization into Bendor’s 
political scientist’s short list of cognitive features to consider in the construction of 
behaviorally plausible theories of how politics and social cooperation work. 
Dehumanization, just like the other cognitive features on Bendor’s list, is such a 
pervasive, basic and yet predominantly unconscious mental process, that it is highly 
inconceivable that such a fundamental cognitive-perceptual process would not influence 
the decisions of political actors in some significant way. Yet the rational choice tradition 
has hitherto overlooked the importance that dehumanization plays in the dynamics of 
social cooperation.  Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that in order to account for a major 
feature of decisions made in a social context, political scientists who adhere to the 
rational choice model, or its modified cousin – the bounded rationality model, have to 
take into account that  
A. Human beings routinely dehumanize others and 
B. that these cognitive processes are implicit, automatic and often passive (Lee & 
Harris 2014), and 
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C. that dehumanization is relevant politically because it severely compromises a 
core social cognitive function called mentalizing, and that therefore 
D. any theory of human behavior and social cooperation has to include the 
uncomfortable fact that dehumanization of others can be one of the major 
disrupting cognitive abilities that can threaten social cooperation in 
hyperdiverse and hypermobile societies, where people are expected to be able 
to include a wide array of individuals into their idea of humanity and circle of 
moral concern. 
 
It is important to realize here that the inclusion of Haslam’s two-category 
dehumanization model into Bendor’s short-list, for example, would not make sense from 
the bounded rationalists’ viewpoint. The fact that we commonly dehumanize people into 
these two categories and deny them human uniqueness and human nature would be 
considered too content-specific for rational theorists and would probably be grouped 
under informational bias (point 1. in Bendor’s list). Indeed, Bendor explains that most 
rational choice/bounded rationality models aspire to the “scaling principle of modeling” 
where 
“(…) what matters in a model is not so much how sophisticated the agents are 
assumed to be or how hard the problems are, but rather the difference between the 
two. Typically, real humans are more sophisticated than agents in bounded 
rationality models, but real problems are also harder, both are scaled down in 
models. As long as a model scales down both sides symmetrically, it may be 
plausible even though the agents in the model are quite dumb.”  
(Bendor, 2010, p.15-16) 
 
According to the scaling principle, dehumanization could then just be treated as one 
specific informational bias and not be included in Bendor’s list as a more fundamental 
cognitive feature that affects decision-making and social cooperation in its own right. 
This is where Harris and Fiske’s insights and their employment of fMRI 
techniques bring about a turning point. By examining dehumanized perception one step 
before explicit dehumanized categorization takes place, they are able to single out 
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dehumanized perception as a distinct cognitive process in its own right. Only through 
fMRI methodology were they able to determine that the brain regions that were disabled 
during dehumanized perception, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mFPC), were those 
regions usually active during mentalizing. Based on this, they were could conclude that 
the effect of everyday dehumanized perception is much more disabling of our social 
cognition network than previously assumed. This is why whereas different 
dehumanization categories could be treated and ignored as contingent factors in Bendor’s 
model, dehumanized perception is so fundamental to human social cognition that it 
cannot be left out. 
Politically, we can then argue that even if in our models we would simplify 
agents’ cognitive capacities and biases to a very basic level, dehumanized perception and 
the way it affects mentalizing cannot be removed from any model of social cooperation, 
if we want to retain some degree of plausibility and accuracy about how decision-making 
and social cooperation takes place in the political world. This leads me to the second way 
in which the “rationalist tradition” can be understood, namely through the political 
ideologies of Marxism and liberalism.  
 
3.3.2. Dehumanization Blindspots II: Liberalism 
One of the defining traditions within liberalism is social contract theory. The 
social contract – traditionally understood as collectively binding due to the power of 
individual consent by all its members – is thought to have been revived in the 20th 
century by John Rawls, amongst others. In his seminal work Theory of Justice (Rawls, 
1971), normative principles such as those surrounding justice and just distribution of 
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society’s resources “are conceived as principles that would be chosen by rational 
persons” (Ibid., p.16), and are able to subsume a ‘plurality’ of claims and interests by 
various groups under the common umbrella of one basic social contract. Indeed, Rawls 
Theory of Justice can be seen as the attempt to theoretically construct the conditions 
necessary for people from diverse backgrounds to be able to cooperate together and more 
ambitiously even, agree on hefty normative questions such as who deserves how much of 
the economic, educational and political share of available social goods in a liberal 
democratic society.  
In order to accomplish this and to address the problem of diverse and opposing 
interests that would inevitably obstruct such an endeavor, Rawls comes up with by now 
famous concepts such as the ‘original position’, ‘veil of ignorance’, ‘reflective 
equilibrium’, and others. With the ‘original position’ – which describes the unbiased and 
fair viewpoint people are supposed to adopt before engaging with their fellow citizens in 
a consensus-reaching process of finding the ultimate principles of justice everyone can 
agree on –, and the ‘veil of ignorance’ – which refers to the hypothetical ability of people 
to be able to ignore their particular position in society in order to make decisions about 
these fundamental principles, Rawls introduced a distinct cognitive model of the rational 
citizen. 
Rawls’ critics have spilled much ink on the question whether his idea of the 
rational citizen and later, of political ‘reasonableness’, makes sense at all (Gauthier, 
1974; Scanlon, 1973; Sandel, 1982). Critics have questioned how realistic it is to assume 
that people are able to think about questions of social justice in a cognitive vacuum, such 
as the ‘original position’, in which people are expected to put aside for a moment their 
 97 
particularistic interests; or decisions made under the ‘veil of ignorance’, which assumes 
certain cognitive biases can be consciously withheld. Rawls himself and his defenders 
(Freeman, 2007) have countered to this that the theories in Theory of Justice, like many 
theories throughout the history of political philosophy, were intended as a non-descriptive 
thought-experiment and were part of what Rawls called ‘ideational theory’. In other 
words, Rawls, just like Bendor in his ‘scaling principle of modeling’, tries to slim down 
the messiness of social reality to an idealized model of our cognitive dispositions before 
we enter social cooperation with others. 
In this context, I claim that dehumanized perception is absent in Rawls’ social 
contract model and I argue that it needs to be included, in order to express a plausible 
theory of individuals as social and rational beings. Again, just as earlier with bounded 
rationality theory, one could counter to this that dehumanizing could simply fall under the 
‘veil of ignorance’ and that it is exactly this kind of cognitive bias that Rawls asks us to 
put aside in his thought-experiment. However, I treat dehumanized perception as such a 
fundamental cognitive ability that affects how we are able to mentalize those around us, 
and, which (as research at the neurological level showed) precedes opinions and 
judgments we might form about people, that therefore I claim that even if we fully 
recognize Rawls’s project as an abstract thought-experiment, we still have to consider, 
even under the most ideational and abstract circumstances, what effect dehumanized 
perception could have on people who are supposed to cooperate with each other. In other 
words, the way I argue that Rawls’ theory of social cooperation is deeply problematic is 
that he did not even consider it possible that the ideal rational person could fail to 
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cooperate with others on the grounds that she did not think them worthy enough as 
human beings.  
Whilst Rawls accounted for all other ways in which political actors could possibly 
reject each other’s viewpoint – namely along the lines of differing socio-economic 
theories of justice (the backdrop of the Cold War and the ideological battle between 
Communism and liberalism permeates Theory of Justice) and of ontological battles about 
existential truths such as in the realm of religion, which he addresses in his second 
seminal work Political Liberalism (published at the end of the Cold War and in the wake 
of the rise of identity politics) – he did not think that on a much more basic level of 
humanization, people’s cognitive endowments could fail them and bar them from even 
the most plain type of cooperation with others. 
Here is an additional example of the humanization problem in Rawls’ theory. In 
Theory of Justice, Rawls makes what he calls a ‘special assumption’, which is that “a 
rational individual does not suffer from envy” (Rawls, 1971, p.143). It is peculiar that of 
all the caprices of human psychology, Rawls chooses envy. He explains that this is 
because “envy makes everyone worse off, [it is] collectively disadvantageous” (Ibid., 
p.144). A non-envious person is “not ready to accept a loss for himself if only others have 
less as well” (Ibid., p.143). In other words, what Rawls worries about most is that people 
will resort to vengeful intentions and actions if they let envy conquer their minds, 
disturbing the equilibrium of the entire social contract. What Rawls does not consider is 
that if I envy someone, I might have already humanized them to a large extent, actually 
so much so that I want to possess what they own, consume what they consume, do 
whatever activities they engage in – to actually wanting to be whom they are! 
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In the “stereotype content model” (SCM), where stereotypes are considered to be 
of mixed nature, envy falls in the dual categories of low warmth/high competence, 
meaning that we perceive people we envy as highly capable and competent, but attribute 
few empathic and warm characteristics to them. In other words, we might admire people 
whom we envy but we do not find them very likeable. In the US, for example, social 
groups that fall into the envy category are Asians, Jews, and the rich (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002). Stereotypes are therefore tricky to address and remain persistent 
because like envy, they contain mixed categories of warmth and competence, i.e. people 
who are stereotyped this way might be told that the stereotyping is meant as a 
compliment, since envied people, for example, are viewed as highly competent. A recent 
international study that tested correlations between income inequality and the presence of 
the SCM model’s mixed stereotypes detected that the higher the income inequality, the 
higher the presence of ambivalent stereotypes (Durante et al., 2013). More equal 
societies, on the other hand, were less tolerant of mixed stereotypes. In that sense, Rawls’ 
assessment of envy’s destabilizing effect on a just society was correct. 
However, in terms of dehumanization, Harris and Fiske’s research linked 
dehumanization to disgust, in that amongst the main four stereotype categories of envy, 
pride, pity and disgust, only disgust groups were seen as less-than-human. This let them 
conclude that only with disgust do we activate brain parts that we usually reserve for the 
perception of objects, not humans. In the US, social groups in the disgust category 
include welfare recipients, the homeless, Arabs and poor Blacks. Further, the significant 
behavioral difference arising from disgust vs. envy is that we will direct aggressive 
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actions towards people whom we envy, whereas we simply neglect people for whom we 
feel disgust (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). 
This makes sense, since we do not bother about objects the way we care about 
people; therefore, people whom we view as less-than-human are exactly that – excluded 
from our vision of who belongs to society and treated like invisible objects no one cares 
about. Linking this back to political thinking on racism, for example, Ralph Ellison’s 
Invisible Man (Ellison, 1997) and his definition of blackness as invisibility come to mind, 
as well as Martin Luther King’s statement that he was “fighting the forever degenerating 
sense of nobodiness” (Cited in Mills 1997, p.112). At least the envied people are given a 
visible seat at the table, even if we might want to snatch it from them! 
The treatment that dehumanized groups and individuals receive in the form of 
neglect is therefore the worst that can happen to a party who wants to join the social 
contract. This is why I argue that Rawls, and the liberal tradition that surrounds him, 
misses the fundamental cognitive condition necessary for inclusion and equal treatment, 
which is humanization of the other. As mentioned above, the problem in Rawls is that he 
thought people would reject each other mainly along the lines of differing socio-
economic visions of society or, as he went on to include in his late life, clashing 
comprehensive doctrines such as religious ones. He simply did not think it possible that 
the process of agreeing to principles of justice between differing parties could fail 
because some are unable to perceive the other as human in the first place.  
Charles Mills, critical philosopher of race, criticized Rawls and the Western social 
contract tradition in his The Racial Contract (Mills, 1997) for the existence of a ‘parallel 
discursive universe’ (p.131) in which ‘white moral cognitive dysfunction’ (p.95) denied 
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people of color the full ‘moral state of personhood’ (p.118). Although Mills’ critique is 
compelling, it is not fully satisfying because he lacks empirical psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence of exclusion and dehumanization to make his case: Mills can 
point out the dehumanizing instances within Western political thought, but he is unable to 
provide further explanation about what exactly is going on in the brain of the excluder 
when this happens. In other words, Mills has lacks insight about the exact mechanisms 
implicated in cognitive dehumanization and in which way exactly dehumanization would 
affect social brain functions such as empathy or moral judgments, for example. This, in 
turn, makes his otherwise powerful objections to social contract theory’s White bias 
susceptible to the criticism of a new generation of philosophers of race, who are 
attempting to backtrack from Mills’s more radical claims by offering alternative readings 
of White social contract theorists17. 
 Thus what the brain science can offer political theorists is precisely an informed 
understanding of this cognitive mechanism and hard evidence for how dehumanization 
affects vital social brain functions such as mentalizing. Disagreeing with Rawls through 
this perspective then is not simply an aesthetic or moral divergence of political opinion 
but becomes an informed disagreement based on the recent brain insights into what it 
takes to view others as full human beings. It effectively suggests that Rawls’ standard of 
‘reasonableness’ for citizens requires the added category of humanization in order to 
make sense even just as ideational theory18. 
                                                 
17 See Brandon Terry’s (2013) recent critique of Mills, based on an analysis of new archival 
material of Rawls’s personal reflections on the civil rights movement. 
18 For a more standard critique of Rawlsian resonableness, see Jeremy Waldron’s (2003) 
argument about the limits of Kantianism and Rawlsian reasonableness in the face of clashing 
views of the good life in diverse societies. 
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In other words, whereas other biases can be treated as contingent factors and 
therefore be justifiably ignored in Rawls’ ideational model, I argue that dehumanized 
perception is so fundamental to our cognitive make-up that it has to be included even in 
the most abstract, ideational thought-experiment of social cooperation. In this sense, what 
the PBP can offer us is not just a more substantiated critique of White political theory’s 
dehumanization blindspot, but even more importantly, it can contribute to a constructive, 
more informed reconstruction of liberal theory’s norms and objectives for social 
cooperation in a hyperdiverse world. 
 
3.3.3. Dehumanization Blindspots III: Marxism 
The historical backdrop of slavery, colonialism, segregation, gender inequality 
and the general social inequities loomed at every point in history when major Western 
political works were written – from Aristotle to Augustine, to Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
Locke, Kant, Marx and far into the 20th century. Political thinkers were not only passive 
witnesses who inevitably internalized some of the dehumanizing social dynamics of their 
time, but in many instances, they were also active players within and defenders of 
dehumanizing systems, exemplified by John Locke’s involvement in the slave trade and 
ideological justification of slavery (Bernasconi & Mann, 2005) or Immanuel Kant’s 
belief, upheld until the end of his life, that blacks were inferior human beings (Gowans, 
2001; Louden, 2011). Although it has been suggested that Kant changed his views on 
colonialism as he got older, recent scholarship suggests that even though that was very 
likely the case, he (much like Thomas Jefferson) did not change his views on race and 
blacks as sub-humans, who were not considered to be part of his circle of human concern 
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(Louden, 2011, p.134)19. In other words, although Kant was able to reject colonialism on 
ideological and ethical grounds, he might not have been able to humanize and mentalize 
the actual people who were suffering within that unjust system. 
This phenomenon of the peculiar coexistence between the acknowledgment of 
faulty ideological systems and yet the inability to humanize those who are suppressed 
within those very systems is nowhere better manifested than in Marxism’s 
dehumanization blindspot. For Marxists, the phenomenon that “the hungry don’t steal 
and (…) the majority of those who are exploited don’t strike” can be attributed to the idea 
of “false consciousness” (Cited in Rosen 1996, p.1). Although Marx and Engels never 
explicitly named this idea in their public writings20, it permeates much of their 
understanding of the psychological disposition of human beings and the forces behind 
historical change. 
“False consciousness” is a way of explaining why a group of people – usually the 
suppressed in society – comply with and obey their oppressors even though it goes 
clearly against their own interests. 20th century Marxists such as Georg Lukács, who 
coined the term in his seminal History and Class Consciousness (Lukács, 1971 [1920]), 
Herbert Marcuse (1964) and Theodor Adorno (1974) applied the idea to understanding 
why societies would stagnate in progressing towards a post-capitalist stage of historical 
development, which Marx predicted would inevitably take place, due to the inherent 
contradictions within capitalism. False consciousness offered a compelling explanation: 
the hungry don’t steal and the oppressed don’t rebel because they have not understood 
                                                 
19 For a comprehensive discussion of Kant’s relationship to colonialism see Flikschuh & Ypi, 
2014; see also Kleingeld, 2012. 
20 Engels spoke of “false consciousness” only once in a private letter to Franz Mehring in 1893. 
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their inferior role in society yet – the belief that this realization will inevitably take place 
in the minds of the oppressed underlies the fundamental optimism of the Marxist vision 
of human psychology – but once they have rationalized their position, and unmasked the 
sinister exploitative forces that grip society in this backward state, they will rebel against 
the ruling class and bring about the next stage of history. 
How is this related to dehumanization at the brain level? The example of false 
consciousness is helpful because it illustrates how Marxists believe that detrimental 
psychological dispositions can be overcome by reason and the exposition of truth alone. 
Indeed, Michael Rosen considers “false consciousness” an idea that represents a 
“rationalist conception of the good for human beings” (Rosen, 1996, p.274), which he 
traces back to a Western rationalist tradition spanning from Plato to Étienne de la Boetie, 
Adam Smith and the Enlightenment thinkers. Rosen is skeptical of this rationalist 
conception of human motivations and behavior, and although he acknowledges the voices 
of anti-rationalists such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, Walter Benjamin, Freud and others, he 
deems their critique of rationalism to “lack[s] the foundations that would be needed to 
constitute a truly effective alternative to the dominance of rationalism” (Ibid., p.274). 
Rosen presumably is referring here to the lack of an empirically grounded foundation that 
would have the necessary evidentiary and theoretical force to counter rationalism in its 
current form. It is exactly this lacking foundation that a neuropolitical, social cognition-
based critique of the current rationalist tradition could provide. 
If we apply Rosen’s analysis of Marxist rationalism to dehumanization, the 
argument could go as follows: from a Marxist point of view, unequal and exploitative 
relationships – of which dehumanization is one – persist because both the exploited and 
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the exploiters (that is why even capitalists are considered to be capable of joining the 
Communist movement, once they come to understand the sinister workings of their 
actions) have not understood the underlying socio-economic mechanism and deeper 
moral truths of their relationships. The problem here for Marxists is not one of emotional 
motivation, but of rational epistemology. Once the actual truth is understood, the 
exploiters and most certainly the exploited will change course and redefine their political 
aims and sense of self. 
Has the Marxist hope of overcoming detrimental psychological processes through 
reason been replaced by a more sensible and nuanced perspective today? This does not 
seem to be the case. Jane H. Hill, a linguistic anthropologists studying the everyday 
language of White racism, reports that whenever she discusses the pervasiveness of 
racism in the US across university campuses and in front of various nationwide 
audiences, fellow White people (including her academic colleagues) will react with 
defensiveness and anger, and usually tell her the story of what she calls the “folk theory 
of racism” (Hill, 2008, p.5). One part of this folk theory consists in believing that racism 
is a matter of individual beliefs, that racists are anachronisms and that ignorance will 
eventually be cured by education and well-being (Ibid., p.8). Defenders of the folk theory 
of racism cannot accept that prejudice and extreme exclusion might be an integral way of 
how human beings (including themselves) function and that dehumanization of others 
cannot be cured through an act of will and reason alone. 
Indeed, to show how this folk theory of racism extends in more sophisticated 
political debates in the field of multiculturalism, it is worth referring to Anthony Appiah 
here, a prominent British political theorist of Ghanaian descent, who once responded to 
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the well-meaning suggestion by fellow liberal multiculturalist colleagues of overcoming 
White prejudice against African-Americans through educating White children early on in 
school about the merits of African culture and civilization, with the exasperated 
statement: “It is not black culture that the racist disdains, but blacks [emphasis added]” 
(Appiah 1996, p.26). This is a powerful example of how the rationalist tradition thus 
keeps exerting its powerful influence beyond Marxist borders into liberal multiculturalist 
theories. By claiming that dehumanization and extreme cognitive exclusion is a problem 
of the unreasonable or uneducated mind, instead of our emotive and cognitive brain 
limitations, multiculturalism theory is echoing the folk theory of racism, denying 
effectively that dehumanization is a disturbingly deep-reaching phenomenon and failing 
to acknowledge that racial exclusion is based on a fundamental social cognitive ability 
we all carry within us. 
The dehumanization research of the last decade, as well as the much older field of 
prejudice study within social psychology, has been able to discover certain conditions 
that might lessen dehumanization of others and increase humanization of out-groups and 
the willingness to cooperate with them. The famous contact hypothesis, first posited by 
Gordon Allport (1954), states that social contact between out-groups can reduce 
prejudice, and has been successfully retested and refined since (Dovidio, Eller, & 
Hewstone 2011; Pettigrew, 1997). However, some political scientists counter to this that 
the contact hypothesis fails to account for the causes behind recent genocides such as in 
Bosnia and Rwanda, where ethnic and religious groups lived peacefully and in close 
contact with each other for many centuries. Here, social neuroscientists who study 
dehumanized perception at the neurological level might be able to offer a more nuanced 
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picture. They found that the tricky aspect about dehumanized perception is that it can be 
turned on and off fairly easily and often without us noticing; the nature of in-group 
categorization and dehumanization of others is automatic and spontaneous (Lee & Harris, 
2014). 
We further know that dehumanization is linked to mentalizing and mental state 
attribution of others, in that we fail to attribute mental states to those we dehumanize. 
One way therefore to counter dehumanization could be to actively and consciously 
mentalize social targets that we know are vulnerable to extreme exclusion in society. 
Although this conscious mentalizing might not make a big difference in peaceful times – 
in that there is little conflict between different groups in those moments – having 
exercised my mentalizing abilities and consciously humanized these groups might have a 
significant effect in moments of conflict, where the competition over resources and the 
situation of civil war puts great pressure on decision-making. This could potentially have 
important implications for IR theory, where scholars have long been aware of the 
precarious cognitive situations under which decision-making takes place (Jervis, 1976) 
and have recently payed increased attention to the role played by cognitive and emotional 
factors in conflict situations and negotiations (Crawford, 2009; Petersen, 2011). 
Furthermore, researchers of prejudice have found that playing simulated 
cooperative games can reduce cognitive biases towards outgroups of another ethnicity 
(Sheng & Han, 2012), through which self-identification with out-group members is 
facilitated. In addition, the cognitive activity of individuating other people, i.e. imagining 
people as distinct individuals, can also contribute to humanization of the other 
(Swencionis & Fiske, 2014). Latest findings in the nascent field of cultural neuroscience 
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indicate that empathic abilities might even be uniquely shaped by culturally distinct 
construals of the self (Sheng, Han, & Han, 2015; Zuo & Han, 2013). 
In sum, the ongoing research into prejudice reduction and rehumanization 
suggests that in order to tackle exclusion, we cannot rely primarily on our reasoning 
capacities but have to include emotive and mentalizing capacities if we want to 
humanize, de-objectify and individuate others. Irrespective of whether we are talking 
about ideational or non-ideational theories, I claim in this chapter that this is what the 
rationalist tradition needs to pay attention to, if it wants to work with plausible 
assumptions about human cognitive capacities and behavior – as well as have a 
reasonable idea of where rationalist politics can begin. 
 
3.3.4. Dehumanization Blindspots IV: Human Rights 
In another strand of the rationalist tradition – the human rights discourse – it is not 
clear whether an explicit awareness about the cognitive challenge of humanizing others, 
as distinct from normative or ideological concerns, is present. A recent study on the effect 
of human rights education on the mindset of Indian police officers looked at the extent to 
which police officers were willing to adopt human rights norms and whether it changed 
their view on torture, after they had attended a two-year long human rights course (Wahl 
2013; 2017). Torture and extrajudicial violence by police in India is pervasive to the 
point of routine (HR Watch Report 2009; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2011). 
India’s relationship towards the UN Convention against Torture is ambivalent; it signed 
the Convention in 1997 but has not ratified it yet. Similarly, domestic legislation against 
torture has stalled in recent years, generating much criticism from human rights activists. 
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India is an interesting case here because of its ethnic and religious diversity within a non-
Western democracy. 
In particular, the study looked at whether police officers could reconcile their 
local beliefs about torture with those universal values learnt in their two-year course. The 
findings were surprising in two ways: contrary to the accepted view in the literature on 
the incompatibility of local beliefs with Western human rights values, the Indian police 
officers found it relatively easy to incorporate human rights beliefs into their local 
religious and moral norms of kindness and respect towards others. However, they still 
reserved the right to torture certain people whom they did not consider worthy enough of 
humane treatment. 
What this case underlines is the point I made earlier in connection to Marxism’s 
dehumanization blind spot, which is that the denunciation of faulty ideological systems 
and yet the inability to humanize those who are suppressed within those very systems 
often coincides. After the two-year human rights course, the police officers were able to 
use Western human rights language and concepts to denounce the use of torture, yet 
because they still cognitively dehumanized certain groups in society, they were unable to 
extend human rights protection to these people. No matter how many human rights values 
those Indian police officers would be willing to adopt, the use of torture will not cease 
until they are able to fully humanize all of their constituent groups.  
 
3.4. Political Contextualization of the PBP 
3.4.1. The Politics of Responsive Equality 
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There exists a lack of clarity about which kind of politics we are referring to when 
we debate the exclusion, in the sense that dehumanized perception occurs and matters in 
situations ranging from representative democratic debates in Congress to election 
campaigns, affirmative action, multicultural policies, ethnic violence, police violence, 
state-led sterilization of the urban poor, and the implementation of human rights – the list 
goes on. In any context where people from different groups face each other, or even just 
where two different individuals engage in a basic socio-political transaction or 
relationship, it matters whether these people are able to view each other as fully human, 
and as a consequence are able to attribute mental states to each other. This makes the 
study of dehumanization in political contexts both very important and very confusing. I 
believe that one major reason for the confusion is that we are not clear about which type 
of politics we refer to in a given context, and propose that there are two main types of 
politics that are at stake here: the politics of responsive equality and the politics of 
unresponsive inequality. 
 In the politics of responsive equality, politics happens predominantly in 
institutionalized and civil contexts. People there have the time to debate with each other, 
listen to each other’s arguments, sit down for negotiations and deliberate their political 
future. In this context, dehumanization matters because it can severely cloud someone’s 
judgment of the situation, and most important, can potentially make political persuasion 
based on public reason impossible. Some adherents of the rationalist tradition (though 
not Marxists) fall into this category, such as rational choice theorists, deliberative 
democratic theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, liberal theorists such as Immanuel Kant, 
John Rawls or Brian Barry, and multicultural theorists such as Will Kymlicka. To put it 
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more bluntly, the kind of politics envisioned there does not involve guns, violence or 
bloodshed, but treats political actors as reasonable actors who can disagree with each 
other profoundly, but could potentially be swayed to an agreement based on an appeal to 
their shared public reason and through the process of political deliberation. 
Though one might say that this vision of politics is too stylized and naïve, it is 
essential for any democratic polity – in order for us to locate politics in the procedural 
and deliberative institutions that we erected and maintain as democratic citizens, and for 
us to have an idealized society in mind that we can strive towards. It is, however, an 
incomplete picture of politics. It is therefore not surprising that this kind politics, where 
everyone is naturally assumed to have an equal say and assumed to be given an equal 
place to say it without fear and repercussions, is criticized for its aloofness and irreality 
by African-American political philosophers (Mills, 1997; Shelby, 2005) and by critical 
political theorists, who base their idea of politics on a Marxist view of politics as a power 
struggle and inherent exploitation. 
 Yet this chapter argues that dehumanization matters for the politics of responsive 
equality, and that the pursuing of this kind of politics, even if it works with an idealized 
model of society, is necessary in order for us to think and debate about how we would 
want to live with each other, under conditions where we would be able to humanize each 
other most of the time. This is why I argue that this kind of political model has to take 
into account everyday dehumanized perception and recognize mentalizing as a crucial 
social cognitive ability in order to work with plausible models of human behavior and 
have convincing expectations about how social cooperation works. 
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In the context of the multiculturalism debate and whether liberal societies should 
reserve a special status for minority rights, Brian Barry in his book Culture and Equality 
(Barry, 2001) rejects the justification for special minority accommodation and argues that 
the “politics of difference” should be replaced by what he calls the “politics of 
solidarity”, which consists in the neutral treatment of minority out-groups and universal 
equality for all. Barry’s view of society is severely limited by his own epistemological 
and biographical narrowness21 and lack of citations of empirical studies on stereotyping 
and the status of minorities in the West. However, his view is worth mentioning here 
because it represents a widespread belief amongst liberal political theorists: the idea that 
equal treatment of all will happen simply by persuading people that this is what they 
should value. This however, I argue, paints a distorted picture of the politics of 
responsive equality, in which equality is understood solely as a rational value or 
ideology, but not as a cognitive-perceptual ability of the brain that can only be reached 
once we have tackled our everyday dehumanized perception of others. 
 
3.4.2. The Politics of Unresponsive Inequality 
 In the politics of unresponsive inequality, there exists no leisurely time to stand at 
a door step and engage in a conversation with a hitherto dehumanized out-group, 
allowing an engaging conversation to induce mentalizing and reduce dehumanized 
perception. In this kind of politics, an adult, sometimes even a child, gets shot by the 
                                                 
21 Barry suggests that Asians and Jews do not face discrimination in US society because – based 
on his own narrow experience of having lived on three university campuses and briefly around 
Chicago as a British White male – Barry’s reasoning for this was that Asians in his perception 
were successful and Jews able to get kosher food and observe their religious practices in the 
Chicago area, see 306ff. 
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police even before they had the chance to defend themselves with words, and are given 
no platform to reduce the prejudice that is directed towards them through an engaging 
conversation. The recent and ongoing police violence against young African-American 
men inevitably comes to mind here, such as the case of Tamir Rice, the 12-year old boy 
in Cleveland who was shot by a police officer before the officer had even confronted him, 
only knowing that the suspect was black22. 
In these instances, the power hierarchies – both in terms of physical and socio-
political power – are so unequal that there is simply no time for the kind of prejudice 
reduction that could be successfully implemented in the realm of the politics of 
responsive equality. Yet the experiments studying prejudice and dehumanization 
reduction assume that the dehumanizing individual will lend their time and attention to 
reducing their own cognitive biases – in fact, time plays such a crucial role in prejudice 
reduction, but is a limited resource in the politics of unresponsive inequality. In this 
second kind of politics, those at the receiving end of this unequal relationship feel that 
politics is far removed from a deliberative process or situations where dehumanized 
perception could be challenged in a meaningful way. 
 The significance of the lack of humanization of social targets in the cases of 
recent US police violence is signified through the slogans that protesters upheld, such as 
‘Black Lives Matter’, as well as by the dehumanization research itself. Waytz and his 
colleagues (Waytz, Hoffman & Trawalter, 2013) found out that White Americans 
commonly “superhumanize” African-Americans, ascribing to them supernatural and 
                                                 
22 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-
names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/?utm_term=.2808233c994a, 
accessed February 3, 2017. 
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magical mental and physical qualities, which in turn leads to denial of pain of Black 
targets. This phenomenon could in fact be observed in the Michael Brown shooting in 
Ferguson, where the police officer was quoted in court of saying that Brown appeared to 
him like an incredible ‘hulk’ of supernatural physical height and that his face looked 
‘demonic’23. Because the police officer effectively dehumanized Brown by 
‘superhumanizing’ him, this might have led to the excessive violence directed against 
him, since the officer felt that Brown would not feel pain the same way as actual humans 
do. Moreover, since dehumanized perception is known to happen only 100 ms after 
stimulus presentation (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Harris & Fiske, 2009) there is little left to 
do for these social targets of police violence to dissipate the bias directed against them, 
even if they wanted to engage in deliberation or meaningful communication with their 
perpetrators. 
The “Black Lives Matter” movement (Taylor, 2016) recently became a focal point 
in the debate between Republican candidates for the 2016 presidential election, with 
many criticizing the movement’s slogan itself. Kentucky senator Rand Paul for example 
suggested changing the slogan to “All Lives Matter”, whereas Ben Carson, the only 
African-American Republican nominee, stated that the slogan is a distraction from real 
political problems facing the Black community24. With the brain evidence pointing to the 
way dehumanization shuts down crucial cognition abilities such as mentalizing and 
                                                 
23 http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/25/darren-wilson-testimony-ferguson-michael-
brown, accessed August 30, 2015. For Darren Wilson’s complete testimony see State of Missouri 
v. Darren Wilson, Grand Jury Vol V, Sept 16, 2014 at 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1371222-wilson-testimony.html, accessed August 30, 
2015. 
24 http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/04/republicans-black-lives-matter-
scapegoating-movement, accessed September 5, 2015. 
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empathic concern, as well as the way how Blacks are singled out in U.S. society for 
“superhumanization”, the poignancy and necessity behind the idea of “Black Lives 
Matter” can be defended more powerfully. In turn, the dehumanization at the brain level 
emerges once again as a tangible and biologically grounded phenomenon with serious 
political consequences for the less powerful in the politics of unresponsive inequality. 
We can thus generalize the political argument about mentalizing as follows: if 
dehumanized impressions are formed so quickly and if there are situations in which the 
politics of responsive equality stands no chance, then the conscious mentalizing of social 
out-groups by those who have disproportionately more power is an essential preventative 
measure against violence driven by dehumanization. Practically, this could mean 
programs in which police officers are routinely prompted to perform cognitive 
mentalizing exercises about vulnerable out-groups in their constituency, and where thus 
the conscious mentalizing of social targets is considered central in preventing the 
escalation of violence against them25.  
 Racially biased police violence is not the only place where the politics of 
unresponsive inequality takes place – numerous other social groups are denied the 
cognitive attention, time commitment and face-to-face interaction necessary for 
mentalizing and re-humanizing them.  
                                                 
25 Preliminary research on the cognitive and affective burdens of humanizing others suggests that 
excessive pre-mentalizing of an out-group might actually lead to increased dehumanization 
(Cameron, Harris, & Payne, 2016). This is because humanizing someone can be painful for us, so 
instead we choose to avoid engaging with them in the first place. Therefore an alternative way to 
moderate one’s dehumanized perception might be to practice mindfulness whilst dehumanization 
occurs in a controlled setting; this way one learns to recognize and moderate everyday 
dehumanized perception in a sustainable and integrative way. 
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From prisoners, to single parents living on welfare, to asylum seekers and beyond – the 
structural inequities in society do not encourage our political, economic and intellectual 
(including academics) elites to communicate with or encounter these groups face-to-face 
on a daily basis. Thus one criticism that one could level against the laboratory settings in 
which social neuroscience and psychology experiments are conducted is that they chiefly 
mimic the politics of responsive equality, where people are required to devote cognitive 
resources and time to each other through institutionalized deliberative democratic 
processes. 
Yet without incorporating the realities and dynamics of unresponsive inequality, 
where the scarcity of time and cognitive attention is pivotal in deciding life-and-death 
outcomes, laboratory studies on prejudice reduction are insufficient to capture the 
complete range of politics where cognitive exclusion and dehumanization can play a 
crucial role in terms of equal treatment, democratic deliberation, and political 
cooperation. In both kinds of politics, the responsibility of public representatives to be 
able to mentalize their diverse constituents and to overcome (or at least be aware of) the 
way how their brains dehumanize others routinely and spontaneously seems vital for the 
basic functioning and implementing of fair and equal treatment within a liberal 
democracy.  
 
3.5. A Neuropolitical Opportunity for Critical Theory 
 In critical political theory there exists an acute awareness about the destructive 
effects of the politics of unresponsive inequality and the need to address the injustices 
arising from it. In particular, in the study of the “politics of difference”, scholars have 
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talked about the need for an “ethics of recognition” (Honneth, 1996) and “equal 
recognition” (Patten, 2014) of disadvantaged minority groups, demanding for them 
“equal social status” (Fraser, 2000). The problem however with these theories is that their 
arguments lack the empirical and objective force that the psychological and 
neuroscientific research into dehumanization can offer, specifically, in terms of the exact 
cognitive mechanisms that are involved in dehumanized perception. Although these 
critical theories often demand humanization of out-groups in some form, they do not 
explicitly name this demand and instead use an array of different, often more vague, 
terms, rendering it difficult to find a more unifying concept under which the phenomenon 
can be understood and discussed politically. 
Most of all however, they are unable to argue that mentalizing is a crucial social 
cognitive ability that is compromised during dehumanized perception and that therefore 
mentalizing should be treated as a politically highly relevant mental ability. In this way, 
critical theorists of exclusion do not manage to come up with a specific cognitive 
mechanism with which to describe and understand social exclusion, dampening the 
persuasiveness and impact of their theories beyond their own field significantly. Yet 
critical theorists hold a unique and crucial position in the debate on the politics of 
exclusion. No other theoretical approach currently focuses on the politics of unresponsive 
inequality with the same concern and analytical sophistication as critical theory does. 
One aim of this chapter was to show that in order to build a meaningful neuropolitical 
theory of exclusion, neuroscientific laboratory results cannot be simply applied to the 
rationalist individual constructed by the liberal White canon that most of Western 
political philosophy is built upon. Social neuroscience and psychology experiments have 
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been accused of being conducted in too sterile and artificial settings, yet this chapter 
argues that it is not artificiality that is the main problem here (in fact, many political 
processes are artificial), but that the majority of laboratory settings exclude basic aspects 
of social structural inequalities in their conception and set-up. 
The neuropolitical opportunity for critical theorists lies in bringing to the table a 
rich tradition of analyzing and understanding these very structural inequities, and help 
incorporate this into the experimental design and the drawing of political conclusions in 
the current brain research on exclusion and re-humanization. For this to happen, however, 
critical theorists and the political Left have to overcome their deeply seated Marxist 
suspicion towards psychological explanations of social exclusion, by appreciating that the 
momentous unlocking of the ‘black box’ of our social brains, which is currently taking 
place at this extraordinary moment in the history of science, can potentially aid 
substantially in understanding the fundamental cognitive mechanism at play in social 
exclusion. In this sense, this chapter tried to show the brain science of exclusion can help 
strengthen political theories of structural inequities considerably, and lift them to another 
level of awareness about the cognitive conditions under which politics takes place. 
 For example, a potentially fruitful application of the PBP to critical theory could 
lie in the realm of political language. Mentalizing/Theory of Mind researchers have 
managed to show a strong link between language usage and mentalizing. For example, it 
is well established by now that linguistic ability relates to performance on tests that 
examine the presence of ToM (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Astington & Baird, 2005). A 
speaker’s ability to use so-called “mental state verbs” (e.g. think, know, want) when 
asked to describe someone else’s state of mind is a reliable indicator for the presence of 
 119 
ToM (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). If mentalizing language can be an indicator for the 
presence of a speaker’s cognitive mentalizing activity, then language usage can also be an 
indicator of whether someone is actually humanizing the person they speak about. 
This could offers political scientists a powerful analytical tool to analyze political 
speech for dehumanization, based on what kind of mentalizing words are used by the 
speaker in describing a certain out-group. With Marxism’s concern about dismantling 
ideological superstructures, which are thought of as the linguistic and conceptual ideas 
passed down through elites, there is potential for a promising merging of these two ways 
of language analysis, and a chance for critical theory to pin down the neurolinguistic 
cognitive mechanisms at work in social exclusion, whilst being able to embed them in a 
materialistic critique of unequal and exploitative social structures.  
 
3.6. Conclusion: The Neuropolitical Duties of Public Representatives 
If excluding someone – to the point of shunning them from our idea of humanity 
– is in fact an integral part of how our brains make sense of their social surroundings, 
how can this fact be integrated in our thinking and the political structures and language of 
liberal democracies? What innovative ways can we outline, through this new insight into 
the cognitive mechanism of social exclusion (as well as the overcoming of exclusion and 
prejudice), of how to deal politically with a cognitive ability that once made sense 
evolutionarily, but is now misplaced in a globalizing world where social cooperation does 
and has to take place across cultural and identity boundaries? 
This chapter attempted to make a first step towards formulating these questions 
out of the empirical evidence that is generated from the social neuroscience field, and 
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making them relevant for our political thinking about identity politics and beyond. The 
chief aim of this chapter was to offer a broadly-painted sketch of how political theorists 
could begin to apply the PBP and include dehumanized perception into a variety of social 
cooperation theories – spanning from social contract, multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism theories to deliberative and power relationships between constituents 
and public representatives in liberal democracies. What all of these theories have in 
common are their inherent “rationalist” assumptions about the human capacity for social 
inclusion. 
This chapter tried to show that dehumanized perception, as understood and 
researched in the context of our social brain, needs to be treated seriously as a 
fundamental cognitive process that potentially undermines the way how we live and 
cooperate together politically. The everyday, rapid and automatic nature of dehumanized 
perception poses a particularly challenge to hyperdiverse and hypermobile societies 
where identities and allegiances are in constant flux, and yet where the peaceful 
coexistence and political cooperation between a wide array of socio-cultural groups is 
desired. In this context of hyperdiverse and hypermobile modern society, public 
representatives must shoulder a special cognitive responsibility: more than anyone else, 
they carry a distinct duty to be able to mentalize and cognitively represent a wide and 
diverse constituency, and make decisions on behalf of many mentalized positions, 
viewpoints and identities. Being in command of their mentalizing faculties and being 
aware of the troublesome political and social effects of everyday dehumanized 
perception, bias and prejudice – particularly in light of structural inequalities in terms of 
raw power between themselves and their constituents – seems to be crucial both for 
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public representatives’ success at fulfilling the representative nature of their jobs, but 
also, to justify the positions of power they are holding on behalf of a democratic and 
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______________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Search of Dignity: Ontology vs. Neurocognitive Processes in 
Human Rights and Multiculturalism Debates 
 
Human dignity is one of those concepts that politicians, as well as virtually everyone else in 
political life, like to throw around, but that almost no one can either define or explain. 
 






4.1. Does Dignity Have to Exist? 
The previous chapter explained why dehumanized perception is crucial in 
political settings where an awareness of the mental state of others is needed, in order for 
decisions and cooperation based on public reason to take place. I distinguished between 
two kinds of politics, the politics of responsiveness and the politics of unresponsiveness – 
arguing that in both cases, dehumanized perception is required to either maintain 
epistemological equality between different political interest groups or to prevent gross 
power inequalities (with potentially ensuing violence) between them. I assumed that 
dehumanization, or the denial of humanness to someone, would be deemed undesirable 
based on the political and moral premises liberal democratic societies are built on. 
Even though this chapter maintains this point, I argue that within current theories 
of toleration, multiculturalism and human rights, there is little or insufficient weight 
placed on the cognitive challenge of humanizing someone in our everyday social and 
political lives. I argue that this stems from confusion about how humanization is achieved 
and about what makes us dignified human beings in someone else’s eyes. My main 
argument here is that currently, the idea of dignity – and not humanization – lies at the 
heart of theories such as universal human rights, and that dignity there is imagined and 
pursued as an a priori ontological “essence” inherent in all human beings. Similarly, in 
other theories such as the politics of difference and multiculturalism, the main goal seems 
to be to acknowledge that individuals or groups who have different cultural or religious 
life pursuits and customs to the majority are nonetheless entitled – due to the inherent 
worthiness or dignity of the ‘otherness’ of their identities – to non-interference or even 
protection by political authorities. In all of these cases, it is the contestation of dignity, 
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not of humanization, which is seen as the ultimate battle ground for the overcoming of 
interpersonal-and group conflict and the protection of political rights. 
Instead of an ontological approach to what makes us human, I propose in this 
chapter a neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization, which is deontological 
and non-essence based. In this model, humanization of another person is defined as a 
fundamental social brain ability, which is extremely precarious due to its “flexible” 
nature (Harris, 2017) and our tendency to spontaneously dehumanize various groups and 
individuals on an everyday basis. Humanness, dignity, human worth, or human 
uniqueness – however we decide to call it – is not an irreducible essence located in the 
individual like an invisible nugget, but a physically detectable, cognitive activity that 
takes place on an interpersonal level between people and groups who perceive each other 
through their social brains. Humanization is thus located in the complex and delicate 
interpersonal nexus between the perceiver and the one who is perceived. It is within this 
nexus where our political questions and theories about toleration, multiculturalism, and 
human rights need to be placed. 
What this chapter does not set out to do is to argue against the moral and political 
aspirations that drive those philosophers, activists and politicians who fight for the 
recognition of universal dignity of all humans. Stating that dignity is neurocognitive and 
interpersonal, instead of deontological and non-essence based, does not mean that we 
cannot justify the defense of universal rights for leading a life unharmed by the state and 
fellow humans, or that we cannot argue for respect and humanization of all human 
beings. Rather, what the neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization introduces 
is an alternative, biologically grounded dimension of reality, where the phenomenon of 
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dignity is constructed around the neurocognitive capacities of the perceiver and the one 
who is being perceived. 
Therefore, the second main argument that this chapter sets out to advance is that 
in order to resist and tackle political assaults on people’s “dignity”, we do not necessarily 
need an ontological proof of “dignity” itself. Rather, I argue that the existing evidence on 
the damaging effects of racism, sexism and dehumanization on targeted individuals’ 
physiological health, executive brain functions and overall well-being and behavior is 
sufficient to justify a defense of “human dignity” (Dardenne et al., 2013; Gibbons et al., 
2012; Harrell, Hall, & Taliaferro, 2003; Kteily, Bruneau, & Hodson, 2016). Therefore in 
order to oppose and fight political dignity violations, evidence showing how these 
violations can harm targeted individuals in terms of their ability to fully function and 
thrive in their capacity as human beings is both more persuasive and sustainable than 
ontological and essence-based proofs of dignity. To put it more bluntly, what happens 
between people – i.e. the interpersonal and neurocognitive ascriptions and denials of 
humanness to each other – is of greater political relevance than the existence of an 
irreducible human essence. Ultimately, what is at stake in political violations of dignity is 
not the eradication of dignity as an essence, but the threat that the frequent and often 
unconscious occurrence of dehumanized perception poses to a viable kind of liberal 
democratic politics.  
 
4.2. Why Does Dignity Matter for Politics? 
The idea of human dignity is both ubiquitous and elusive. This might be due to 
the fact that the term “dignity” has an air of immaterial fuzziness about it, or because 
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“dignity” has been used in almost every possible debate ranging from human rights 
(Amnesty International, 2005; Habermas, 2010; Lutz-Bachmann & Nascimento, 2014), 
animal rights (Cavalieri, 2001), euthanasia (Azize, 2007) and racial discrimination 
(Clark, 1970; Mitchell, 2005; Palmer & Smith, 2010), to the set-up of penal systems and 
the distribution of welfare (Chan, 2005). Within the Western post-Enlightenment 
discourse, the political question that lies at the heart of these debates can be summed up 
as follows: ‘Does human dignity exist independently of a rights-guarantor (such as the 
state or international law), and if so, how can its existence be proven?’ When this 
question is posed, it is almost always assumed that dignity is a kind of invisible “essence” 
located in each human being (or possibly, also in non-human animals, see Röska-Hardy 
& Neumann-Held, 2012) and that therefore the ultimate goal is to demonstrate with a 
convincing proof that this “essence” exists. The problem of “dignity” is thus construed as 
an ontological one.  
What drives the search for dignity’s essence is the fear that without a non-
negotiable, objective claim on the unique worth of being human, the future of universal 
rights and equality is under peril. For example, Jack Donnelly, a leading human rights 
theorist, states that we simply need to take a leap of faith when it comes to the existence 
of dignity (Donnelly, 2003). The fear is that without ontological claims laid on dignity, 
the demands for rights become mere subjective claims. The assumption therefore is that 
once an objective, ontology-based proof can replace a more instinctive moral belief about 
the inherent worth of human beings, the desirability and necessity of human rights can be 
justified cross-culturally and cross-nationally. 
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Indeed, from the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to the Grundgesetz in 
Germany’s 1949 Constitution, as well as the U.S. government’s National Security 
Strategy spanning the last couple of decades, an essence-based idea of dignity continues 
to be invoked in both national and international politics. I argue that this can be traced 
back to the political question that I singled out at the beginning of this chapter, namely 
that in these above examples, governments and international institutions are trying to 
establish the existence of dignity independent to a formal rights guarantor. For example, 
the UDHR demands recognition of the “inherent dignity (…) of all members of the 
human family” and that “all human beings are born equal and free in dignity”26; whereas 
the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law), signed in 1949 in the wake of German atrocities 
committed during the war and through the Holocaust, states that human dignity is 
inalienable and untouchable by anyone27, especially by state power. Similarly, the U.S. 
government’s National Security Strategy (2015) lists “human dignity” numerous times 
together with the advancement of rights, prosperity and security; and further pits the 
preservation of dignity against the outbreak of conflict28. Within this list, dignity is the 
most intangible and perhaps least explicitly political value, yet one philosophical tenant 
underlying U.S. foreign policy seems to be based on the existence and importance of 
“human dignity”. 
Undoubtedly what these documents foremost try to invoke is the idea of natural 
inalienable rights, thus “dignity” serves more as a decorative rhetorical device for 
validating more substantial politico-legal ideas, rather than introducing a freestanding 
                                                 
26 UDHR, Preamble and Article 1. 
27 Deutsches Grundgesetz, Artikel 1: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar.“ 
28 US National Security Strategy, February 2015, signed by President Obama. 
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argument about human dignity itself. However, in a more subtle fashion, these 
invocations are also making a distinct point about how dignity matters as an independent 
phenomenon, in that it is believed to be out there in the world and in need of protection, 
even if it might not have fully materialized into current political structures, language and 
rights29. What this chapter is asking is whether these philosophical invocations of an 
essence-based human dignity are in fact necessary to achieve the political goals that these 
governments, institutions and movements are trying to attain. 
To take a step back, where might the understanding of dignity as in independently 
existent phenomenon have come from? In the Western context, Judeo-Christianity seem 
like an obvious starting point, consider Genesis 1:26-27: “Then God said ‘Let us make 
man in our image, according to our likeness’…so God created man in his own image 
(…)”. This is echoed in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1252), in 
which he states that “dignity signifies something’s goodness on account of itself” 
(Aquinas, 1975), essentially affirming the intrinsic value of dignity, which it acquires 
through its fitting place in God’s creation. In the Reformation period, John Calvin 
reasserts the link between Imago Dei and dignity by saying that “God’s image is the 
perfect excellence of human nature” (Calvin, 1960, p.190). Indeed, “from the early 
Church to the sixteenth century to the present, appeals to the image of God and a 
concomitant assertion of human worth or dignity have been constants in Christian moral 
reflection about the person” (Howard, 2013, p.2f.). 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of human rights foundationalism vs. human rights pragmatism, see Luban, 
2015. The former contends that legal human rights should copy universal moral human rights; the 
latter believes instead that the semantics of “human rights” ought to correspond to its practical 
use and implementatory effects. In the context of this chapter’s argument about dignity, a 
foundationalist argument most likely would support the idea that dignity is essence-based. 
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The dignity idea therefore has strong roots in Judeo-Christian thought – as a 
substance that exists by virtue of birth and possibly even precedes birth through its 
connection to the eternal Imago Dei, as a principle or human status that cannot be 
negotiated and should not be violated by worldly powers, and as a value that lives on 
unchanged despite political and constitutional transformations that are taking place now 
or in the future. Even when asking atheist or non-Christian human rights activists today, 
the account they give about the inalienability of human dignity (and the ensuing rights 
attached to it) often sounds strikingly similar to the above (Amnesty International, 2005; 
Blanco, 2014; Cruft, Liao, & Renzo, 2015; Novak, 1999). This is because in its core, the 
current human rights discourse, and the nations and international organizations that 
ascribe to it, embraced the philosophical tenets of the Judeo-Christian idea of dignity 
wholeheartedly, especially in the post-War context, in which most of the current legal 
vocabulary of human rights was developed (Glendon, 2001). If we go back to the 
question ‘Does dignity exist independently of a rights-guarantor?’, then an essence-
based, Judeo-Christian idea of dignity allows us to answer the question with a resounding 
Yes, and the political and legal challenge that remains is to compel rights-guarantors to 
recognize and protect human dignity, and the rights that are attached to it. 
That being said, the Judeo-Christian influence on current accounts of dignity is 
undoubtedly more complicated than suggested above. Immanuel Kant, whom Michael 
Rosen justifiably calls “that thinker on whose giant shoulders the modern theory of 
human rights largely rests” (Rosen, 2012, p.19) and whose “thought about dignity should 
stand at the center of any historical account of dignity” (Ibid.), famously tried to define 
human worth (Würde) not as defined through God or an external authority, but within an 
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individual person’s capacity for autonomy and making one’s own moral laws. Kant 
developed this idea in his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in which he 
states that dignity has an ‘inner value’ that cannot be replaced by a relative value, and 
therefore serves as an ‘end in itself’ (AK. 4:434-435). It is here where the foundation for 
Kant’s categorical imperative is laid down, in which Kant demands that human beings 
should treat each other as ends in themselves. However, despite Kant’s attempts at 
liberating the idea of dignity from its reliance on the external image and authority of a 
Christian God, Kant’s idea of dignity as an intrinsic, non-negotiable value still retains 
some aspects of idea of an essence-based understanding of dignity. 
The belief in an inviolable human worth, enshrined in natural rights, has been 
contested and even been subjected to ridicule in the history of political thought. Most 
famously perhaps, Jeremy Bentham’s quote that “natural rights” is “simple nonsense: 
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, – nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham, 
1848) comes to mind. Although Bentham is referring to natural rights here, I argue that 
the implicit reference here is to human dignity – Bentham contests the plausibility of the 
existence of human dignity, as implied in natural rights. Bentham continues saying that 
“and of these rights, whatever they are, there is not, it seems, any one of which any 
government can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the smallest particle [my 
emphasis]” (Ibid.). The reference here to the physical non-properties of natural rights, 
and human dignity as its foundation, are a strike against the ontological, essence-based 
claims underlying dignity. To Bentham, rights do not exist independently of rights-
guarantors, whether that is a political-legal guarantor such as the state, or a moral 
guarantor such as society’s majority. 
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One way to counter Bentham would be to point to his contemporary, David 
Hume, who impassionately argued in a much-overlooked chapter in the Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) that human beings have a natural tendency 
towards benevolence and empathic emotions towards their fellow human beings, and that 
this special ‘sentiment’ is the driving force of morality. Although Hume agrees with 
Bentham’s skepticism of defining characteristics about human nature and virtues through 
abstract principles and metaphysics, he claims that in the empirical world, “morality is an 
active principle” (Hume, ECPM Gale Version, p.6), in which the driving force is a 
benevolent human sentiment that people in large parts have for each other, and which, 
most importantly, “nature has made universal to the whole species” (Ibid.). 
In other words, humanizing others is an “activity”, not a metaphysical essence, 
which exists for Hume in the world already and does not need to be proven. Hume rejects 
the cynical view that all human moral sentiments are driven by self-interest, but insists 
that he has observed in many instances where family and friends, and even strangers, 
have bestowed on each other benevolent feelings without ulterior motives. I will build on 
Hume’s idea of moral sentiment as a cognitive-psychological activity instead of 
metaphysical essence, and his claim about the natural and universal occurrence of 
empathic feelings towards others in my neurocognitive model of humanization.  
Human rights scholars and activists have pointed out that a Benthamian approach 
towards human dignity leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of governments and the 
tyranny of majority opinions, insisting that the affirmation of the existence of human 
dignity independently of a rights guarantor is essential to the purpose and success of 
human rights (McCrudden, 2008; Kateb, 2011; Kretzmer & Klein, 2002; Rosen, 2012; 
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Simmons, 2015; Tasioulas, 2012) – this position is commonly referred to as a 
“foundationalist” one within the human rights discourse. Critics of this discourse (Beitz, 
2011) argue that international human rights do not need a philosophical foundation other 
than the practice of human rights, or that at the very least, the idea of human dignity can 
be decoupled from human rights applications, without making the latter less significant or 
successful (Buchanan, 2015; Luban, 2015; Waldron, 2015). This chapter sides with the 
latter camp, in that it maintains that what matters is not so much the independent 
existence of dignity but the acknowledgment that dignity violations at an interpersonal 
and neurocognitive level are harmful both to individuals and the viability of liberal 
democratic politics.  
In a completely different vein to Bentham, Edmund Husserl, 20th century 
phenomenologist, introduced the idea of the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), in which 
intersubjectivity and empathy, as its foundation, play a crucial role. Discussed mainly in 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931) and Husserliana XIII-XV (1950), intersubjective 
experience is understood as empathic experience, which in turn makes up the ‘lifeworld’ 
of human beings. The ‘lifeworld’ is the pre-given and generally unreflected backdrop of 
our social world in which we make sense of ourselves and others – phenomenologically 
speaking, it represents the way members of social groups structure the world into objects. 
From a starting point of egocentric subjectivity, they move towards a psycho-physical 
perspective of the objective, spatio-temporal order (Beyer, 2015).  In this ‘lifeworld’, my 
self-image as a full-fledged person comes about through what Edith Stein, Husserl’s 
former Ph.D. student, calls ‘iterated empathy’ (Stein, 1917), meaning that I put myself 
into the position of someone else, under the condition that they will do the same, and that 
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the ability to ascribe intentional acts to someone else depends on a bodily, i.e. flesh-and-
blood identification with each other as fellow human beings30. 
One cannot help but think of the strong parallels between the brain-based activity 
of mentalizing and humanization outlined in Chapter 3, and Husserl’s phenomenological 
account of intersubjectivity and empathy. It is through Hume’s observation of the natural 
and spontaneous occurrence of everyday humanization of others and Husserl’s 
‘lifeworld’ as intersubjective, bodily empathy that we have arrived at the entry point of 
the neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization that I wish to advance in this 
chapter.  
 
4.3. A Neuropolitical, Interpersonal Model of Humanness 
Why do we need to bring in the brain in the context of humanization? Firstly, by 
showing that the physical manifestations of (de)humanization at the brain level exist 
rebukes Bentham’s challenge that claims to human dignity are groundless “non-sense” – 
in fact, what the brain data shows is that the perception of the humanness of others 
constitutes a fundamental way of how our social brains function on a daily basis, and that 
therefore the phenomenon of dignity is tangible, visceral and manifested in physical 
reality. 
This reality, however, is not captured by brain imaging methodology as essence-
based but instead as an interpersonal, brain-based experience. Furthermore, psychological 
and neuroscientific studies on how people react to stereotyping, rejection and ostracism 
cement the claim that dignity and humanization matters for those who wish to be 
                                                 
30 See how Jewish phenomenologists in the latter half of the 20th century, such as Emmanuel 
Levinas, built on Husserl’s idea of empathy post-Holocaust.  
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humanized (i.e. those at the receiving end), in that human beings have shown to be 
extremely sensitive to exclusion and denial of recognition by others (DeWall, 2013; 
Hiroshi, Taishi, & Mitsuhiro, 2015; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). An 
alternative proof of human dignity could therefore be based on the fact that our social 
brains seem to have a deeply felt need to feel recognized, included and humanized, and 
that neurobiological and psychological evidence of this need might be sufficient for 
justifying political rejections of dignity violations. 
The everyday and universal aspects of dehumanized perception can further allow 
us to rid dehumanization off its “evilness” and “sinfulness” connotation, by treating 
dehumanization not so much as a rare aberration from social and moral norms that is 
carried out by a small number of sadistic and evil people within the population, but 
rather, as an inherent cognitive ability that we all share and bring into politics. For 
example, the necessity for expanding the understanding of dehumanization as a more 
ubiquitous and widespread phenomenon came to the attention of Hannah Arendt, when 
she covered the Eichmann trail in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1963). Adolf Eichmann, a former 
German Nazi official who was tried in Jerusalem in 1961 for his implementation of the 
“Final Solution” strategy to exterminate Jews during the Holocaust, was portrayed by 
Arendt as an ordinary person who was not chiefly driven by sadism or a hatred of Jewish 
people, yet he was capable of and fully responsible for extraordinary crimes. What has by 
now become the famous title of her book, Arendt described the Eichmann phenomenon 
as the “banality of evil”, capturing the everyday and ordinary aspect of how Eichmann 
executed and recounted his crimes against humanity. Arendt was baffled by the mundane 
and seemingly “normal” way how Eichmann came across, which foreshadows the 
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findings in the recent studies on everyday and subtle dehumanization by Leyens et al. 
(2001), as well as historical accounts of how Holocaust atrocities were committed by 
seemingly ordinary people (Browning, 1992). 
Although Arendt’s assessment of Eichmann was heavily criticized by various 
contemporaries (Abel, 1963; Ezorsky, 1966) and even discredited as having 
underestimated Eichmann’s sinister intentions when he carried out the orders to 
exterminate millions of Jewish people (Robinson, 1965), her assessment of the 
“ordinariness” of Eichmann in her analysis of his language in the original German – in 
particular the impersonal jargon he used to describe key events as well as his lack of 
agency – illuminate how dehumanization can manifest itself in ordinary speech and 
accounts. What matters here is that language usage, as mentioned in Chapter 3, can serve 
as an indicator for the presence or absence of dehumanized perception. What struck 
Arendt most was Eichmann’s inability to speak both about his victims and himself in a 
humanizing way when recounting past events, creating the image of the bureaucratic cog 
stuck in the workings of the larger machine.  
To sum up, I propose the following model: 
1. This chapter argues that in order to resist political dignity violations, we do not 
need an essence-based, ontological model of dignity. Instead, an interpersonal, 
neurocognitive model suffices in proving that human dignity exists: both based 
on the human brain’s ability to flexibly ascribe and deny humanness to others, as 
well as on the cognitive need to feel humanized, included and recognized by 
others. What matters is how dignity is negotiated, denied and demanded at the 
brain level between people, not whether it exists independently of governments 
and laws as an irreducible essence. 
 
2. The ontological hunt for dignity is misguided, because we already spontaneously 
humanize and dehumanize people on a daily basis. Trying to prove the existence 
of an inherent human essence is misguided on two grounds: firstly, it denies the 
fact that spontaneous humanization (in the form of spontaneous mentalizing, or 
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through feeling empathic emotions) of others is an inevitable and a basic part of 
how our social brains function, 
 
3. And secondly, it neglects the mechanism underlying everyday, spontaneous 
dehumanization, in so far as an ontological ‘essence-based’ theory of human 
dignity underestimates the way how everyday dehumanization permeates all 
aspects of everyone’s social lives, making us all regular ‘violators’ of each other’s 
humanness (even the most morally perfected person can still succumb to 
dehumanized perception), and that one cannot expect that once the existence of 
the ‘dignity essence’ is proven, dehumanization does not take place anymore. 
 
4. But also, it underestimates the sheer frequency and pervasiveness of when a 
denial of individual human worth occurs and what affect this might have on those 
vulnerable groups whose dignity is affected by everyday dehumanization. Here, 
the relatively new field of everyday dehumanized perception is supported by more 
established research on automatic stereotyping and exclusion, see compelling data 
on frequency and pervasiveness of implicit biases gathered through the “Implicit 
Association Test” (IAT)31. 
 
5. Cultural neuroscience on biculturalism: difference in sense of self/self-construal 
amongst East Asians (interdependent) and Westerners (independent) suggests that 
the Western individualist-construal of the self is not the only path for people to 
define their human worth. But also, see non-Asian minority groups such as 
Muslim women in Western Europe: for example, an interdependent self is implied 
in French Muslim-headscarf debate, i.e. anti-headscarf feminists and philosophers 
such as Luc Ferry want to ‘save’ Muslim women from this ‘undignified’ 
interdependent construal of their self, by forcing a public space where they have 
to publicly display what is seen as a dignified, i.e. ‘independent’ assertion of the 
female body (Winter, 2008). In addition, other non-Christian religions such as 
Buddhism have a completely different idea of human dignity, stressing non-
individualism as highest standard of the Self (Wu et al., 2010).  
 
6. Bicultural individuals, if primed, can effortlessly switch between cultures and 
different self-construals and value systems (Chiao et al., 2010). How does this 
affect a monolithic, single-ontology based proof of dignity (even if it were found 
one day), if people can exist and switch between different ontological accounts of 
self? How can universal theories of human dignity be defended against the 
pluralistic experience of dignity in multicultural individuals?  
 
                                                 
31  See AG Greenwald, DE McGhee, & JLK Schwartz (1998) “Measuring individual differences 
in implicit cognition: The implicit association test” Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 
74: 1464-1480. The IAT has since been tested in a multitude of international settings, and has 
been strengthened through correlating fMRI data, see Kristine M. Knuston, Linda Mah, Charlotte 
F. Manly, & Jordan Grafman (2007) “Neural correlates of automatic beliefs about gender and 
race” Human Brain Mapping 28: 915-930. 
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Ascribing a human mind to others and trying to figure out what others think and 
feel as unique human beings within our immediate environment is a cognitive activity 
that we develop in infancy and continue to employ in a wide variety of social situations 
throughout our lives. This cognitive activity is called mentalizing or Theory of Mind 
amongst developmental psychologists and social neuroscientists (Adolphs, 2006; 
Wagner, 2015; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Making sense of other people’s minds, i.e. 
making sense of others as fellow human beings is of such importance to us that our brains 
will try to use various cues ranging from someone’s facial expression (Adolphs et al., 
1994; Calder et al., 1996), emotions in their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), body 
language, to actively probing others and analyzing their self-ascriptions. Attributing 
mental states to others has been reported to develop in infancy cross-culturally (Avis & 
Harris, 1991), i.e. it is a universally occurring ability and need of the human social brain. 
In this sense, Hume was correct to insist that humans direct pro-social cognitive and 
emotional resources towards each other on a daily basis, and that this is a fundamental 
way in which humans operate within society. 
Furthermore, the most recent research on mindreading draws strong links between 
mindreading and empathic reactions (McCall & Singer, 2013), as well as the moral 
evaluation of one’s own and other people’s actions, with some going so far as to claim 
that the “primary service of mental state reasoning may be for moral cognition and 
behavior” (Young & Waytz, 2013). Again, Hume’s assertion of morality as an activity – 
not an ontological essence – grounded in the benevolent sentiments towards others 
resonates strongly with the neurobiological manifestations of mentalizing, pro-social 
emotions, and empathy. 
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It is important not to simplify the phenomenon here: the fact that I am ascribing 
mental states to others on a frequent daily basis, and that this might primarily serve moral 
reasoning, as well as result in Humeian ‘benevolent sentiments’ does not have to 
automatically result in a world where people live in harmonious unison as each other’s 
friend. The first thing to keep in mind here is to separate cognitive activities, pro-social 
emotions and attitudes (i.e. what goes on in the social brain) with actual actions and 
behavior towards people (i.e. what goes on in the social world), which was already 
discussed in the discussion on neuropolitical methodology and epistemology in Chapter 
2. In addition, cultural neuroscience stresses that in the context of bicultural individuals 
that attitudes do not equal behaviors (Boski 2008; Ward & Kus, 2010), in the sense that 
the way people navigate the cultural divide within their bicultural identities can be 
‘multideterminate’. On the question of multideterminate outcomes of psychological 
attitudes and neurocognitive abilities consider political scientist Robert Jervis, who 
repeatedly pointed out the self-deceptions and contingences at play in political 
perceptions and decision-making: 
“We cannot understand systems by summing up the characteristics of the parts or the 
bilateral relations between pairs of them (…) intuitively, we often expect linear 
relationships. If a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid 
should produce greater growth. But in a system a variable may operate through a 
nonlinear function. That is, it may have a disproportionate impact at one end of its 
range (…) Similarly, the effect of one variable or characteristic can depend on which 
others are present.”  
(Jervis, 1997, p.34-35) 
 
Jervis argues that different variables do not simply “add up” to one single outcome, but 
that it is the interaction between the variables (and other external, often unforeseen 
factors) that lead to a multideterminate outcome. 
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Whereas Jervis is describing what he calls “system effects” for situations on a 
national or international political scale, this chapter is concerned with a more micro-
based framework of interpersonal ascription and denial of humanness and human dignity, 
from the perspective of our social brains. Jervis’ system analysis can however be applied 
to our case here, in that dignity is a complex system in itself, which manifests itself at 
levels of neurobiological, attitudinal, affective, as well as social behavior and political 
action. Treating ‘dignity’ in the one-dimensional, essence-based way (which also leaves 
out behavioral outcomes) as is currently the case within many debates in Western moral 
philosophy and theories of human rights, is insufficient in grasping the “system 
complexity” at stake with humanizing others, and eventually the challenges of putting 
humanizing attitudes into actual actions and practice.  
 
4.4. Dehumanization’s “System Complexity”  
4.4.1. Dehumanization’s “System Complexity” I: Perceptions, Attitudes, Behavior 
Research into subtle, everyday dehumanization (Leyens et al., 2001) has shown 
that our social brains are highly susceptible to quickly dehumanizing others as a result of 
disgust reactions, skin color and out-group membership, amongst various others triggers. 
The previous chapter already introduced the concept of dehumanized perception at the 
brain level, trying to explain why and how it matters or the politics of dealing with out-
groups. To recap, dehumanized perception is chiefly characterized by an absence of 
mentalizing (i.e. inactivity in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction), 
and that it can manifest itself in animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization of others 
(Haslam, 2006). Dehumanizing others is thus a way of how we navigate ourselves 
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through our social world, where evolutionarily we had to make quick decisions about 
who belonged into our in-group (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Behaviorally – if we do 
end up manifesting behaviors based on spontaneous, rapid dehumanization of others – 
this can result in both active and passive harm to others: as a result of dehumanized 
perception, we can end up demanding harsher punishments of offenders in the penal 
system (Vasiljevic & Viki, 2014), poorer health care quality and insufficient 
administration of pain medication towards Blacks (Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, & Oliver, 
2016), to the more obvious behaviors associated with dehumanization, such as extreme 
acts of aggression and atrocities committed during civil wars and genocide. 
How does this relate to dignity? One premise on which the neurocognitive, 
interpersonal model of humanization rests is that dehumanization is known to occur 
spontaneously and with high frequency in our lives. Not all neurocognitive experiences 
of dehumanized perception result in active behavior, even passive behavior can only arise 
if the socio-political circumstances encourage neglect towards a dehumanized out-group: 
for example, if I were to dehumanize homeless people, my neglect behavior towards 
them might only arise and become significant if I take part in decision-processes that 
allocate welfare resources to various groups in society, and as a result of dehumanization 
of the homeless, I forget to take their needs into account when I make those decisions. 
Again, as with humanization, dehumanization has to be considered in the context of its 
own “system complexity”. 
What I wish to highlight in this chapter, however, is that the automatic and 
frequent nature of dehumanized perception gravely undermines an essence-based, 
ontological proof of dignity’s existence. People cannot simply ‘decide’ that they 
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recognize the existence of human dignity and as a result, never deny humanness to 
someone again, but rather, no matter how much we pledge to respect someone’s dignity, 
chances are high that we might deny unique humanness to them if dehumanization is 
triggered by disgust, racial or other stress factors. Essence-based accounts of dignity 
therefore need to take into account the neurocognitive capacities of social actors for both 
humanization and dehumanization, and develop a more nuanced account of how ‘dignity’ 
is negotiated in the social world between social brains. 
Finally, we again need to take into account the perception vs. behavior divide. 
One could say that human rights activist are well-aware of people’s capacity for 
dehumanizing others – criticizing those who violate humanness is a human rights 
activist’s core objective – yet what they chiefly focus on is a behavioral manifestation of 
dehumanized perception, i.e. atrocious actions and discriminating decisions. 
Dehumanized perception, however, as explained above, is not just defined by behavior 
but originates first in a neurocognitive perception, is then felt as an excluding attitude and 
accompanied by emotions of disgust, stress or fear, and might only as a last step 
materialize finally in observable behavior. The model put forward in this chapter suggests 
that political scientists and human rights theorists take into account not just behavioral 
manifestations of dehumanization, but also consider the perceptual, attitudinal and 
affective dimensions, and think about how those do (or do not) interact with specific 
behaviors in the social and political world. 
 
4.4.2. Dehumanization’s “System Complexity” II: Culture and Hyperdiversity 
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Moving onto cultural neuroscience, this model also tries to incorporate the 
identity experiences of bicultural individuals and non-Western people within Western 
liberal democratic societies. Today, an ever increasing number of people hold multiple 
identities within them, which contributes to increasingly hyperdiverse societies in 
Western liberal democracies (European Commission, 2013; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). 
In the context of universal claims to human dignity, a monocultural and exclusively 
Western understanding of the Self can become problematic for the following reasons. For 
example, in studies on differences in self construals amongst Westerners and East Asians, 
cultural psychologists have proposed for a long while that Westerners have an 
‘independent’ idea of self, whereas East Asians have an ‘interdependent’ idea of self, 
which is much more tied to one’s community and family (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In 
the last decade, cultural neuroscience has managed to provide supporting evidence for 
this claim through fMRI data that shows that the brain area that is usually implicated in 
self-reference is activated in both Westerners and East Asians when prompted to think 
about themselves, but when both are asked to think about their mothers, only in East 
Asians does that same brain area for self-reference activate as well – meaning that an 
East Asian person views their mother as identical to themselves, which confirms the 
psychological theory that East Asians have an “interdependent” sense of self (Zhu, 
Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007). 
Similarly, in the realm of religious identity, a comparison between Christians and 
Tibetan Buddhists showed differences in their self-construal, detectable at the brain level. 
When asked to think about themselves, Christians activate their dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex, which is usually active during third person perception – this could be explained 
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by the fact that Christians routinely judge themselves through the eyes of God (who looks 
onto them as a third person) (Han et al., 2008). Buddhists, on the other hand, do not 
activate any brain region usually implicated in self-reference at all, which could be 
explained by the fact that the daily religious routine and the core of its religious 
philosophy tries to rid the Self from an ego-based, self-referential concept, and to this 
effects employs various meditation and prayer techniques to exculpate the Self from self-
reference (Wu, Wang, He, Mao, & Zhang, 2010). 
It is remarkable that the differences of self-construal in different religions can 
manifest themselves in brain activity and possibly even brain structure. This poses a 
serious challenge to monocultural constructions of human dignity, as they are currently 
employed within much of contemporary Western philosophy (Taylor, 1989). The picture 
becomes even more complicated when considering individuals who hold multiple 
identities within themselves, i.e. who are both Western and East Asian or who identify 
with a secularized Judeo-Christian individualist conception of rights but are at same time 
devout Buddhists. In the burgeoning field of bicultural brain science, researcher have 
found that Asian-Americans, for example, can switch effortlessly between their 
independent Western and interdependent East Asian identity, if primed with a specific 
cultural symbol (Asian dragon; US flag), a culturally-specific story or language. In other 
words, two completely different neurological circuits activate depending on how 
bicultural individuals are primed (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). In another experiment more 
directly relevant to political science models, the level of cooperation in Asian-Americans 
increased in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, when primed according to their interdependent 
Asian identity (Wong & Wong, 2005; Utz, 2004). 
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It is important to note here that many of these insights could not have been made 
without fMRI and brain science tools, since survey and attitudinal methods (which are 
usually used in psychology and social science research) in the form of self-reporting 
might not always be accurate. For example, Warnick and Landis (2015) stress “it is 
important that intercultural behaviors are measured directly and not through self-report 
questionnaires, which are necessarily affected by memory and demand characteristics” 
(Warnick & Landis, 2015, p.17f). 
I propose a neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization vs. an 
ontological, essence-based model of human dignity because it manages to incorporate the 
ongoing demographic shifts in Western liberal societies, where an increasing number of 
people hold bi-or multicultural identities and define their sense of dignity through more 
than just a single, Western monocultural framework of what it means to be human. It is 
this effortless switch between multicultural identities that Western monocultural models 
of dignity within current theories of toleration and human rights often fail to capture. In 
addition, in the context of cosmopolitanism theory (Brown & Held, 2010), my model 
suggests that cosmopolitanism is not just a “value” out there in the world, or a lifestyle 
decision, but that many people in our increasingly hyperdiverse societies embody 
cosmopolitanism at the brain level, in oftentimes conflicting and confusing ways. Identity 
hybridization can create multideterminancy of behavior, which underlines the need for 
current conceptualizations of “dignity” to take into account the cultural “system 
complexities” that come with it. 
 
4.5. Multiculturalism and Toleration 
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 So far this chapter made a strong case for the Judeo-Christian origins of “dignity” 
but equally, one could go back to Antiquity, where “dignity” signified one’s designated 
status in the world. In Cicero’s De Officiis (On Duties), he linked one’s dignitas to the 
“honored place” which one was holding in the social order of things, but also, perhaps 
more radically, Cicero proposed in addition to this that human beings possessed dignitas 
because of human being’s superiority over other animals (Cicero, 2014). Humans, in 
other words, were thought to hold a special status place within the world (and universe – 
within the framework of Cicero’s Roman cosmology), i.e. there was something 
distinctive about their existence that merited an elevated position from other living beings 
around them.  
The idea of the ‘distinctiveness of man’ carried through the history of Western 
philosophy up until the Renaissance, where Pico della Mirandola reiterated this point in 
De Dignitate Hominis. Mirandola claimed that humans were special because they did not 
just fulfill a preordained role, but were given the capacity by God to choose their own 
destiny (Mirandola, 1953). This leads Michael Rosen to argue that Mirandola “opens a 
relatively clear path toward the use of dignity we find in modern human rights 
documents”, turning it from “a matter of the elevated status of a few persons in particular 
society to being a feature of human beings in general” (Rosen, 2012, p.15).  
 The link between status and dignity was redrawn for modern political thought by 
Jeremy Waldron (2012), who argues that dignity in modern times constitutes a set of 
rights based on an underlying idea of the status in question, and that dignity ought to be 
defined as a status-concept, not a value-concept. Likewise, Mirandola’s compelling 
theory about status-based dignity grounded in human autonomy has found its way into 
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other modern liberal theories, such as multiculturalism. In the multiculturalist view of 
society, various cultural, ethnic and religious groups all can lay a claim to the inherent 
dignity (and therefore a claim to be tolerated or even protected by a rights guarantor, such 
as the state) of their group identity. Dignity here is both pluralistic and unitary in nature, 
in that all groups can potentially lay claim to their inherent dignity, but the status (i.e. the 
particular place in society) of each group in relation to the majority group can vary 
greatly. 
One of the most influential works in this area is Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995), in which he justifies the 
recognition of minority group’s inherent dignity (and subsequent rights attached to it) 
through the idea of the good life, meaning that in order for people to achieve conditions 
of the good life, they might want to draw on the values, customs and beliefs of their 
group identity. The chief criterion through which the good life can be categorized is 
through autonomy: people should be allowed to lead their lives from the inside, i.e. in 
accordance with what they believe gives meaning and worth to their lives, but most 
importantly, they should always be allowed to question and opt of their chosen beliefs, 
i.e. be given the autonomy to choose what ultimately is the good life for them (Kymlicka 
1995, p. 81). 
As others have argued (Parekh, 2000), Kymlicka’s definition of autonomy is less 
ambitious than those of John Stuart Mill, Kant or Joseph Raz, in that it does not aim for a 
substantial kind of self-fulfillment in terms of self-legislation or self-creation. Autonomy 
for Kymlicka is simply a necessary condition for the good life to thrive, which is why he 
judges minority groups not according to the actual contents of their identity, but whether 
 146 
they allow their members to develop into autonomous individuals, who can, if necessary, 
challenge beliefs held within their group. The deciding factor for Kymlicka is not 
whether they can opt out of their identities, but to be given the freedom to move within it. 
 Kymlicka’s position aligns with liberals such as Michael Walzer, who point out 
the pervasiveness of “involuntary association”, i.e. familial, social, birth and other group 
memberships, which we are all part of throughout our lives and are often born into 
without initial choice (Walzer, 2005, p.2). Contradicting Rousseau, Walzer contends that 
“we are not born free, we are not born equal” (Ibid.) – echoing the multiculturalist view 
that group recognition depends on a group’s status. In contrast, other more purist liberals 
such as Joseph Raz justify culture on more functional grounds, demanding that one’s 
affiliation and love for one’s cultural identity has to be “rational and valid” and be based 
on the “right reasons” (Raz, 1994, p.184). Raz further claims that a secure grounding 
within one single cultural group “is a precondition” for individual freedom (Ibid., p.178). 
In a much more radical and polemic vein, Jason D. Hill, a self-proclaimed radical and 
unapologetic liberal, demands that if a minority member does not adopt individualist 
values in the strict liberal sense as defined by Hill, then they affirm the “uncivilizedness” 
of their identity-belonging and therefore automatically loose the right to be accorded 
respect and entry into the liberal political community (Hill, 2009). 
 The neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization and its insights into the 
actual cognitive mechanisms of self-construal and identity-switching within bicultural 
individuals offers us powerful evidence against Kymlicka, Walzer, Raz and Hill. First of 
all, liberal multiculturalists’ preoccupation with autonomy as the guiding principle for 
judging the worth of a cultural group is entirely based on a (ironically) monocultural 
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Western model of individualist identity. They do not take into account that 
interdependent identities such as Confucianist and East Asian identities can derive 
equally as much dignity as independent ones, and deserve to be respected for what they 
are. At the brain level, someone who constructs their sense of self – and arising from that, 
the existential, moral and emotional meaning of their lives and the relationships they have 
with others – in an interdependent way activates distinctively different neuronal circuits 
to someone with an individualist sense of self. This interdependent representation at the 
brain level is thus not simply an erroneous or misguided choice (as Raz would have it) 
but a physical-biologically experienced reality that is deep-seated and fundamental. 
 That being said, the insights into how bicultural Asian-Americans can switch 
effortlessly between independent and interdependent identities, if primed, suggests that as 
much as identity affiliations are neurologically represented at the brain level in a 
biologically significant way, the brain also has the flexibility to incorporate new identities 
and activate these effortlessly if primed. It also shows that in the most influential 
theoretical accounts within liberal multiculturalism, the depiction of the issues at hand are 
way too simplified or in some cases, outright wrong (curiously, many of the leading 
multiculturalists are monolingual, or do not fluently speak a language of the Global South 
or the minority groups of color they theorize about). It certainly proves wrong Raz’s 
claim that one can only have one identity group in which one is grounded – indeed, in the 
light of the dramatically shifting demographics and the increasing number of bi-and 
multicultural individuals within societies around the world, Raz’s claim does not just 
seem outdated but deeply dehumanizing. 
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In recent years, Raz’s positions have been criticized by a more subtle take on 
multiculturalism and minority experiences, such as in the edited anthology Minorities 
within Minorities (2005) by Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev. In there, Rob 
Reich, citing Jeremy Waldron on cosmopolitan individuals with highly diverse 
biographies, agrees that “the phenomenon of multicultural, hybrid individuals thus 
challenges Raz’s liberal multiculturalism” in so far as clear cultural boundaries become 
blurred, people are not Herderian wholes, and “people construct their identity and 
exercise their autonomy within a multiplicity of cultural frameworks” (Reich, 2005, 
p.222). The way Reich counters Raz through examples of individual biographies of 
hybridized people is persuasive and evocative, yet additional brain evidence can help 
build a more complete picture of the cognitive mechanisms at play for bicultural 
individuals. For what the biographical stories do not tell us is how and when exactly 
bicultural individuals switch their identities – or indeed, if they switch them at all. The 
brain science is important here not because it provides us with an ontological definition 
of who hybridized individuals are, but how certain crucial cognitive mechanisms function 
within them.  
I now wish to apply the neurocognitive, interpersonal model of humanization in 
the context of toleration. Michael Walzer feels strongly about minority groups who do 
not pull themselves up by their bootstraps and fail to overcome, in Walzer’s own words, 
the “permanent state of suspicion”, in which this “nervous”, “obsessive”, “self-defeating” 
and angry minority group claims that it is not granted respect (Walzer, 2005, p.37), 
instead of trying to gain respect by becoming economically successful (I claim that 
Walzer is referring here, in a thinly veiled way, to low-income African-Americans) in 
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society32. For Walzer, economic status is intrinsically linked to dignity ascription, and 
those groups who lack respect in society have simply not sufficiently understood this 
fundamental connection. Walzer calls this “meat-and-potatoes-multiculturalism”, where 
the “material strengths of groups compels their mutual respect” (Ibid., p.38). It is 
puzzling where exactly Walzer derives his economic status optimism from, given various 
historical examples in recent history, such as the fact that neither high economic status 
nor educational achievements of European Jews in the 19th and 20th century protected 
them from subsequent persecution in Europe (Albanis, 2002; Brustein, 2003). It is 
exactly this paradox of wealthy, middle-upper class Jews who were respected in their 
town one day, and harassed and deported by their neighbors the next that Walzer seems 
to be oblivious about. 
But even in less extreme political contexts, the social psychology and 
neuroscience of dehumanization shows that in the U.S., Jews and Asians are routinely 
mechanistically dehumanized and stereotyped with emotions of envy, in that they are 
seen as economically competent but humanly lacking in warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002; Haslam, 2006). Walzer omits the long tradition on stereotyping research within 
social psychology of the last three decades, such as for example Fiske et al.’s “stereotype 
content model”, which shows that stereotypes are often mixed (i.e. a group can be seen as 
competent in one way, but lacking in humanness and warmth on the other hand – or the 
other way around). An important take-home point about the envy stereotype category is 
that the behavior resulting from it is aggression (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). 
                                                 
32 The ‘pull yourselves up by your bootstraps’ argument was used already commonly employed in 
the US in the 1960s, in the context of shaming and blaming the urban poor, see sociological study 
by Gans, 1995. 
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If interpreted less generously, we could treat Walzer’s materialistic dignity 
argument as a manifestation of his own mixed stereotyping towards certain minority 
groups, if interpreted more generously, we could say that his economic status reasoning is 
deeply misguided. In the case of the latter, Anna Galeotti, a recent critic of liberal 
theories of toleration, would counter that the problem here is that “liberal theory 
understands toleration [as] a conflict produced by differences which usually pertain to 
individual choice” (Galeotti, 2002, p.5). Leaning on Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, she argues that minorities do not just possess fewer 
resources and opportunities, but have fewer capabilities altogether. In other words, “those 
whose collective identity is despised, or who are subject to prejudice and stereotyping, 
usually experience a lack of confidence or self-esteem and various forms of self-hatred, 
which make it much harder for them to become fully functioning social agents and 
citizens” (Galeotti, 2002, p.9). 
For Galeotti, liberal theories of toleration fail to grasp unequal status of social 
groups to start with, which is not simply (just) economic inequality as Walzer would have 
it, but a “special kind of power which the majority can wield over social standards, 
standards so deeply rooted that they have been embodied in political institutions without 
our even being aware of it” (Ibid., p.227). In the neurocognitive model of humanization, 
this “special power” can have particularly wide-reaching effects if it is accompanied by 
dehumanized perception, i.e. absence of mentalizing and mindreading, of the minority 
group. As I argued in Chapter 3, neurocognitive capacities have to be contextualized in 
political and economic systems of inequality, in order to grasp the full extent to which 
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dehumanization (and to whom exactly) can be damaging, and in order to determine 
whether subtle, everyday dehumanization is of concern in a particular situation. 
Galeotti stresses the largely unconscious ways in which majority standards have 
skewed a sense of equal recognition for minorities within political institutions, and the 
additional knowledge we have about the occurrence of everyday dehumanization, which 
is why national and transnational political institutions should pay special attention to the 
disadvantage minority groups face as an effect of this. The European Convention on 
Human Rights33, however, does not have special minority rights provision, i.e. there 
exists no requirement for positive rights – recognition of minorities’ demands and needs 
is usually based on the argument of “democratic pluralism” (which implies a certain basic 
equality between all groups, which does not exist de facto) (Pentassuglia, 2012; Peroni, 
2015). How can the European Convention make special provisions that would facilitate 
the humanization of minorities and elevate them to equal cognitive status as others? The 
European Convention, and other transnational institutions, need to recognize that the 
humanization of minority groups faces particular humanization challenges, which should 
be taken into account in potential future minority provisions. 
 
4.6. Conclusion: Becoming Autonomous Agents of our Social Brains 
 In this chapter I tried to advance a concept of human dignity that is not based on a 
transcendental, inherent essence but instead on the neurocognitive processes and 
interpersonal dynamics at play in societies that are becoming increasingly diverse. This 
leaves one to wonder whether the identity landscape of the 21st century has become too 
                                                 
33 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
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complex to navigate oneself through it morally and politically. Should we just try to 
avoid dehumanized perception, even though this might be impossible and even if latest 
research suggests that too much conscious humanization of a vulnerable out-group might 
lead to increased dehumanization instead, because we would rather not feel someone 
else’s pain? How is one to conduct one’s political brain, given the insights gained in this 
chapter? 
In conclusion, I propose – leaning loosely on Kant here34 – that the most 
important duties we owe in terms of our neurocognitive perceptions are not towards 
others, but ourselves. This is to say that we have to become autonomous agents of our 
own social brains, before we can engage in purposeful humanization of others. Cameron, 
Harris & Payne (2016) showed that anticipated emotional exhaustion leads people to 
dehumanize groups in order to avoid emotional pain. Therefore instead of asking people 
to actively humanize everyone, which this study suggests might overwhelm the emotional 
capacities of our brains, practicing “mindfulness” whilst we dehumanize an out-group 
might help in lessening dehumanizing reactions the next time we meet them. Although 
this does not equal overcoming dehumanization completely, it could potentially blunt 
aggressive behavioral outcomes (Borders, Earleywine, & Jajodia, 2010; Heppner et al., 
2008). Becoming autonomous agents of our social brains is no small feat. It requires that 
people view their moral and political obligation to others as a neurocognitive 
understanding and mastery of their own neuronal humanization and dehumanization 
networks. If we can accept that our brains are major players in the ascription of someone 
                                                 
34 Kant was no humanist in that he believed we owe our most important duties to ourselves, see 
AK 4:435 and AK 5:86, also Rosen, 2012, p.138ff. 
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else’s dignity and humanity, we can begin to putting our brain abilities at the center stage 






















5. Dangerous Dehumanizing Divides: Neuropolitical Effects of 
the “Civilizationary Clash” Theory  
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If mankind is to get rid of the coercion to which the form of identification really 
subjects it, it must attain identity with its concept at the same time. 
 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics 
 
 
5.1. Alive and Potent: The ‘Civilizationary Clash’ Theory 
In this chapter, I apply the PBP on dehumanization in the realm of International 
Relations (IR), particularly to discourses of “clashing civilizations” and “civilizationary 
divides”. This chapter examines the theories behind these discourses, specifically in 
regard to how they operate on either subtle or blatant dehumanizing notions of 
“uncivilized” or “barbaric” out-groups. I argue that locating the source of political 
conflict and challenges to governance-building along civilized vs. barbaric lines is 
problematic on two accounts: firstly, due to how this particular kind of distinction can 
lead to the reinforcing of dehumanized perception of other out-groups within our brains, 
and secondly, how describing certain groups as barbaric or lacking civilized capacities 
can lead to feelings of hostility and increased likelihood for intergroup violence. 
Whereas the previous two chapters primarily focused on the political 
consequences of dehumanized perception in the brain of the excluder, this chapter 
switches perspectives by paying special attention to the implications of feeling 
dehumanized by someone else. In particular, this chapter discusses the concept of 
metadehumanization and how groups who believe that they are viewed and treated as 
barbaric will more likely resort to retaliatory violence (Kteily, Bruneau, & Hodson, 2016) 
and choose retributive over restorative justice options (Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 
2013). It is based on this that I argue that theories and rhetoric employing the concept of 
incommensurable civilizationary divisions are counterproductive for promoting 
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intergroup cooperation and peace, and might in fact exacerbate conflict and violence. 
This chapter urges political theorists and international relations scholars to reconsider the 
language and frameworks within which they frame international political conflicts, 
arguing that the employment of hierarchical and divisive civilizationary concepts is 
problematic because of its potentially dehumanizing priming effects on our social 
cognition, and of how it increases the likelihood of violent intergroup conflict. 
Political scientists therefore need to be aware of how civilizationary rhetoric can 
negatively affect our cognitive abilities in viewing other groups as fully human, as well 
as the dramatic effects it has on intergroup attitudes and behavior. Instead of viewing the 
civilizationary argument as an insignificant rhetorical flourish in political exchanges and 
theories about the international world order, it should be treated as a central and decisive 
element in determining the outcome of peace, and intergroup cooperation and solidarity 
in international conflicts. In addition, the ongoing success and popularity of the 
civilizationary clash theory, both within academia and policy circles, but also amongst 
surging extreme right-wing movements across the Western world, could be ascribed to 
how this particular perspective towards out-groups feeds into and amplifies our natural 
tendencies towards in-group favoritism (Cikara et al., 2014; Krill & Platek, 2009). 
The two most notorious works on the future of the global order that emerged since 
the end of the Cold War are most arguably Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and 
the Last Man (1992) and Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order (1996). In both of these works, the authors rely heavily on the 
concept of ‘Western civilization’, and how it relates to (and oftentimes contradicts) other 
‘non-Western’ civilizations. Fukuyama lays the theoretical groundwork for Huntington’s 
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thesis by arguing that world history’s ideological struggles have come to an end with 
political liberalism as the only viable and persuasive ideology left. Building on this line 
of reasoning, Huntington posits that if the dialectical battle between political ideologies 
has come to an end, then what remains as the major friction point between countries and 
societies are their ‘civilizational’ differences. In particular, Huntington warns of trying to 
impose ‘Western’ values and ideals upon ‘non-Western’ societies, since for him 
‘civilizations’ are bounded and often mutually exclusive due to fundamental and essence-
like differences. 
His controversial theory has been enormously influential in the post-Cold War 
debates on modernization, development, and within US foreign policy in particular, but 
also garnered a wide array of critical responses from postcolonial historians, sociologists 
and political scientists. For example, IR critics have argued that societies are never 
actually as bounded, insular and static as portrayed by Huntington – both in their histories 
and the way they transmit and communicate their cultural values and practices to the 
outside world (Hall and Jackson, 2007; Hobson, 2004); building on the earlier work of 
20th century sociologists such as Pitrim Sorokin, Norbert Elias, Shmuel Eisenstadt and 
Benjamin Nelson, who all pointed out the importance of civilizational encounters, the 
porousness of borders and frontiers, and civilizations as dynamic, not static, entities35. 
Others have made a powerful case that ‘civilizations’ cannot be understood as actual 
actors on the global stage (Mazlish, 2001), since they are rarely unified entities in the 
                                                 
35 For a review of the civilizationary discourse in the social sciences after Huntington’s 
publication see O’Hagan (2007). For a recent re-assessment of the influence of Huntington’s 
theory and the crucial role of the media in its initial promotion see Bantimaroudis (2015). 
 157 
same way as states or cultures, nor do they hold the monopoly on political and military 
power, as global political actors usually do (Melleuish, 2000).  
In the specific case of “Western” versus “Islamic civilization”, others have joined 
this line of reasoning by pointing out that the United States’ close relationship with 
Saudia Arabia and other Muslim states, as well as the amount of time that many Islamic 
extremists have spent in the West attests to the ambiguity of this alleged civilizationary 
divide (Berman, 2003), suggesting a more dynamic interdependency rather than an actual 
cultural clash (Said 2001). From a materialist viewpoint, postcolonialist theorists such as 
Tariq Ali (2002) argue that it is chiefly economic inequalities, and the structures that 
sustain them, which drive the decisions of political actors on both sides of cultural 
divides. 
Remaining in the context of Islam versus the West, Fareed Zakaria (2001) 
believes that the frustration and anger expressed in Islamic terrorism does not originate 
within Islamic religion itself but stems from disillusionment with the West, as the Arab 
world has largely failed to implement in-depth modernization for its populations36. 
Continuing in this vein, Daniel Chirot (2001) claims in direct response to Huntington that 
the frictions in contemporary politics are less due to an incommensurable clash of 
cultural and religious values between societies, but stem from a materialist difference in 
levels of modernization between countries. It is this difference of development, and the 
ensuing variation in socio-economic and political progress, which causes clashing 
interests and beliefs between states. Amartya Sen (1999) echoes this sentiment in his own 
                                                 
36 Indeed, the Arab Spring revolutions, which began in 2010 and gripped countries from Tunisia to Egypt, 
serve as example that neither Muslim nor Arabic societies are inherently incapable of democratic activism 
or the pursuit of liberal individual rights. 
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response to Huntington, when stating that “the practice of democracy that has won out in 
the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution” (16), thus stressing the contingent 
circumstances that aided the West in achieving stability and prosperity. 
What Sen is trying to point out is that the successful implementing in the West of 
philosophical and revolutionary ideals in the real socio-political world was not due to an 
unwavering commitment to these very ideals over millennia, but a fortuitous culmination 
of historical circumstances and developments happening at the right time, in the right 
place, within a brief time period in very recent history. Therefore, non-Western societies 
that have not reached the same level of current Western standards of rights, governance 
and development are not necessarily in that position because of a lack of appreciation of 
ideals about the individual, equality and diversity, but rather, might be experiencing the 
crippling after-effects of colonialism and their own particular historical predicaments, in 
which political and economic progress did not coincide in the same fortuitous way as in 
the past three centuries in the West. 
Huntington’s view is commonly contrasted as pessimistic, versus Fukuyama’s 
more optimistic assessment of the viability and endurance of liberal democracy (Mueller, 
2014). However, they do converge in their shared belief in a hierarchical ordering of 
different global societies, in which those who have fully reached economic and political 
modernization (i.e. mainly Western societies) are implicitly seen as superior to others37. 
                                                 
37 In defense of Huntington, he did not explicitly state in his work The Clash of Civilizations that 
Western ‘civilization’ is superior to others. However, it can be argued that the likelihood of 
Huntington being completely unaware of which kind of historical and philosophical discourses he 
was inserting his civilizationary clash theory into (and the potential polemical and superiority-
based conclusions others would draw from it) is very small. 
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In fairness to Fukuyama, it ought to be pointed out that unlike Huntington, he does not 
ascribe the divergence of development to innate and insurmountable cultural differences 
so much as to institutional variation. In his recent publications (2011, 2014) on the 
historical comparison of the developmental difference of Western and non-Western 
countries (and variation within Western countries’ own histories), he argues that 
divergence in institutional development is the key variable for explaining civilizationary 
difference. The effort to establish impersonal, rule-based political order – in the Weberian 
definition of modern institutions and state power – is described by Fukuyama as an 
arduous and contingent process, which for the West had happened to work out well, at 
least in some crucial time periods.  
In the case of Huntington, the hierarchical difference is drawn along more innate, 
cultural lines, where people of different civilizations are ascribed culturally deterministic 
identities. As briefly outlined above, the critical discourse that emerged in response to 
Huntington’s theory of closed and mutually exclusive civilizations has in powerful ways 
– both empirical and theoretical – refuted many of his assumptions, or at least shed 
critical light on it. It is for this reason that this rich discourse, joined not only by 
postcolonial voices but also realist IR scholars, poses a serious challenge to Huntington’s 
theory. Yet despite the persuasiveness of this academic discourse, one cannot fail to 
notice how Huntington’s specter of a clash of civilizations and its implicit threat to 
“Western” values has successfully penetrated political and public discourse, and is only 
gaining widespread popularity amongst the far-right movement in Europe, as well as in 
the United States. 
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In Germany, for example, the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland [trans. 
‘Alternative for Germany’], also known as “AFD”, was extremely successful at the state 
and federal electoral level since its inception in 2013, running a campaign that was 
chiefly focused on eurosceptism, anti-immigrant sentiment, the fear of Islamic religious 
values clashing with ‘European’ ones, as well as anxieties about the demographic demise 
of White Germans38. It is important to note that the AFD was founded by a highly 
educated elite from within German academia and cultural-political circles, and that its 
most prominent founder, Bernd Lucke39, is a professor of macroeconomics at the 
University of Hamburg and former World Bank advisor. Rallying around the ‘battle of 
civilizations’ has since become popular amongst AFD supporters, both for activists on 
the streets and journalists and intellectuals who publish on this topic40. The main thrust 
there, similar to Huntington, is the antagonistic and hierarchical pitting of homogenous 
cultural groups against each other, and the sense that Western civilization is absolutely 
incommensurable with any other value system – which is why, in their opinion, Muslims 
and other minority groups who live in the West have to leave. 
The phenomenon of right-wing parties’ success and their attempts of running their 
platforms on the vision of civilizationary clash is no way restricted to Germany alone, nor 
                                                 
38 The full AFD party manifesto can be found here: 
https://www.alternativefuer.de/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-
grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf. For the most comprehensive political analysis of the rise and success 
of the AFD see Alexander Häusler, ed. (2016) Die Alternative für Deutschland: Programmatik, 
Entwicklung und Politische Verortung. Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag. 
39 Barbara Supp, “A portrait of Bernd Lucke and the new German Right”, Der Spiegel Online, 22.05.2014. 
At: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-portrait-of-bernd-lucke-and-the-new-german-right-a-
969589.html 
40 Heinz Theisen, “Im Kampf um die Zivilisation” [The battle for civilization], Der Tagesspiegel, 
10.05.2015. At: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/islam-und-islamismus-im-kampf-um-die 
zivilisation/11755982.html#commentInput. This article was recommended by the AFD party on their 
website: http://www.afd-ofl.de/leseempfehlung-im-kampf-um-die-zivilisation/. 
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is it an anomaly in the electoral trends of post-Cold War Europe: in recent elections, the 
staggering success of right-wing parties in France, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Greece and the UK, have baffled political analysts and mainstream-
party politicians alike (Akkerman, De Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016; Hartleb, 2011). 
Likewise, in the US, as can be seen in the 2016 presidential election41, the fear of a 
beleaguered Western civilization under threat is potent and alive. The roots of this might 
go back to President George W. Bush (2001), when he described the new enemy four 
days after the September 11th attacks as “a group of barbarians [who] have declared war 
on the American people” – the first time he used the ‘barbarian’ term.  
The aim of this chapter is not to question the clashing civilizations theory using 
historical or theoretical approaches that focus on refuting the intellectual and moral 
content of the theory. Rather, this chapter will examine how the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in the in-group/out-group positioning and the hierarchical ordering of different 
human groups within the clashing civilizations theory are problematic for cooperative 
politics. The choice of cognitive mechanisms over ontology is a deliberative one within 
this dissertation, and runs as a thread through all the chapters. 
Within this chapter, I use the PBP to criticize the clashing civilizations theory 
based on its rigid and nonnegotiable demarcation between different civilizational groups, 
as well as the inherent sense of the superiority of Western civilization in Huntington’s 
position, arguing that both aspects lead to a potentially dehumanized perception towards 
out-groups at the brain level. This, as shown in earlier chapters, is associated with de-
                                                 




mentalizing, disgust and questionable moral judgments towards out-groups. I will 
proceed to mainly advancing a theoretical argument, but also discuss recent studies 
coming from Emile Bruneau’s (2015; 2016) lab at MIT, in which he discovered troubling 
links between rating different groups along a civilizationary scale, dehumanization 
rhetoric and inter-group violence. I will build on the theoretical claims laid down in 
earlier chapters and focus in this chapter on applying my claims at the International level, 
particularly to the case of the Bosnian genocide, and within discourses in the IR field. 
The main point I wish to bring across is that in order to effectively criticize the 
historical, political and moral pitfalls inherent in the civilizationary clash theory, the PBP 
on dehumanized perception is crucial in highlighting the cognitive dangers in this kind of 
thinking about one’s own in-group and global politics at large. Unlike other more 
conventional avenues of criticism, the PBP allows us to consider what effect 
civilizationary clash thinking might have on our mentalizing and humanizing capacity of 
other out-groups, and take into account attitudinal and behavioral outcomes such as 
aggression, violence or neglect. 
Although postcolonial and historical criticisms of the civilizationary clash theory 
can prove powerful in intellectually rejecting Huntington’s worldview, they cannot 
explain why his theory is cognitively problematic and thus fail to understand why it could 
be so compelling for the brains of the people who operate on this kind of worldview. 
Furthermore, they fail to explain why up until today, his theory remains highly 
compelling for elites and ordinary citizens alike, such as for example the elite founders 




5.2. Ambiguous Categories of ‘Civilized’ and ‘Barbarians’ in History 
I argue that the ‘clashing civilizations’ theory is powerful and enduring not 
because of its intellectual sophistication or historical accuracy, but because it exploits in a 
fundamental way how our brains operate in the social world, i.e. through the construction 
of in-group identities vs. out-group ones (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer and Miller, 
1996; Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, and Hodson, 2002; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 
2002). Indeed, Huntington’s own definition of civilization goes straight to the heart of 
this: “Civilizations”, he says revealingly, “are the biggest “we” within which we feel 
culturally at home as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there” (ibid., 1996: 43). 
Just as with any in-group bias, the civilizationary in-group belonging depicted by 
Huntington serves “not just [as] a matter of rational self-interests but may also include 
more symbolic and emotional benefits to the group” (Spears, 2007: 484). However, as 
inevitable and even natural in-group identification might be, I argue that the 
civilizationary pitting of “us” against “others” is one of the most exclusionary and 
problematic kind of in-group belongings – because it involves a hierarchical and 
antagonistic positioning of the superior civilized in-group vs. the inferior barbaric out-
group, potentially facilitating dehumanization at the cognitive level, and as a result, 
neglect and aggression at the behavioral one.  
But what about past empires and their pitting of the civilized insider against the 
barbaric outsider, one could ask? Was this kind of divisive distinction not commonplace 
in various parts of the world, throughout history? The Ancient Greeks, who coined the 
term first with Homer and his description of the Carians as ‘barbarophonoi’, viewed 
 164 
anyone who could not speak the Greek language as barbaric – i.e. membership of Greek 
in-group identity was chiefly constructed along linguistic and political participatory lines 
(Bacon, 1961; Vlassopoulos, 2013). It is important to note here that the Ancient Greeks 
were themselves confused, at least until the time of Alexander the Great, who actually 
spoke Greek, since many local and regional dialects were mutually comprehensible and 
cross-pollinated linguistically (Vlassopoulos, 2013). 
In the case of the Roman Empire, barbarians were even more loosely defined – 
the word served as an umbrella term for all foreigners and those people who encroached 
the imperial borders. Historians believe that Romans “conceptualized groups of 
barbarians not for their specific traits but for their collective appearances with other 
groups of barbarians” (Mathisen, 2016: 17), suggesting that the term was used more as a 
descriptive rather than trait-specific or derogatory term that targeted a particular out-
group. 
Further to this, the demarcation between civilized Romans and foreign barbarians 
was permeable in the sense that foreigners could change allegiances and transform 
themselves to the point of being absorbed by Roman identity (Ladner, 1976; Goffart, 
2006). Indeed, the latest scholarship on the relationship between Romans and barbarians 
suggests that it was marked by interconnectedness, dynamic exchange and fluctuation, 
going so far as to state that “Romans of Late Antiquity did not have “barbarians on their 
mind” and were not obsessed with “barbarophobia” to nearly the extent that modern 
commentators seem to think” (Shanzer and Mathisen, 2016: 2). Even though it is 
important not to forget that Romans of Late Antiquity, including Christians such as 
Augustine, harbored “stereotype[s] of the bestial barbarian who must be tamed as wild 
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animals are tamed: overpowered then calmed, for they cannot be persuaded by reason” 
(Clark, 2016: 35), the enacted relationship between ‘civilized’ Romans and ‘barbarian’ 
foreigners was undeniably a reciprocal one, where cultural interaction and economic 
exchange, rather than hostility, dominated everyday life in the empire.  
Similarly, in the context of the Chinese Empire, where modern onlookers 
commonly hold the notion that the Northern frontiers of the empire were marked by “a 
set of dual oppositions – between pastoral and settled people, between nomadic tribes and 
Chinese states, between an urban civilization and a warlike uncivilized society” (Di 
Cosmo, 2002: 2), whereas in fact, “a single term analogous to the European barbarian did 
not exist in Ancient China” (ibid.: 7)42 and that in fact, just as in the case of the Roman 
Empire, insiders and outsiders of the empire engaged in a variety of exchanges, 
interactions and alliances (So and Bunker, 1995). Revisionist Chinese historians who 
refuse to rely solely on texts and rhetorical analysis to understand the relationship 
Chinese had with outsiders, but consider instead the context of political relations within 
the empire itself, point out that the stark distinction drawn by rulers between the cultural 
unity of the Chinese “Hua-Hsia” and external barbarism was in fact a strategy to unite 
factional states within China itself (Di Cosmo, 2002: 7). In other words, instead of being 
driven purely by “barbarophobia”, rhetoric about the civilized vs. the barbaric world in 
Ancient China often had expedient causes originating from domestic political 
instabilities. 
                                                 
42 Sima Qian, China’s first major historiographer, who composed his masterpiece Records of the Grand 
Historian (1971) around 100 B.C., first introduced the idea of the ‘barbaric’ other in the form of the steppe 
nomadic people of the North, whom he called “Hsiung Nu” (匈奴). In Ancient China, various names 
existed for the Northern and Western frontier peoples, such as “Dong Yi” (東夷) and “Xi Rong” (西戎), 
amongst others.  
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A completely different perspective comes from the beginnings of the Ottoman 
Empire. As much as the siege and sack of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 was a 
gruesome affair, historians such as Margaret Meserve question whether the eyewitness 
reports and subsequent recollections of the Turks’ brutish and quasi-animalistic rampage 
during the conquest were not somewhat exaggerated, building in fact on “a long tradition 
of Christian rhetoric, dating back at least to the First Crusade, had aimed at dehumanizing 
the Muslim foe [my emphasis]” (Meserve 2009: 66; Tolan, 2002). Renaissance 
humanists, in fact, hoped to use the rhetoric of the brutal Turkish ‘barbarian’ in order to 
persuade their compatriots of the necessity of a new crusade, leading Meserve to 
conclude that “the motivation for attacking the Turks on so many fronts was rhetorical” 
(ibid.: 67). 
However, the impression that the Turks gave of themselves and their culture was 
anything but ‘barbaric’: their military and diplomatic skills, the willing obedience the 
sultan managed to command from his subjects, as well as the intellectual sophistication of 
Islamic religion and its related artistic and cultural outpourings were awe-inspiring to 
many outside contemporaries and observers (Tolan, Laurens, & Weinstein, 2012). In 
other words, Renaissance humanists managed to conveniently and successfully 
dehumanize Turks as animal-like barbarians for their own expedient political purposes, 
but at the same time, the overall response to the Turks political and cultural achievements 
was much more ambiguous and conflicted, if not marked by a certain level of respect and 
admiration amongst Christians. 
The upshot of these historical examples is that dividing the world into civilized 
in-groups and barbarian out-groups is widespread in world history. One could argue that 
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one common reason to rally around a civilizationary in-group identity in the above cases 
is a sense of threat: “although a sense of “belonging” to the community might exist prior 
to an external challenge, the fact of being challenged makes its members acutely aware of 
their common boundaries” (Di Cosmo, 2002: 2). I will return to the connection between 
in-group threat and dehumanization of out-groups when I discuss the Bosnian genocide. 
Boundaries between civilized “us” versus barbarian “thems”, as Huntington 
himself puts it, are by far less bounded, rigid and incommensurable as in his clash of 
civilizations theory. Throughout the history of different empires, the civilized in-group 
and the barbarian outsiders communicated, influenced and fundamentally changed each 
other’s identities. The reason for erecting a division between “us” and “them” were less 
due to inherent, essence-like differences, but often served politically expedient reasons 
such as domestic instability and a perceived sense of threat from the outside. By stressing 
this, I side with postcolonial and historical critics of Huntington’s theory who believe that 
his theory is misguided on various historical, empirical and theoretical grounds. Martin 
Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2007) sum it up best when they, in opposition to 
Huntington, postulate that: 
1. Civilizations are weak, not bounded. 
2. They are loosely integrated. 
3. They are heterarchical, not centralized. 
4. They are contested, not consensual, in that power struggles over material 
and symbolic resources, and disputes over meaning and purpose abound, and 
finally 
            5.   Civilizations are in a state of flux; they are processes and relations (p. 7-10). 
  
Yet as powerful as Huntington’s critics are in deconstructing some of his 
misguided ideas about how civilizations function and why antagonistic relationships with 
outsiders might arise, I believe that these critics have failed to respond to an important 
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challenge and uncomfortable truth that Huntington’s theory reveals, namely, what if the 
differentiating between a superior “us” versus an inferior “them” is actually how our 
brains function in social settings? By looking at the historical evidence alone, it is 
difficult to deny that this tendency exists across cultures, geographies and time periods. 
The problem with Huntington however, I argue, is that he is unaware of the 
cognitive mechanisms at play in extreme in-group/out-group perception and the extent to 
which a ‘barbaric’ view of an out-group can lead to dehumanizing and de-mentalizing 
them. Huntington and those who borrow his civilizationary clash theory do not realize 
that by exploring our inherent tendency to divide our social world into “us” and “them” 
to the very extreme – i.e. amplifying our perception of in-group belonging to the point 
that any relationship with an out-group is anticipated as a battle or clash – they invite our 
brains to exclude and de-mentalize other out-groups to an extent where intractable and 
violent conflicts become more likely. 
As the above historical examples have shown, even though our social brains 
might function in terms of in-group/out-group distinction, they are also equipped to 
overcome some of these biases and divisions for the sake of inter-group communication, 
exchange and cooperation. Even though the Ancient Greek, Roman, Chinese and 
Ottoman Empires were all defined by distinguishing themselves from foreigners and 
barbarians, the relationship with barbarians was not exclusively marked by isolation and 
antagonism, but instead, the civilized and the so-called barbarians often engaged in 
reciprocal economic, cultural and political relationships, resulting in a deep 
interconnectedness, as well as cross-pollinating influences on each other’s own identity 
and self-conception. History, therefore, unlike the civilizationary clash theory, paints a 
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much more ambiguous, nuanced and creative picture in respect to how we can challenge 
and transform our innate cognitive tendencies. In order to do so effectively, however, we 
need to understand which exact cognitive mechanisms are at stake. 
The point of this chapter is to show that no matter how forecful a historical 
argument might be in refuting the civilizationary clash theory, we still need the PBP in 
order to access the cognitive mechanisms that Huntington and his followers tap into and 
amplify. Instead of rejecting the civilizationary clash theory as outright wrong, I wish to 
address the fact that in-group/out-group divisions and biases do (and will continue to) 
exist and are fundamentally part of how our social brains function. However, unlike 
Huntington, this dissertation contends that the current research evidence in prejudice and 
in-group bias reduction coming out of the social psychology and neuroscience fields 
show that we have reasons to be hopeful that these divisions can also to an extent be 
overcome.  
 
5.3. Why the PBP on Civilization Theories Matters 
5.3.1. Why the PBP on Civilization Theories Matters I: The Extreme Effects of Subtle 
Dehumanization 
 
It is undeniable that to most of us, dividing one’s world into groups that one feels 
one belongs to and other groups that one views as outside or foreign to one’s sense of 
identity, seems completely natural. Feeling part of a cultural, gender, occupational or 
religious in-group, but also more specialized in-groups such as one’s local bird watching 
or dancing club, or a charity or civic activism society, can feel rewarding and 
empowering. Indeed, Robert D. Putnam (1993) famously argued that local civic group 
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memberships in the Italian North versus a lack thereof in the country’s South led to more 
favorable conditions for democratic institutions in the North43, effectively designating a 
highly positive role for civic in-group memberships in the development of democratic 
accountability and sustainability. However, when we think of in-group identification, out-
group exclusion in the form of prejudice, discrimination and racism also come to mind, 
suggesting a darker side to the naturalness and inevitability of in-group belonging. It 
seems that as much as in-group identification can contribute to our nobler civic 
aspirations, it can also become a breeding ground for the most disruptive chauvinistic and 
tribal tendencies in society. But is the need to identify with an in-group really inevitable? 
And does in-group preference automatically entail out-group prejudice? 
If we look at the psychological (and increasingly, neurocognitive) research into 
in-group belonging, a more complicated picture emerges. Understanding in-group 
favoritism and how it might lead to interpersonal conflict and discrimination has been 
one of the major research questions for social psychologists in the 20th century, especially 
after extreme manifestations of nationalism and racial superiority in the two World Wars. 
One group of psychologists, led by Muzafer Sherif, focused on how competition over 
scarce resources and conflict over materialistic goods determined in-group bias (Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif, 1961). As a reaction against what Sherif termed his 
“realistic conflict theory”, Henri Tajfel and his colleagues created the “minimal group 
paradigm”44, in which they postulated that not all inter-group discrimination is due to 
competition over resources (Tajfel, 1970). Instead, Tajfel discovered that minimal 
                                                 
43 For critical reviews of Putnam’s controversial correlation between civic community memberships and 
the efficiency of democratic institutions see Tarrow (1996) and Barceló (2014). 
44 See Tajfel (1982) for his own critical review of the theory. 
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conditions, such as being randomly assigned to a group that favors one painter over 
another, were sufficient for strong in-group identification and the wish to allocate 
positive rewards to one’s in-group – though it has to be stressed here that this in-group 
bias did not necessarily entail out-group discrimination or the wish to do them harm 
(Mummendey & Otten, 1998). 
What the minimal group paradigm shows is that neither materialistic rewards nor 
impending conflict as such were necessary for in-group alliances and bias to occur – 
eventually, this would lead to the development of “social identity theory” (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986; Hogg and Abrams, 1988), which explored why members of a group 
discriminate in favor of their members because of symbolic and psychological, rather 
than materialistic rewards. The upshot of this is that in-group bias does not always have 
to be motivated by blatant self-interest, such as the securing of resources, but might occur 
for non-materialist, more subtle reasons as well. 
Another level of complexity that we need to consider is the automatic and 
unconscious nature of some in-group biases. The “Implicit Association Test” (IAT), 
developed by Greenwald, Banaji, McGhee and Schwartz (1998) takes into account that 
much of the out-group discrimination that might result from in-group bias might in fact 
not be accessible to us in explicit self-reporting. In other words, much inter-group 
discrimination might often not be detectable if we simply asked people how they felt 
about certain out-groups. 
For example, in the case of race-based discrimination, the phenomenon of 
‘aversive racism’ reflects the subconscious nature of our out-group prejudices (Dovidio 
& Gaertner, 2005). Unlike “old-fashioned racism”, aversive racism “represents a subtle, 
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often unintentional form of bias that characterizes many White Americans who possess 
strong egalitarian values and believe that they are nonprejudiced” (Dovidio, Gaertner, 
Kawakami, and Hodson, 2002, p.90). People who engage in aversive racism face a 
genuine conflict between denying subjective prejudice and yet having underlying 
negative feelings and beliefs towards another racial out-group; therefore the 
manifestation is implicit, not explicit racial prejudice. 
For example, aversive racism in an everyday situation such as a hiring process 
might manifest in the following way: when White candidates were asked to evaluate the 
applications of White and Black applicants who were equally qualified for the job, there 
was no discrimination against the Black applicant. However, when the candidates’ 
qualifications were more ambiguous or problematic, White candidates chose the Black 
applicant significantly less often than a White candidate with the same credentials 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). This study suggests that aversive White racists are more 
willing to give White applicants the “benefit of the doubt”, but which they are not willing 
to extend to Blacks. Alternatively, an aversive racist’s feelings can be described as “more 
diffuse, such as feelings of anxiety and uneasiness” (Dovidio et al. 2002: 90). It is 
important to note here though that aversive racism is not viewed as a kind of 
psychopatholoy, but instead as rooted in ordinary and also adaptive processes (Dovidio 
and Gaertner, 1998). Similar to subtle dehumanization and infra-humanization, which I 
have discussed in earlier chapters, implicit out-group prejudice is something that we all 
experience, including minorities themselves (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Subtle out-
group discrimination should therefore not be vilified or pushed to the margins of the 
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political debate, but in order to tackle it, needs to be addressed and acknowledged as a 
widespread phenomenon and natural brain capability in the first place. 
I argue further that another kind of closely related out-group discrimination, infra-
humanization, can become particularly problematic in the context of the civilizationary 
binary of “us” between “them”. As a reminder, infra-humanization is the process in 
which we only ascribe ‘secondary’, i.e. distinctly human, emotions to members of our in-
group, whereas we ascribe solely “primary emotions” to out-groups and animals (Leyens 
et al., 2001). Put differently, we attribute an exclusive psychological essence to members 
of our in-group, in so far as we believe that only in-group members have emotions that 
are uniquely associated with humans, such as complex feelings of pride, shame, hope, 
hate and despair, for example (Leyens et al., 2002). Out-groups are denied that human 
uniqueness at the emotional level and are therefore considered less uniquely human than 
“us”. Even when secondary, uniquely human emotions are invoked for an out-group, we 
will only activate a “humanity concept”, i.e. the idea that someone belongs to humanity, 
for in-group members (Vaes, Paladino, and Leyens, 2006). It is important to remember 
here that infra-humanization, just like aversive racism or implicit bias, is a subtle process 
that we might not be fully aware of (or admit to) when interacting with our own in-group 
and other out-groups. 
However, just because infra-humanization of one’s in-group happens implicitly 
does not mean that there are no considerable consequences at the behavioral level. For 
example, in response to secondary emotions by a fellow in-group member, we are more 
willing to help them, show increased perspective taking and imitation than when these 
same secondary emotions are displayed by an out-group individual (Vaes, Paladino, 
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Giovanazzi, Castelli, & Leyens, 2003). In addition, other attitudinal consequences of 
infra-humanization are lack of forgiveness for the out-group and justification (rather than 
guilt) for past misdeeds committed by the in-group against the out-group (Castano, 
Giner-Sorolla, & Leyens, 2006; Demoulin et al., 2007). 
If applied to the context of political campaigning in Italy, political slogans that 
employ secondary emotions only seemed to be effective in commanding conformity if 
viewers identified the campaigning politician as part of their in-group (Vaes, Paladino, & 
Magagnotti, 2011). If participants in this study were presented with a political slogan 
employing primary emotions (e.g. fear or anger as in “With this government, the future 
makes us afraid”), no bias in preference for an in-group or out-group political candidate 
was found, whereas if slogans used secondary emotions (e.g. shame or pride as in 
“Shame to this government: salaries are in lire [Italy’s previous national currency], 
prices are in Euro [Italy’s current currency as a member of the European Union]”), 
participants were much more inclined to stand behind the political opinion of their own 
in-group candidate rather than an out-group one. 
This study therefore shows that infra-humanization, triggered by the usage of 
uniquely human emotions for one’s in-group, can be a powerful and decisive factor in 
people’s support of political opinions, even if the psychological processes at play might 
be manifested in subtle and implicit ways. Infra-humanization also plays a role in 
perceiving someone as a symbolic threat to one’s in-group’s welfare: a study on 
Portuguese infra-humanization of Turkish people showed that it led to the perception of 
them as a symbolic threat and thus predicted opposition to include Turkey in the 
European Union as a new member (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). At its core, the idea 
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of infra-humanization is based on the primacy of the in-group and might be “the only 
way to distinguish between groups” (Leyens et al., 2003, p.710) when the existence of 
political taboos and standards of political correctness forbid the explicit expression of 
nationalist or racial prejudice. Most crucially, infra-humanization of out-groups 
withholds a human essence from them, by denying them emotions that would normally 
distinguish humans from animals.  
In earlier chapters, I discussed another manifestation of subtle dehumanization, 
namely the dual model of dehumanization, where groups are dehumanized along 
animalistic and mechanistic lines (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). In the case 
of animalistic dehumanization, out-groups are denied uniquely human (UH) traits that 
distinguish humans from animals (e.g. cognitive aptitude, refinement, and civility), 
whereas for mechanistic dehumanization, out-groups are denied human nature (HN) 
traits (e.g. warmth, individualism, creativity, and emotionality). Studies on the real-life 
political behavior and attitudes showed significant effects of both kinds of subtle 
dehumanization. 
For example, when testing Italians’ willingness to help Haitian and Japanese 
earthquake victims, a study found that Italians animalistically (but not mechanistically) 
dehumanized Haitians and that they mechanistically (but not animalistically) 
dehumanized Japanese – both of which led to decreased willingness to help either group 
of earthquake victims (Andrighetto, Baldissari, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014). 
In another study, mutual mechanistic dehumanization between Palestinian and Jewish 
Israeli people predicted preference for punitive forms of justice over restorative forms of 
justice (Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013). 
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In an extremely troubling study, Viki and colleagues (2013) found that Christians 
associated more animal-related words than human-related words with Muslims, which in 
turn predicted their support for torture of Muslim prisoners. In short, both infra-
humanization and the Haslam’s dual model of humanization, though highlighting rather 
subtle and oftentimes seemingly innocuous or benign ways in which we deny other out-
groups their humanness, can nonetheless have destructive political effects in a variety of 
interpersonal conflict, punitive, and humanitarian aid situations.  
If we apply these psychological insights to the political debate about the 
‘civilizationary clash’ theory, the importance of paying attention to subtle 
dehumanization of out-groups is undeniable. Edward Said (2001), in his article “The 
Clash of Ignorance”, addressed Huntington’s prediction that the two civilizations that 
were most likely to come into conflict were Islam and Western Judeo-Christian culture. 
Said is appalled at the historical ignorance and analytical over-generalization in 
Huntington’s theory, and points instead to the interconnectedness between the West and 
Islam, and the plural voices and diverse internal developments within Islam itself. 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, where George 
W. Bush (2001) described the attackers as “a group of barbarians [who] have declared 
war on the American people”, and an overwhelming majority of public intellectuals and 
journalists jumped eagerly on Huntington’s ‘civilizationary clash’ bandwagon to explain 
the significance and causes behind the attacks, Said views the ‘civilizationary clash’ 
theory as a “gimmick”, which in troubling ways reinforces a sense of “defensive self-
pride” and “gigantism and apocalypse” amongst Western nations (ibid., p.12).  In a 
subsequent publication, Said is even more blunt in his criticism of Huntington, calling the 
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clash of civilizations thesis the “purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian 
science directed today against Arabs and Muslims” (Said, 2004, p.293). 
One could construe Said’s analysis and subsequent comments as exaggerated and 
paranoid – what, after all, is so problematic about Huntington’s pitting of the Western 
“us” against the non-Western “thems”? How can this possibly amount to racism? Based 
on the above evidence, we can counter to this that as aversive racism and infra-
humanization show, there exist powerful indirect and implicit ways to express out-group 
derogation and in-group superiority, without having to make explicit racist statements as 
such. 
Said’s critique therefore could be strengthened by the PBP and psychological 
evidence on implicit in-group favoritism, since his historical line of argument is unable to 
specify and address the exact mechanism of subtle in-group humanization inherent in 
Huntington’s thesis. That being said, this chapter disagrees with Said and other critics 
that Huntington is committing an empirical or theoretical offense by dividing our political 
world into cultural in-groups and out-groups, since his assumptions about the naturalness 
of in-group identification are not completely implausible from a psychological viewpoint. 
Rather, where Huntington goes wrong is in the dangerous amplification and 
radicalization of a ‘Western’ in-group identity, to the point of presenting Western 
civilizationary identity as so completely unique and superior to backward Islamic culture 
that the ascription of equal humanness in regard to other non-Western identity groups 
becomes impossible. 
I argue that the civilizationary clash theory is dangerous for international peace 
not only because it misrepresents the interconnected relationship between different 
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cultural and religious groups in history, but because it engages in subtle in-group 
humanization rhetoric such as infra-humanization, which nevertheless can result in 
negative behavioral and attitudinal consequences, such as lack of concern and forgiveness 
for the out-group, unwillingness to accept responsibility for past misdeeds against the 
out-group, and a general inability of perspective taking on behalf of the out-group. On the 
latter point in particular I have written in chapter 3 in regard to mentalizing, which is a 
fundamental kind of perspective taking that we develop cross-culturally in infancy. In 
other words, one could argue that the ‘civilizationary clash’ theory makes it harder to 
mentalize other cultural groups, especially in Huntington’s version, where different 
groups are treated as isolated and bounded units that are divided by essence-like and 
incommensurable differences. 
Isaiah Berlin once made a helpful distinction in regard to the conception of 
civilization, outlining two approaches: relativist and pluralist. He described the relativist 
approach as follows: 
“the most extreme versions of cultural relativism, which stress the vast differences of 
cultures, hold that one culture can scarcely begin to understand what other 
civilisations lived by – can only describe their behavior but not its purpose or 
meaning, as some early anthropologists described the behavior of savage societies 
[emphasis added]. If this were true (as, for example, Spengler, and at some moments 
even Dilthey, seemed to say) the very idea of the history of civilisations becomes an 
insoluble puzzle” 
(Berlin, 2013, p.84f.) 
 
Based on Berlin’s assessment, Huntington is a civilizationary relativist as well, not only 
because of his indebtedness to the work of Oswald Spengler, but most important, because 
of his belief that the West will never be able to fathom the ‘purpose and meaning’ of 
other non-Western civilizations (and vice versa), and therefore should refrain from 
engaging with them. Although we could potentially interpret this kind of relativism as a 
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respectful acknowledgment of irreconcilable differences, Berlin suggests that there is a 
darker aspect to this: other civilizations are viewed as so completely different and 
incomprehensible to us that they are reduced to the category of ‘savages’ (or alternatively 
‘barbarians’) – animal-like creatures with primary but no secondary, uniquely human 
emotions. Berlin then presents and advocates for another kind of approach, the pluralist 
one: 
“(…) the values of these remote peoples are such as human beings like ourselves – 
creatures capable of conscious intellectual and moral discrimination – could live by. 
These values may attract or repel us: but to understand a past culture is to understand 
how men like ourselves, in a particular natural or man-made environment, could 
embody them in their activities, and why; by dint of enough historical investigation 
and imaginative sympathy, to see how human (that is, intelligible) lives could be 
lived by pursuing them [emphasis added].”  
(ibid., p.86) 
 
It is remarkable how Berlin stresses and details the ability to view other cultural groups 
through the lens of our shared humanity, as well as mentioning the need for imaginative 
sympathy – i.e. sympathy being the highest form of empathy, which builds directly on 
our universal mentalizing abilities (McCall and Singer, 2013). It is worth noting here that 
Berlin’s remarks could be interpreted as well-meaning but naïve, in that his demand for a 
shared sense of humanity when imagining other cultural out-groups would be nice if met, 
but really is not central to solving real-world clashes between ‘civilizations’. Here again 
the PBP and experimental evidence on the infra-humanization of out-groups (as well as 
how it affects actual decisions and behaviors) become crucial for strengthening Berlin’s 
theoretical argument. 
Another point that Berlin is making in this quote in favor of the “pluralist” 
civilizationary outlook is more subtle: by asking us to humanize cultural out-groups, he is 
also asking us to imagine them as fully human individuals, whose life choices might not 
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align with our own, but which were nonetheless taken by someone and not some 
homogenous, unintelligible group. I mentioned in previous chapters the effective role of 
individualizing and individuating people who belong to an out-group, which can help in 
overcoming and preventing dehumanized perception at the cognitive and brain level 
(Swencionis & Fiske, 2014). 
Echoing Berlin, the psychologists studying infra-humanization and subtle 
dehumanization state in their policy recommendations that “to combat infra-
humanization, rather than emphasizing differences and similarities between groups, 
politicians, media, and educators should insist upon complementarities and universalism” 
(Leyens, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007: 160) as well as “emphasizing understanding, 
accepting, and showing concern for the welfare of all human beings, even those whose 
life differs from one’s own” (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan, 2006, p.137). 
In conclusion, it might be worth reflecting on another historical example here. In 
trying to explain the decisive reason that brought about the formation of NATO, Patrick 
T. Jackson (2003) suggests that rhetorical appeals to a shared ‘Western civilization’ 
between the U.S. and Europe – in contrast to the Soviet Union – played a decisive role in 
NATO’s eventual formation. For Jackson, the U.S. needed to be convinced to join a 
British-led NATO initiative, which the latter achieved by employing “occidentalist” 
language of Western exceptionalism and the rhetorical “nesting” of NATO states within 
an imagined community of shared Western civilization (ibid.: 245). 
Instead of proposing realist, liberal or constructivist explanations of this crucial 
moment in NATO’s history, Jackson offers what he calls a “relationist” approach, which 
neither locates causal mechanisms exclusively at the individual level (i.e. realism and 
 181 
liberalism) or at the level of social totalities and systems (i.e. constructivism) but at the 
place where “patterns of social practice” determine political outcomes. In other words, 
contra explanations of NATO formation that assume that NATO came into existence 
predominantly because it was needed as a defensive alliance between individual states, 
Jackson argues that the civilizationary arguments and pitting of a Western “us” against a 
hostile and foreign Soviet “them” created a sense of common in-group identity, which in 
turn became such a powerful narrative that it created sufficient consensus on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
Given our insights into the deep-seated psychological and cognitive need for in-
group belonging, and the way how the civilizationary argument feeds and amplifies this 
need, Jackson’s alternative explanation of the NATO formation process and his 
highlighting of the significance of civilizationary rhetoric in a climate of geopolitical 
uncertainty is worth considering. 
 
5.3.2. Why the PBP on Civilization Theories Matters II: Blatant Dehumanization and 
Intergroup Violence 
To recap the argument, the subtle forms of dehumanization discussed above have 
one thing in common – they are not just an expression of dislike for an out-group (as for 
example prejudice is), but they are an indirect and implicit expression of our sense that 
someone else does not count as a full human being to us. This sense is distinct from 
disliking someone in that the exclusion inherent in subtle dehumanized perception is both 
more profound and yet less straightforward than mere dislike: it is more profound 
because being unable to include someone else in my sense of humanity carries more 
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philosophical and moral weight than the feeling of ‘I don’t like you for X reason’; it is 
less straightforward because subtle dehumanization is measured along trait attributions 
(animalistic, mechanistic), the denial of secondary emotions and disgust, instead of 
explicit dislike reasons. 
The field of subtle dehumanization study emerged over a decade ago in response 
to the existing field of explicit dehumanization (Kelman, 1973; Bandura et al. 1975; 
Opotow, 1990). The field arose in the aftermath of grappling with WWII’s atrocities and 
genocide, thus locating the occurrence of dehumanization in situations of extreme 
hostility and violence. Subtle dehumanization, on the other hand, is thought to occur in 
everyday situations and to be experienced by the dehumanizer in often unconscious and 
automatic ways. I argued that despite its subtle manifestations, this kind of 
dehumanization can be politically problematic when employed in the context of the 
civilizationary clash theories, where inferior civilizations are often described in brutish, 
savage and barbarian and denied uniquely human emotions. It is possible that the 
analytical tool of subtle dehumanization is convenient in the academic context, where 
there exist standards of political correctness and linguistic propriety that forbid an explicit 
expression of disgust or contempt for an out-group, but are instead expressed implicitly 
and even unconsciously. This being said, however, racism, sexism or tribalism are 
nonetheless still known to exist and enacted in seminar rooms, lecture halls and between 
the lines of academic research books and articles (Berg, 2009; Coleman, 2005; Patton, 
2004). 
What happens however when in the real political world, where viciously fought 
intergroup conflicts and violent clashes do not adhere to any such standards of political 
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correctness, and as an effect, political actors use much more blunt and direct language to 
express their disdain for another group? One only has to think of how Jews were 
portrayed in Nazi propaganda as rats, African-Americans as apes during slavery, Tutsis 
as cockroaches, and Romani people as vermin by Europeans (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
and Jackson, 2008). More recently and ongoing, in the Israeli-Palestine conflict for 
example, Palestinians are described as “wild beasts”45 and Israelis as “killing 
machines”46; whereas in the Mediterranean migrant crisis in the migrants have been 
called “cockroaches, “swarms”, “brutes” and “scum”, by both European right-wing and 
mainstream conservative politicians alike47. Other examples are soccer fans who throw 
bananas at black football players in Europe, or President Obama being depicted as an ape 
in political cartoons48. It is for this reason that a new line of research has turned its 
attention to so-called blatant dehumanization, which involves explicit beliefs about the 
biological and human inferiority of certain out-groups (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & 
Cotterill, 2015). With blatant dehumanization, people do not so much indirectly associate 
certain groups with non-human traits, or deny them uniquely human traits, but instead 
differentiate very openly between their in-group and others – in a hierarchical fashion 
where other out-groups are inherently inferior to one’s own in-group. 
In order to measure blatant dehumanization, Emile Bruneau and his colleagues 
devised an “Ascent measure of blatant dehumanization”, which consisted in an “Ascent 






48 Huffington Post. (2014, March 24). Belgian newspaper accused of racism for picture of Obama and 
Michelle as apes. Retrieved from http://www .huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/24/newspaper-obama-ape-
belgian-satire- putin-barack-president-racism-racist_n_5020987.html/  
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of Man” diagram that depicted five different figures, from an ape-like animal to an up-
right standing, human-looking person. Underneath the diagram is a list of different 
national and religious groups (American, Canadian, European, Chinese, South Korean, 
Muslims, etc.) with sliders. The instructions accompanying the diagram read as follows: 
“People can vary in how human-like they seem. Some people seem highly evolved 
whereas others seem no different than lower animals. Using the image below, indicate 
using the sliders how evolved you consider the average member of each group to be” 
(ibid.: 904). Since Bruneau’s study wanted to test the potential blatant dehumanization of 
Arabs and Muslims by Americans in particular, they recruited American participants for 
this study and excluded minority groups that were listed next to the sliders (such as 
Asians, Latinos/Hispanics and Middle Easterners/Arabs). The results showed that 
Europeans, Canadians and Japanese were rated as similarly evolved as Americans, 
whereas South Koreans, Chinese and Mexicans were deemed as significantly less 
evolved. The lowest on the scale, however, were Arabs and Muslims (i.e. rated as 
resembling the ape-like figure at the lowest end of the “Ascent of Man” scale). In 
addition, they found that a measure called “social dominance orientation”, which reflects 
an active orientation towards enforcing hierarchy between groups, was strongly 
associated with blatant dehumanization. 
In the context of this same study, Bruneau and colleagues the further tested how 
blatant dehumanization would predict support for various policies and decisions towards 
out-groups. They found that blatant dehumanization “predicted support for minimizing 
Arab immigration, less compassionate responses to injustice experienced by an Arab 
target, and less money donated to an Arab versus American cause” (ibid.: 910). In 
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addition, subtle dehumanization was not a significant predictor for various important 
political decisions, which highlights the need to acknowledge blatant dehumanization as a 
unique way of excluding an out-group from one’s sense of humanity in its own right. 
Similarly, prejudice defined as disliking another group did not determine the outcome of 
immigration support for or objection to injustice done to Arabs. Thus the common 
wisdom that disliking someone must surely be a decisive indicator for intergroup conflict 
might not necessarily be true – politically we therefore need not only to pay attention to 
how certain groups are disliked, but also, how they are viewed and portrayed in a 
hierarchically dehumanizing and animalistic way.  
So far, we have gained an understanding of the perspective of the dehumanizer 
and how both subtle and blatant dehumanization of an out-group can have significant 
behavioral and attitudinal consequences for political decisions. But what about the 
dehumanized out-group itself? How does a dehumanized out-group experience being 
called “vermin” – a term with which for example Polish people living in the U.K. have 
been targeted with in the aftermath of  “Brexit”49? And what happens if a majority, high-
status group itself feels dehumanized by another out-group? Does the knowledge that one 
is being dehumanized increase reciprocal dehumanization, and does it affect intergroup 
conflict and aggression? 
Bruneau and his colleagues (2016) pursued this latter question in a follow-up 
study, where they tested whether ‘metahumanization’, i.e. to be viewed as less evolved 
by another group, leads to the outbreak of conflict and violence. “No prior work”, they 
claim, “has examined how individuals respond to the (meta)perception that their group is 




dehumanized” (ibid.: 344), even though previous concepts such as ‘metastereotyping’ 
exist (Vorauer et al., 1998). Based on the earlier mentioned work of Tajfel, we know that 
belonging to an in-group and deriving esteem from that membership is a widespread 
need. Further to this, we know from other studies that negative evaluations of one’s in-
group can be perceived as a threat that individuals might seek to remedy (Hornsey, Harth, 
& Barlow, 2011). 
Yet Bruneau and colleagues wanted to test specifically whether the explicit 
dehumanization of another group would affect intergroup relations, and how this would 
play out in real political conflict situation with large-N samples in a range of cultural 
contexts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the hostile 
relationship between ethnic Hungarians and the Roma minority, and the U.S.-Iranian 
nuclear deal. For example, Israelis who believed that they were dehumanized by 
Palestinians (i.e. metadehumanized) were more likely to reject peaceful conflict 
resolutions and support instead disruptive actions such as population transfer and 
collective aggression towards Palestinians. In the study, metadehumanization “had 
significant direct and total effects on all variables, again suggesting its unique role in 
predicting hostile intergroup attitudes and policies” (ibid., p.355). Similarly, Americans 
who were told that Muslims viewed Americans as animalistic brutes and less developed 
than themselves in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, for example, were much more 
likely to support torture of Muslims and support of drone strikes as a result. 
Finally, Bruneau and colleagues tested their hypothesis with a large-N (906 
participants) sample of the Hungarian population in regard to their tense relationship with 
the Roma people. When ethnic Hungarians were told that the Roma target them for theft 
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because of the disregard they have for Hungarians’ suffering and because they view them 
as less human than themselves, Hungarian respondents were much less likely to be 
willing to fund projects for Roma integration, more likely to support discrimination and 
emotional hostility towards the Roma. 
In all of these cases, the knowledge that another group viewed your own in-group 
as less human and less evolved was a significant contributor to hostile reactions and 
support for aggressive retaliation. It is important to note here, again, that the feeling of 
being disliked by a group (i.e. prejudice) was not as significant a predictor of intergroup 
aggression, nor was subtle dehumanization. This is not to say that either prejudice and 
subtle dehumanization do not have an affect on political attitudes and behavior, but that 
blatant dehumanization and the explicitness attached to its rhetoric (i.e. animalistic and 
degrading terms and explicit hierarchical ordering of different groups) has to be 
acknowledged as a worrisome and exacerbating factor in intergroup conflict in its own 
right. 
Another interesting aspect of this study is that Bruneau and colleagues tested their 
metadehumanization theory on high-power, majority groups instead of low-power, 
minority out-groups. This highlights the need to understand the impact of dehumanization 
not only on those groups who are usually seen as vulnerable, but also those groups who 
are usually assumed to be the dehumanizing offenders. It turns out that explicitly telling 
each other that you do not belong to my sense of humanity and that you believe that the 
other group is less evolved than one’s in-group can actually be politically disastrous for 
both sides. However, if we combine this insight with previous research into how low-
power groups care more than high-power groups to be respected and perceived as 
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competent (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010), then it seems highly plausible to 
argue that low-power groups might be especially sensitive and reactive to 
metadehumanization, and that this in turn can lead to a higher chance of political 
aggression and resentment. 
In the context of the ‘civilizationary clash’ rhetoric, this becomes significant as 
we look for ways to establish moral and rhetorical standards of how different groups 
should talk to and about each other. Not only do we have to pay attention to 
dehumanizing rhetoric directed towards low-power groups, but we also need to recognize 
that dehumanizing language and the belief that one’s in-group is viewed in a humanly 
inferior and demeaning way by an out-group (even if that out-group holds less power and 
status in society) affects high-power groups as well, and can therefore have toxic effects 
on intergroup peace and cooperation. 
I argue therefore that civilizationary clash theories are not only problematic 
because they might make non-Western nations and cultural groups feel excluded from a 
shared sense of humanity and humiliated as a result of being portrayed as culturally and 
economically inferior, but also, because the idea of a hierarchical ordering of different 
‘civilizations’ can backfire for the ‘superior’ West, in that non-Western groups might feel 
metadehumanized by this kind of discourse, and as a result, return and retaliate by 
blatantly dehumanizing the West. The 2016 Bruneau study showed that even high-power 
groups, i.e. in this case, the West, are very much affected by feeling dehumanized by a 
low-power group, and that this sense of dehumanization experienced by a high-power 
group can result in support for aggressive and belligerent actions to resolve conflict, 
instead of compromise and peaceful negotiations. 
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One only has to think of the phenomenon of Anti-Americanism in the Arabic 
world, which is often expressed through flag burning or more recently, violent protests in 
front of U.S. embassies in the Middle East following the Arab Spring in 201150. Amaney 
Jamal (2012), in her book on Anti-Americanism in the Arab world, argues that the 
persistence of Anti-Americanism should not be explained through the existence of some 
deep civilizationary hatred or as an emotionally charged sentiment towards the world’s 
largest superpower, but as a rational response to U.S. policies and the way how they have 
systematically disadvantaged Arabs economically and politically. Jamal claims that 
because the U.S. has insisted on “pro-American democracy or no democracy” at all, 
authoritarian rule was allowed to flourish in many places, opposition against the latter 
which Jamal pins down as the main source of Anti-American sentiment. Based on the 
PBP argument, Jamal’s claim could be reconsidered. Indeed, Jamal’s attempt at 
characterizing Arabs as rational decision-makers with sensible political grievances 
instead of an emotion-driven and brutish mob can be understood as a way to humanize 
the Arabic people to a American audience. 
As much as this kind of re-humanization of Arabs and the reminder that Arabs 
can be rational actors according to Western standards just as everyone else is much 
needed in the current U.S. foreign policy discourse, Jamal might be overlooking the 
relevance and power of civilizationary rhetoric on political behavior. Although Anti-
Americanism in the Arabic world should not be pinned down to the existence of some 
dubious and ominous existence of ancient civilizationary hatred, Jamal might be 
underestimating how the West’s obsession with the civilizationary clash theory can come 
                                                 
50 http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/11/world/meast/egpyt-us-embassy-protests/. 
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across as dehumanizing for the Arabic world and in turn, the humiliation and anger in 
response to both the subtle and blatant dehumanizing by the U.S. towards Arabs might 
manifest itself partially in the anti-American protests and flag burning events that took 
place in the wake of the Arab Spring.  
In his review of Jamal’s argument, Marc Lynch (2013) points out that the role of 
cognitive bias was overlooked, in that Arabs might ascribe much more powers to 
Washington in influencing their lives and political events than is actually the case – 
indeed, with the PBP, this cognitive bias could be explained by the fact that feeling 
dehumanized and viewed as a lesser and more backward ‘civilization’ deeply affects 
group members’ sense of worth and can backfire in aggression and retaliation. Ironically, 
the hated high-power group (in this case the U.S.) would then be ascribed much more 
cognitive significance and as a result, be viewed as the main culprit for one’s political 
woes. 
I contend further in this context that we need to redefine what we mean by 
‘rational’ political responses, since reactions to feeling metahumanized in the form of 
retaliating by dehumanizing another group in turn could in fact be constructed as rational 
cognitive mechanism, which serves protective and strategic functions, even though the 
behavioral and attitudinal outcomes are not politically desirable. From the PBP it is 
important that we begin to take into account the emotional and cognitive effects 
dehumanization has on our sense of self-worth, group-membership and humanity, and 
that once a civilizationary rhetoric about “us” versus “them” is unleashed, dehumanized 
groups might continue and reciprocate dehumanization in a vicious cycle of political 
actions and rhetoric. Painting this cycle as exclusively non-rational is just as misleading 
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as painting it as completely rational (in the way how rational choice theory defines 
‘rational’ agents, for example).  
Rather, if we return to a point I made in the introductory chapter and chapter 2 of 
this dissertation, we need to seriously redefine what ‘rationality’ means in the intergroup 
dynamics of mutual denial of humanity, and how everyday dehumanization is part of how 
our social brains function, but also, how dehumanizing someone and feeling 
dehumanized in turn is experienced at the brain level in a complex and visceral way that 
cannot simply be dismissed as ‘irrationality’. 
A good example of this confusion about ‘rationality’ is the discourse surrounding 
the Bosnian war and genocide. The Bosnian conflict took place between two main 
groups, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, and resulted in the slaughter and attempted 
eradication of the Muslim population in the early 1990s. The discourse preceding and 
surrounding the Bosnian conflict in the form of “Balkanization”, i.e. painting the 
situation as an outbreak of ancient hatreds and irrational feuds that had been going for 
centuries in this region, was a major contributor in the West’s reluctance to intervene 
(Zimmermann, 1996; Dobbs, 1995; Bush 1992; McCain S1204010, 102nd Congress, 
August 10, 1992). Two of the most influential publications were Robert D. Kaplan’s 
Balkan Ghosts (1993) and Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey 
through Yugoslavia (1941). Kaplan’s in book in particular was said to have persuaded 
President Clinton to abandon his policy of ‘lift and strike’ in May 1993 and adopt the 
stance that the Balkan conflict was unsolvable due to the civilizationary peculiarity of the 
region51. Lene Hansen (2006) sharply criticizes both Kaplan’s and West’s works for 
                                                 
51 Roger Petersen (2011) makes a similar but much more sophisticated and subtle argument about 
how Western powers have not sufficiently mentalized Balkan people, and that Balkan people’s 
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conveying a 19th century romantic image of the Balkans, which celebrates the Orthodox 
and Byzantine influences on the Yugoslav region and draws a sharp Western “us” 
distinction against the Orthodox “them” (ibid., p.153). 
Another influential voice in the discourse is the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Report on the Balkan Wars, published in 1914, 1993 and 1996. 
Unlike the dominant Western discourse that assumed insurmountable civilizationary 
differences between the West and the Balkan region, the 1914 Carnegie Report took a 
markedly different position. Although American and Western civilization were declared 
as superior, the 1914 report struck a very optimistic and humanizing tone, in which 
Balkan people were described as being “the same as us” and reformable, and thus should 
be made “young clients of civilization” (in Hansen, 2000, p.8). 
Although the 1914 report was written as an attempt at reconstructing history after 
the Second Balkan War in 1913, and not as a piece to advocate Western intervention, it is 
important to note the outlook in this report, where the attainment of a singular civilization 
was seen as possible52. In other words, the West’s in-group boundaries were defined as 
flexible and embracing of the Balkan people, and for this reason, the Balkan conflict was 
not viewed simply as an ancient, unintelligible conflict, but as an intelligible and tragic 
event carried out by humans just like us. The Balkan people were not depicted as 
animalistic or mechanistic brutes and savages but were instead ascribed characteristics 
and decision-making capabilities that were intelligible and potentially equal to 
Westerners. 
                                                 
motivations and aspirations might not adhere to the highly individualized and rationalist model of 
Western rational-choice based political models. 
52 See Trix (2014) for a balanced and critical historical analysis of the 1914 Carnegie Report on the Balkan 
Wars. 
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On the other hand, the 1993 report was politically much more crucial than the 
1914 report, and stood in stark contrast to the latter. Prefaced by George Kennan, it 
depicted the Balkan conflicts as a savage battle between “emotionally excited” groups 
whose untamable drives could not be subdued by Western powers but should instead be 
left to itself to resolve, almost like a wildfire (note the animalistic dehumanization at play 
here). Kennan’s advice not to intervene is decisive in this aspect, urging Western leaders 
not to get involved in a conflict that is essentially carried out by people with a different 
kind of (i.e. more brutish) humanity than the West’s. In comparison, the final 1996 
report, written up in the aftermath of the war and after the shocking revelations of 
genocidal violence directed against Bosnian Muslims, takes a more balanced stance by 
arguing on the one hand that the West could have and should have intervened – 
criticizing in particular the UN’s portrayal of the war as a natural disaster – yet on the 
other hand being reluctant to revert to the 1914 report’s optimistic belief in the progress 
of universal civilization. 
Critics of the ‘ancient hatred’ theory – some of whom were actual witnesses to the 
Bosnian conflict – strongly condemn the civilizationary perspective for denying the 
actors in the conflict rationality and intelligible political motives. For John Mueller 
(2014), for example, the Bosnian war was not a manifestation of internal civilizationary 
clashing within the region but a political event that happened as a “result of inadequate 
government” (ibid., p.47). Similarly, Hansen contends that “the war should be understood 
in the terms of Serbian nationalist aggression directed against a tolerant and liberal 
Bosnian government and its citizens” (ibid.: 346). Hansen criticizes harshly the 
construction of the specter of “Balkanization”, which portrays the region as hopelessly 
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embroiled in intergroup violence and its people as “prey to (…) violent promptings of 
their own passions”, which would entrap the Western great powers if they were so foolish 
as to intervene (Todorova, 1997: 34). 
Ed Vuillamy (1998), one of the major British journalists who reported about the 
Bosnian conflict from the ground, offers a more nuanced explanation of the conflict’s 
causes. Vuillamy believes that one of the main reasons why Serbs felt threatened is 
because they were told by their political leaders that Muslims were trying to kill them and 
eradicate them, since “the first task facing any group intending to inflict genocide on 
someone else is to convince its own people that they are about to be victims of genocide 
themselves” – indeed, the ‘genocide’ term was first used in the context of Serbs fearing 
expulsion by President Milosevic (ibid., p.77). In addition, Radovan Karadzic, the main 
political instigator and war criminal on the Serbian side, was a rural papak who felt 
rejected and betrayed by a cosmopolitan Sarajevo dominated by urbanized Muslims, and 
possibly even felt dehumanized by that very community. In other words, Vuillamy’s 
observations suggest that Serbs might have felt metadehumanization prior to their own 
instigation of genocide of the Muslims, which in turn led to the perceived need for 
retaliatory and excessive violence against the Muslim out-group. 
Instead of being driven by ancient and opaque hatreds, this shows that Serbs 
might have been reacting aggressively and violently to Muslims because they had worked 
themselves up into believing that they were dehumanized victims. They were fuelled by 
the fear-driven metadehumanizing rhetoric of their political leaders, to the point of 
feeling sufficiently dehumanized and threatened themselves that they could justify 
retaliation against the Muslim out-group. 
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 The PBP on dehumanization is crucial in the Bosnian context because it firstly 
debunks the civilizationary divide theory by taking on the perspective that we all share 
the same brains cross-culturally, therefore political scientists cannot dismiss certain parts 
of the world and its people as cognitively unintelligible. Instead, the PBP compels 
political scientists to come up with explanatory models premised on the humanly 
intelligible motives of its political actors. Secondly, the psychological and neuroscientific 
research into intergroup violence and dehumanization offers a strong glimmer of hope 
that dehumanization can be tackled through various mentalizing and empathy efforts, as 
well as cooperational set-ups, which in turn makes the Bosnian conflict seem less like an 
endless vicious cycle of violence but a toxic intergroup conflict that could have stood a 
chance of de-escalation and intervention, if only political leaders and experts would have 
taken seriously the devastating political consequences of feeling dehumanized by another 
out-groups. 
 
5.3.3. Why the PBP on Civilization Theories Matters III: International Human Rights 
Civilizationary clash theories based on hierarchical distinctions between “us” and 
“them” do not just appear in U.S. foreign policy debates and the International relations 
field but also in human rights theory. I contend that International human rights scholars 
often operate on a similar logic in order to justify the implementation of human rights and 
Western norms abroad. For example, a widely respected authority on human rights 
theory, Jack Donnelly (1998), couches his explanation of the growing acceptance of 
universal human rights in the post-War period (and post-Cold War period in particular) in 
the language of divisive civilizations. Human rights, he says, emerged as a new 
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international “classic standard of civilization”, in which being inside or outside is defined 
through the acceptance of shared cultural values. 
He traces back this civilizationary standard exclusively through Western history, 
claiming that this standard first emerged in the 19th century in the context of colonialism 
and the question of extraterritoriality, in which imperialist countries such as Britain 
needed to find a way to distinguish between “uncivilized natives” in prospective colonies 
who could then be justifiably civilized through colonization and excluded from 
international law, and on the other hand, countries such as Imperial China, which could 
clearly not be described as uncivilized or savage but was also not allowed membership in 
the “family of nations” headed by the West (ibid.: 4). The latter case was understood to 
fall under the realm of “extraterritoriality”, i.e. applying to countries such as Imperialist 
China, Japan and the Ottoman Empire, which were not considered to be at the same 
“savage” level as the African dark continent, but at the same time, were not accepted as 
being as civilized as the colonialist West and hence treated as sovereign, but still unequal. 
It is important to note here both the subtle and blatant ways in which “uncivilized” and 
“extraterritorial” out-groups were being dehumanized in the 19th century. 
Africa and other “uncivilized” regions of the world were blatantly dehumanized 
by being portrayed as brutish, savage and ape-like, whereas “extraterritorial” cases such 
as China or the Ottoman Empire – even though they were deemed sovereign – were 
subtly dehumanized or infra-humanized by denying them uniquely human emotions and 
attributes through “Orientalism” and being given the status of exotic exceptionalism 
(Said, 1978). To put it more bluntly, the world regions that the Imperialist West 
colonized were simply written off as beneath their own humanity, whereas other world 
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regions that the West did not dare to aggressively colonize were characterized as exotic 
freaks that might have made certain cultural, economic and political achievements, but 
were lacking in a special human essence that only the West possessed53.  
There are parallels to this kind of subtle dehumanization of the East with the 
reported mechanistic dehumanization experienced by East Asians in the West today 
(Haslam, 2006), which was brought up in Chapter 3 and 4 already. East Asians who are 
mechanistically dehumanized are seen to lack unique human traits such as emotional 
warmth, compassion, individuality and creativity and are often perceived (and feared) as 
over-achieving, excessively competent, high-functioning machines. Subtle 
dehumanization of this particular group is therefore repeating itself in a strikingly similar 
fashion to colonialist periods in Western history – casting doubt on whether a cognitive 
rejection of dehumanizing perceptions of East Asians ever took place. 
Despite the West’s troublesome colonialist usage of the idea of civilization and 
hierarchical civilizationary divides between different groups, Donnelly presses on in his 
advocacy of modern-day human rights as a desired “standard of civilization”, arguing 
that in the 20th century, the West was able to liberate itself from the ugly shackles of 
colonialism and turning towards a more egalitarian idea of sovereignty. Donnelly 
                                                 
53 This difference can also be analyzed at through the lens of “tutelary politics”, in which case the 
“other” is infantilized rather than dehumanized. For example, J.S. Mill, who worked for the East 
India Company, argued that Indians were not ready for self-government, although they could be 
ready for self-governance eventually (Zastoupil, 1994). Mill famously distinguished Indians from 
“savages” (the lowest rank within the civilizationary scale), classifying them instead as either 
“semi-barbarous” or “barbarous” (Tunick, 2006). This begs the question whether instead of 
having blatantly dehumanized Indians, Mill held an infantilized view of the Indian people who 
however to him still had some level of agency in determining their history and changing their 
government at some point in that history. The ascription of human agency and the capacity for 
bringing about historical change thus seems to be an important factor in evading more extreme 
forms of blatant dehumanization and categorization of people on the lowest rank of the 
civilizationary scale.  
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contends that the “standard of civilization” was suddenly turned into a force of good, 
such as igniting campaigns against the slave trade, advocating for penal reform, 
outlawing practices such as piracy, polygamy and infanticide (ibid.: 5). Historical 
milestones, such as the when the League of Nations pledged after WWI to protect the 
rights of national and religious minorities in their territories and most important, the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the United Nations 
General Assembly, serve as legal and normative examples of this “standard of 
civilizations” for Donnelly. Based on these achievements, as well as the success of the 
colonial independence movements in the latter half of the 20th century, Donnelly perhaps 
too optimistically (and naively) concludes that “the whole globe was recognized as 
civilized” in a postcolonial era (ibid., p.13). 
This chapter casts doubt on this optimistic conclusion, not least based on Bruneau 
and his colleagues’ (2015; 2016) studies discussed earlier, which contradict Donnelly’s 
claim completely by showing that civilizationary concepts based on dehumanizing and 
divisive hierarchies very similar to those of the darker colonialist periods in Western 
history are still alive and potent within the West today. The most troubling part of 
Donnelly’s argument, however, lies in the part when he insists that we need to continue 
to uphold the “standard of civilization” because “something like a standard of civilization 
is needed to save us from the barbarism of a pristine sovereignty that would consign 
countless millions of individuals and entire peoples to international neglect [emphasis 
added]” (ibid.: 16). He invokes the recent tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia and Tiananmen 
Square, where suffering populations were helped with too little, too late by the 
international community and were left at the mercy of their national and local politicians 
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to die unspeakable deaths. Donnelly is worried, just as other interventionist human rights 
advocates (Power, 2002), that the abandonment of a “standard of civilization” – both as a 
rhetoric tool and a normative international measure – will be tantamount to conceding 
defeat to human rights abuses and atrocities committed by authoritarian and oppressive 
regimes. Donnelly ascribes to the concept of “civilization” and the drawing of the 
dichotomy between the “civilized” and the “barbaric” a great persuasive quality – in the 
hope that the mere invocation of the term will spur the international community into 
action. 
I claim that there exists a strong connection between Western political theorists 
defending of an essence-based idea of dignity on the one hand (as discussed in Chapter 4) 
and of this kind of civilizationary argument espoused by Donnelly. The hope is that by 
simply stating and believing that a “standard of civilization” and “universal dignity” must 
exist, international human rights laws and interventionist actions taken against oppressive 
regimes will have the necessary fuel and justification to be carried out and survive. My 
argument is that Donnelly, by invoking a “standard of civilization” against the “barbaric” 
other, might in fact be engaging in potentially subtle and blatant dehumanizing of those 
very out-groups he wishes to help, and therefore, in a counter-productive fashion, invite 
people to engage in dehumanizing perceptions of various groups and countries in the 
world. 
Although Donnelly’s intentions are opposite to those of Huntington, in that 
Huntington is wary of interventionist politics in non-Western countries because he fears a 
battle between incommensurable cultural values (whereas Donnelly advocates for 
interventionist politics in the name of universal human rights), both Donnelly and 
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Huntington completely misunderstand what the invocation of the “civilizationary divide” 
does to the social brains of both Westerners and non-Westerners. Instead of making 
people more wary of interventionist politics in non-Western regions (Huntington’s aim) 
or more empathetic and proactive in intervening in human rights violations abroad 
(Donnelly’s aim), the studies on subtle and blatant dehumanization unmistakably show 
that individuals who dehumanize someone through the civilizationary lens are less 
willing to help that out-group and are more likely to engage in aggressive actions. In 
addition to this, individuals who feel that their own in-group has been dehumanized want 
to retaliate belligerently against the other group and refuse cooperation with them. 
In a nutshell, the outcome of thinking of people as less evolved and barbaric, i.e. 
as less than human than ourselves, and of thinking of ourselves as superior on the 
civilizationary ladder makes us all worse off politically: those who dehumanize others as 
a result lose the capacity to mentalize others through deactivation of their medial 
prefrontal cortex and exhibit negative and uncooperative political attitudes and behavior, 
and those who feel dehumanized might then dehumanize the other group in return and 
retaliate violently. 
It is this retaliatory dehumanization by the initially dehumanized group that is 
often just marginally discussed in research on intergroup conflict, particularly how it 
plays out within the social cognition systems of both dehumanizer and the dehumanized 
(Ascher & Mirovitskaya, 2015; Dancygier, 2010; McDoom, 2012; but then see Claassen, 
2016). Although it is important to foremost outline power and status imbalances that 
determine dehumanized perceptions of certain out-groups by more powerful and higher-
status groups (Harris & Fiske, 2008), it is also necessary to acknowledge that 
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dehumanized groups can dehumanize their dehumanizers in turn – in other words, the 
politics of dehumanization can be a two-way street, even if it is often a politically and 
socially unequal one. 
Donnelly is therefore terribly naïve in contending that the dehumanizing and 
undesirable aspects of the “civilization” concept back in the 19th colonialist century can 
be easily overcome in the 21st century, by claiming that the idea of a superior “standard 
of civilization” does not always have to be correlated with power and domination (ibid.: 
5) and that we have “moved a significant distance from civilizationary imperialism” 
(ibid: 21). Critics of Donnelly within the IR field reject the claim that we have entered a 
postcolonial and postimperial age but believe that many contemporary practices, 
including within the IR field itself, are driven by economic and political neocolonialism 
(Jones, 2006; Hall and Jackson, 2007). Julian Saurin (2006) argues that if we, according 
to Lenin, understand colonialism as chiefly an expression of capitalist imperialism, then 
in many ways, colonialism did not come to an end with the national independence 
movements of various former colonies (ibid.: 26). Instead, Western supremacism 
continues in the structural production of an economic world order skewed in favor of the 
West and the insistence on the nationalist principle as the primary way to gain political 
legitimacy on the historical stage. Saurin concludes that from the moment of its 
conception, the field of IR was imperialist and national in character, founded on “myths 
of nationalist origination” and the aim to monopolize the means of mental production 
around a Western vantage point of superiority. 
Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2006) goes so far as to say that IR studies are a form of 
“modern imperial ideology” (ibid.: 5) in which international relations are predominantly 
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conceived as imperial relations. She uses the example of Islam as a way how Western IR 
studies have both misunderstood and caricatured the phenomenon in its religious, 
historical and socio-political complexity, and how there is a “deeply rooted, almost 
subconscious tendency to deny legitimacy and worth of non-Western values, traditions, 
practices, struggles, discourses, and thought” (ibid.: 12). The biggest criticism for Jones, 
which could be applied to universal human rights theorists such as Donnelly, is that IR is 
so self-confident about its own good intentions towards non-Western countries and 
groups that it comes to believe its own “myths” and the construction of a “privileged, 
genealogically useful past, a past in which we exclude unwanted elements, vestiges, 
narratives” (Said, 1994: 16). 
This chapter treats the neocolonialist critique by IR theorists on the Left as 
complementary to the previous neuropolitical criticism of Donnelly. The neocolonialist 
critique within IR chiefly uses materialist and historical arguments to make their point, 
which provides a crucial backdrop to the power relations between the civilized “us” 
versus the barbaric and backward “thems” inherent in the political civilizationary clash 
theories, as well as the dehumanizing civilizationary hierarchies detected at the brain-
level. Meanwhile, it could be argued that the “Ascent of Man” ratings in the Bruneau et 
al. study followed a pattern of global economic status hierarchy, which might be 
correlated with the kind of Western supremacist and neoimperialist bias highlighted by its 
critics. 
Donnelly’s stance is part of a larger call within the human rights debate to “name 
and shame” human rights abusers, if necessary with civilizationary arguments (Farer, 
2000; Franklin, 2008; Krain, 2012). Indeed, what bigger shame and loss of face could the 
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international community bring to another country’s leaders by calling them “savage”, 
“barbarian” and denying them sophistication and humanity? It seems to be a recurring 
phenomenon that dictators throughout history have aspired to be popular and loved, 
which might however be more due to individual egomaniac vanity than to having read 
and taken to heart Machiavelli’s advice to princes that they should always try to be loved 
instead of being hated. More seriously, the idea here is that by shaming internationally a 
government or political actors who commit human rights abuses against their citizens, the 
citizens’ own perception of their governments’ crimes will shift, thus increasing the 
likelihood of rebellion and dissent (Gurr, 1970; Lichbach, 1995).  
The empirical evidence on whether “naming and shaming” is actually effective is 
mixed, with some studies showing that this tactic can lead to a significant shift in public 
opinion (Ausderan, 2014) and others suggesting that shaming can in fact result in an 
overall increase of violations (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Krain 2012). I argue here that 
shaming has to be done very carefully, with a special sensitivity towards dehumanizing 
language. In the case of shaming human rights abuses committed by the Chinese 
government, for example, Western powers and human rights organizations constantly 
have to manage a balancing act where the “naming and shaming” directed against the 
government does not trigger an indignant nationalist response from the populace 
(Hughes, 2006; Liu, 2007). 
This was especially relevant in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, where 
international pressure to improve China’s human rights record drove some parts of an 
offended population into rallying behind the government (Yang, 2008). Ongoing hot 
button issues such as Tibetan and Uyghur independence (and in connection to this, 
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furious nationalist responses by both young Chinese at home and abroad) suggest that the 
West needs to pay attention in which way it delivers its human rights critique. Based on 
the PBP of both in-group and out-group, I wish to stress the importance of making the 
criticized out-group feel fully humanized and included in the critic’s sense of humanity. 
Both subtle and blatant dehumanization have to be avoided at all costs, since this would 
trigger defensive and even retaliatory reaction from a Chinese populace’s side, which 
might in fact not be strongly supportive of its government, but feel driven into supporting 
it as a result of feeling dehumanized by the West. 
In this sense, I wish to transcend the current divide within the human rights field 
between those who believe that human rights standards are universally valid and 
applicable (Donnelly, 1998; 2007), and the growing oppositional voices that insist that 
non-Western societies have their own, home-grown human rights traditions and values 
(Midlarsky, 1998; Sen, 1997; Bauer & Bell, 1999) and that claims to the universal 
applicability of human rights is deeply Eurocentric (Mutua, 2016; Nisbett, 2003; Zakaria 
and Lee, 1994). I believe that this divide might never be solved, in that both sides hold a 
deep historical and political investment in their cases, which can be equally persuasive 
depending one one’s own political agenda and outlook on dialectic historical processes. 
What can be said concludingly however, is that the universalist camp, if it wants 
to succeed, needs to understand the danger of invoking civilizationary arguments, 
especially when they are supposed to serve “shaming” purposes. Even if the universalist 
camp disagrees with those who accuse it of Eurocentrism and lack of understanding of 
local, non-Western traditions, it cannot revert to a hierarchical idea of civilizationary 
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The argument I tried to make in this chapter is both simple and complicated. The 
complicated part consists in the many facets in which dehumanization can manifest itself 
– either as animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization, subtle infrahumanization, implicit 
bias or blatant dehumanization. Researchers are still in the process of parsing out the 
differences between these modes and exploring to which extent they affect political 
attitudes and behavior. It is for this reason, as well as the particularity in which intergroup 
dynamics play themselves out in specific historical and situational contexts, that the exact 
causal relationship and correlation between civilizationary theories and intergroup 
aggression is still in the process of being developed on various interdisciplinary fronts in 
the cognitive and social sciences. However, what I wish to have transpired in this chapter 
is a simple message, which is that civilizationary theories have to be employed with a lot 
of caution by politicians and political scientists alike. This is because these theories tap 
into and amplify our natural tendency for in-group favoritism and potentially, 
dehumanized perception of out-groups. In the end, framing one’s political worldview in 
this way makes both the dehumanized and the dehumanizer politically worse off. 
As many non-Western parts of the world are in the middle of a precarious 
balancing act between modernization and the struggle to define their identities on a 
global stage, we need to be cautious with the concepts and language employed in 
international conflicts and interventions. The danger of the civilizationary rhetoric is its 
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deep divisiveness along the lines of those who are considered to be fully human and those 
who are seen as barbaric and inferior to another group’s superior humanity. We need to 
remind ourselves that the wish to be humanized by others is a need and passion that runs 
so deep that it can both heal seemingly insurmountable divides but also become the toxic 
fuel for a spectacular kind of redemptive revenge. The goal of an identity politics in the 

























6.1. The Two-Realities Problem 
 The wider purpose of this dissertation was to show that the brain matters for 
politics. This is not only due to the fact that the brain is located as a vital organ inside the 
body of political actors, but also, because certain social brain abilities and mechanisms 
are fundamental to the dynamics underlying political cooperation, especially in 
hyperdiverse societies. Yet political theories on diversity and difference commonly suffer 
from the two-realities-problem: there is one reality imagined by political theorists, based 
on analytic and normative assumptions derived predominantly from Western political 
thought, on how individuals from different ethnic, cultural and religious groups can live 
and cooperate together; and a second reality, in which the actual cognitive and affective 
experiences of the perceivers of difference and those who are perceived to be different 
are largely unknown. 
The two-realities-problem poses a genuine problem for political theorists: theories 
about cooperation between diverse groups are always based on some assumption, 
however minimal, of how human beings operate in social settings with others – yet what 
if our theoretical assumptions do not match up with the second reality of the social brain? 
What if, as a result, this dissonance leads to the depiction of a reality that is far removed 
from how the excluder herself experiences acts of exclusion at the brain level? Further, 
what if normative demands made by political theorists on how we should include others 
might be cognitively impossible to achieve, due to our ‘flexible social cognition’ (Harris, 
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2017) regarding the everyday dehumanizing of others? Finally, what if political theorists’ 
largely monocultural concepts of self and human dignity are challenged by recent insights 
from cultural neuroscience on how bicultural individuals switch between both Western 
and non-Western identities? How should new models of the hyperdiverse political self be 
structured accordingly? 
In an effort to bridge the chasm between these two realities, this dissertation tried 
to develop the PBP as a new epistemological tool to navigate between insights from 
psychology and brain data on the one hand, and political levels of analysis on the other. 
In a post-Civil Rights age where political and social norms about prohibiting the explicit 
expression and endorsement of racism, sexism and other kinds of prejudices against 
minority groups are largely accepted and adhered to, the PBP on the implicit exclusion 
and subtle dehumanization of other groups can become a crucial window into forms of 
less explicit and yet still persisting systematic discriminatory and exclusionary practices. 
Indeed, in an effort to appeal to a larger voter base and to submit to these norms, 
even current leaders of far-right political parties and movements, such as and Marine Le 
Pen in France and Steven Bannon in the U.S., do not want to be branded as “racists” and 
claim that they do not hold racist political views (Polakow-Suransky, 2016; Wolff, 2016). 
In a reverse example to this, Chapter 3 discussed the fact that liberal thinkers such as 
Immanuel Kant were willing to reject slavery on ideological grounds but nonetheless 
viewed Blacks as humanely inferior to European Whites. 
It is this split between the content of political ideologies and the way that our 
brains (do not) enact them that this dissertation tried to draw attention to. If an explicitly 
unequal and subhuman treatment of any particular group is prohibited ideologically in 
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one society – and if, as scholars in the post-Cold War era have argued (Fukuyama, 1992), 
liberalism’s normative prescription on social cooperation and diversity is the main 
survivor in today’s ideological landscape – then having access to the second reality of 
how these norms and ideological beliefs are in fact instantiated in the brains of individual 
political actors becomes indispensable in gaining a complete picture of political reality 
itself. The window into the second reality allows us to understand the nature of political 
beliefs and ideologies beyond their mere written and rhetorical manifestations. 
On a more pragmatic level, being able to offer evidence of this second reality can 
be empowering for minorities and targets of exclusion in instances where, based on the 
first reality, they are told that exclusion does not exist or that they are just imagining the 
exclusion that they experience subjectively. The brain evidence is a powerful tool to 
employ in the context of trying to understand and outline what is happening in the brain 
of the excluder, and to help establish a reality that minorities experience at an intense, 
visceral and damaging level, yet whose very existence they often struggle to describe and 
validate. 
 
6.2. Towards a Post-Ontological Idea of the Political Self 
 A central assumption underlying the PBP is that in order to understand and 
predict political behavior, and the cognitive conditions under which individuals enter 
political scenarios such as the social contract or cooperation in hyperdiverse societies, a 
minimal neuropolitical theory based on the PBP needs to commit to a non-ontological, 
non-essence based idea of the political self. I outlined this based on more general 
epistemological grounds in Chapter 2 and by applying this stance more concretely to the 
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concept of ‘human dignity’ in Chapter 4: instead of treating the nature of political virtues 
and moral goods such as dignity, toleration and recognition as an ontological essence that 
resides within each of us like an invisible nugget, this dissertation argues that we should 
instead construct the existence of dignity as an interpersonal, neurocognitive ascriptive 
process that is realized through flexible brain mechanisms of ascribing or denying 
humanness to someone else. 
 One fear amongst critics of the mechanism-based approach (Bennett & Hacker, 
2003; Nagel, 1974) is that constructing an idea of self based on our ‘social cognition 
network’ and the neurocognitive mechanisms that underpin it will lead to extreme 
reductionist, determinist and non-dualist views of human subjective experience and 
irreducible goods such as dignity. This dissertation tried to show, primarily in Chapter 2’s 
historical depiction of the highly thoughtful internal discourse within social and political 
neuroscience, that neuroscientists themselves are usually very skeptical about extreme 
reductionist and determinist explanatory models of social behavior, and furthermore 
would balk at claims that brain data alone could explain complex social or political 
phenomena in their entirety. However, what a mechanism-based model of the political 
self offers us – especially on topics such as discrimination, prejudice and exclusion – is 
the ability to access implicit biases, ambiguous stereotyping, as well the spontaneous and 
rapid way we deny humanness to others through crucial brain mechanisms that would 
otherwise go undetected through more behavior or survey-based methods. 
Social neuroscientists today might be willing to affirm that the ‘biological is 
social and the social is biological’, however, this dissertation expressed uncertainty over 
the question whether the same goes for biology’s relationship to politics. Although the 
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political is certainly always biological, in that every political actor possesses a brain and 
body (and enacts politics through them), it is not clear whether the biological is also 
always political. Chapter 3 made the argument that public representatives in a liberal 
democracy have a special neuropolitical responsibility to mentalize their diverse 
constituencies but that this neuropolitical responsibility cannot be justifiably demanded 
from every citizen to same degree. In other words, whereas the existence of unchecked 
implicit biases and dehumanization of another by a public representative has serious 
political consequences for targeted groups in terms of power and economic equality, 
private citizens might hold implicit biases that should ideally be overcome, but that the 
state or other citizens cannot legally or politically force another private citizen to rescind. 
This opens up the question – touched upon throughout all chapters – on what the 
relationship is between rapid and implicit biases and dehumanizing tendencies, and 
explicit political behavior. I argued that implicit biases and subtle dehumanization 
matters for the healthy fabric of liberal democracies and the neuropolitical capabilities of 
both its members and public representatives. However, solving this question is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation as a whole, but it is worth mentioning in this concluding 
chapter that addressing the problems and confusions underlying the relationship between 
implicit brain mechanisms and actual behavior – and especially its political implications 
– is an important future research question for the nascent field of political neuroscience 
and neuropolitical theorizing. Constructing a post-ontological, brain mechanism-based 
idea of the political self is a first step towards this aim. 
 
6.3. Humanizing the Other: A Basic Condition for Cooperative Politics 
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 The core political argument of this dissertation was centered on exposing 
dehumanized perception as a major disrupter of cooperative politics in hyperdiverse 
societies. The neuropolitical reason for this is that dehumanized perception disables a 
core social brain function called mentalizing, which plays a crucial role in executive and 
moral decision-making, perspective taking, and feeling empathy with others. To put it 
more bluntly, if we dehumanize someone in the form of de-mentalizing them at the brain 
level, they are in our eyes equal to a non-human object (for example, a chair) – with 
consequences for our ability to fathom their interests, feelings, sufferings and aspirations, 
as well affecting our behavioral response towards them. Chapter 3 therefore argues that 
the ability to mentalize a wide array of viewpoints and identities is of utmost importance 
for public representatives in liberal democracies, whose positions are based on the 
principle that they will represent their diverse constituencies, as well as to help guarantee 
equal and fair access to legal and political institutions to all political members of their 
community. This dissertation argues that without being informed and in command of 
their ‘flexible’ dehumanization abilities, public representatives might struggle to fulfill 
their duties at the cognitive level, and their constituencies might suffer as a result. 
In addition to this, this dissertation believes that dehumanization needs to be 
recognized as a potential disruptor of political cooperation and solidarity within political 
theories about the social contract, multiculturalism and the politics of difference. I argue 
that without understanding this fundamental way of how our social brains navigate 
themselves on a daily basis with others, any political theory about political cooperation 
situated in the context of hyperdiverse societies lacks explanatory and predictive power. 
The point is to realize that even well meaning individuals who affirm liberal and 
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democratic political values can succumb to everyday dehumanized perception of others 
in rapid and spontaneous ways. It is important to realize that humanizing someone is not 
an essence-based value that we can pledge allegiance to at one point in our lives but that 
overcoming our inherent brain-based ability to dehumanize others has to be a conscious, 
daily effort – being in command of our ‘flexible social cognition’ thus becomes a chief 
neuropolitical condition for successful cooperation in hyperdiverse societies. 
However, even though dehumanized perception and biases are such a 
fundamental part of our social cognition system and cannot be completely overcome, it 
can be moderated and kept in check through a mundane cognitive exercise such as 
mentalizing other people’s food preferences (Harris & Fiske, 2007), exposure to 
counterstereotypical exemplars (Lai et al., 2014), forming more individuating 
impressions of others (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999), stressing what we have in common 
on a human level, and mindfulness training of one’s empathic and kind feelings towards 
others (Fredrickson et al., 2008). Activating our reward and competition cognition 
network can also help towards humanizing others and treating them as people who 
deserve our concern, such as by shifting group boundaries through competition (Lai et. al, 
2014) and establishing a sense of “cooperative interdependence” between groups (Ames 
& Fiske, 2013). Understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying dehumanizing is 
however the necessary first step in working towards trying to partly overcome it. 
Humanizing others cannot be taken for granted or treated as a by-product of liberal 
democratic values such as toleration, recognition and inclusion, but instead needs to be 
treated by political theorists of diversity and difference as a cognitive challenge for the 
political self and as a fundamental neuropolitical ability that needs to be in place in order 
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for the above mentioned liberal democratic values to have a chance of realization and 
long-term survival in the first place.  
Whereas Chapter 3 and 4 focused on the need for humanization and mentalizing 
of others in domestic contexts within liberal democracies, Chapter 5 situated this 
argument in the international political arena, looking at the post-Cold War discourse on a 
‘civilizationary clash’ between Western ‘civilized’ nations and non-Western ‘barbaric’ 
ones, as well as the way how groups who feel dehumanized by others in international 
conflicts have the potential to engage in retaliatory dehumanization in return. The point 
there was to underscore the importance of the PBP on dehumanized perception not only 
for the politics of domestic contexts but also for international conflicts and the language 
used in diplomacy between Western and non-Western states. 
Most important, Chapter 5 exposed the disastrous behavioral outcomes of feeling 
dehumanized – from supporting retributive justice to engaging in intergroup violence – 
and the way how ascribing a unique human essence to one’s national (or Western) in-
group in the form of infrahumanization can seriously hamper efforts for effective 
international dialogue and cooperation to take place. In the case of the international 
political arena, words and rhetoric surrounding ‘civilized’ in-groups and ‘barbarous’ out-
groups truly matter because they have an effect on both the brain of the speaker and 
brains of individuals and groups who are addressed and portrayed as ‘barbarous’. Recent 
statements by U.S. military leaders, such as current National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. 
H.R. McMaster on how using the term “Radical Islamic Terrorism” is counterproductive 
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because of how it associates terrorism with Islam as a religious group seems to support 
this argument54. 
Being able to mentalize and humanize other groups and nations on the 
international stage, as well as feeling humanized by others internationally is a necessity 
and fundamental brain-based need that IR scholars and analysts have to take into account 
when trying to understand what motivates the outbreak of international conflict. Whereas 
dehumanization can destroy the fabric of a liberal democracy at the domestic level, it can 
lead to potentially avoidable escalations of retributive and retaliatory violence between 
different cultural groups and nations. Stressing what we have in common in terms of our 
humanness, whilst still acknowledging differences in terms of political and economic 
interests, seems crucial in avoiding the dangerous effects of mutual dehumanization on 
the international stage. In the context of another international crisis – global warming and 
environmentalism – this approach of affirming shared humanness on a global scale can 
possibly even contribute to a higher willingness to proactively engage in the fight against 
the environmental degradation of the globe (Kashima & Margetts, 2014).  
 
6.4. Neuropolitics of the Future: Cognitive Warfare versus Cognitive Solidarity 
 In a recent investigative journalistic piece for The Guardian newspaper, Carole 
Cadwalladr55 exposed how one of the main donors to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign – data science and hedge fund billionaire Robert Mercer – employed  a 
sophisticated internet-and social media based system during the 2016 presidential 





election, which collected and analyzed social media and Facebook data based on “bio-
psycho-social profiling”, and targeted profiled users with the intent to influence their 
political views at an emotional and cognitive level. Also described by its creators as 
“cognitive warfare”, the strategy is to combine big data analysis, cognitive science and 
new social media technology to understand what motivates voters from a psychological 
and brain-based level (and how, based on this information, they can be influenced 
politically through social media messaging). Although using profiling and targeted 
messages to reach voters is certainly not a novel phenomenon in the history of modern 
politics (Hillygus & Shields, 2008), the Oxford’s Internet Unit for Computational 
Propaganda Project deems the concept of ‘cognitive warfare’ in conjunction with big 
data and social media to be a significant development in “computer-scripted 
computational propaganda”, where biocognitive profiling and social media bots are used 
to influence public opinion56. 
This further underscores the relevance of the PBP and the urgent need for political 
science to include neuroscientific insights into our understanding of the political brain. 
Political scientists can no longer choose to ignore the ways in which brain insights and 
politics are linked in 21st century election campaigns, where, due to increased social 
media and internet usage by large parts of the voting population in the developing world, 
as well as the availability of increasingly personal and private ‘biosocial’ information 
                                                 
56 For more information, see their webpage at: http://politicalbots.org/?page_id=24. See also 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/russia-soft-warfare-cyberwar-hackers-fake-
news-170227070148722.html. For a more scholarly treatment of “extra-factual” sources of 
political information (EFI) and states’ decision-making, see Kelly Greenhill’s current work. For a 
recent assessment of the cognitive abilities and limitations of voters, and the way how social 
identities influence voting decisions, see Achen & Bartels (2016). 
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during this usage, unprecedentedly large and extensive data sets on people’s 
psychopolitical proclivities are collected. Without a general understanding of the 
cognitive mechanisms behind voters’ decision-making processes and a special awareness 
of the role that dehumanized perception plays in the formation of partisan in-group 
allegiances and out-group disgust towards groups such as Muslims, immigrants and 
refugees, political scientists will struggle to make sense of developments at the nexus of 
big data, cognitive science and internet technology that are poised to define the political 
landscape for this century. 
In opposition to the idea of ‘cognitive warfare’, I wish to close by sketching a 
vision for what I call cognitive solidarity. As we have seen, the picture that has emerged 
of our social brains does not necessarily fit very well with the normative political 
demands of a liberal democratic society: our brains are prone to in-group favoritism over 
equal and neutral treatment of all; we hold inherent biases and prejudices towards other 
out-groups; we succumb to heuristic biases when trying to make rational decisions; and 
we spontaneously and rapidly ascribe or deny humanness to others, even though we 
might consciously commit to universal and cosmopolitan values. 
Despite the fact that the initial picture of our social brains appears to be rather 
dark and sobering, this does not automatically mean that our brains are unable to function 
well and cooperate with others in a liberal democratic setting. In Chapters 3 to 5, as well 
as earlier in this conclusionary chapter, I outlined the various ways in which we can 
challenge our brains to overcome biases and dehumanized perception, and also pointed to 
the plastic and malleable nature of our brain structures and function. This dissertation’s 
main aim was to draw attention to dehumanization as a serious threat to political 
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cooperation in hyperdiverse societies, and the obvious next step would be to investigate 
ways to overcome this threat, at least to some extent. 
I argue in these final paragraphs that before dehumanization can be overcome 
politically, we need to forge a new neuropolitical concept – such as ‘cognitive solidarity’ 
– in which the cognitive challenges to mutual humanization and inclusion are 
acknowledged, but most importantly, in which the idea of cross-cutting solidarity 
between different socio-economic, racial, cultural and to an extent, political groups is 
treated a highly precarious yet acutely needed political good. 
A neuropolitical concept of ‘solidarity’, I argue, is distinct from simply asking 
people to be more empathetic towards others or overcoming their dehumanization 
tendencies toward certain groups. Solidarity here is understood to be more than a 
(potentially fleeting) emotional state or an individualist way of taking control over 
exclusionary aspects of our ‘flexible social cognition’: rather, it expresses a distinct 
political commitment in that it contains a political justification over why someone ought 
to extend inclusion and their cognitive resources towards another out-group. It addresses 
the question of  “What’s in it for me?” in that it tries to make a persuasive argument 
about the merits of cross-cutting solidarity for individuals and the particular groups they 
belong to, and offer incentives to pursue solidarity as a worthy neuropolitical good for all 
members of society. 
Social scientists and historians are know to criticize neuroscientific and 
psychological concepts of social emotions and behavior for lacking historical context, 
external validity and direct political relevance (Bauman, McGraw, Warren, & Bartels, 
2014; Sered, 2014). In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I argued that the brain 
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data alone is not politically self-evident – this also applies to the psychological and brain-
based evidence on overcoming exclusionary biases: just because bias reduction works 
well in experimental laboratory settings through playing cooperative games does not 
mean that simulating the same kind of game in the real political world will yield similar 
results in the long term; likewise, just because empathy seems like a desired emotion to 
foster between individuals and groups does not automatically make empathy itself a 
desired and persuasive political good. 
This is why a PBP on ‘cognitive solidarity’ would be different than just asking 
people to mentalize, humanize or empathize with each other: the idea of solidarity is 
distinctly political and not just attitudinal or emotion-based – in that solidarity appeals 
not only to our brains in their individual biological existence, but situates the fate of our 
brains (and the human beings attached to them) in a historical and political community of 
other fellow individuals who, just like us, cannot accomplish their political objectives on 
their own. Affirming the need for ‘cognitive solidarity’ in a neuropolitical fashion means 
that we acknowledge that we need to overcome certain brain-based biases and 
dehumanization tendencies in order to achieve our own and our group-based political 
goals, and that humanizing other out-groups is a first step towards it. This incentive-
based, long-term and communal politico-historical outlook on overcoming exclusionary 
biases is supported by other neuroscience research in moral decision-making, for 
example, which shows that basic reward-based neuronal networks underpin moral 
decision-making processes in individuals (Greene, 2015). 
From within political science, the topic of solidarity and collective action has 
attracted long-standing attention. In particular, Seymour M. Lipset’s Political Man 
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(1960) stands out in its analysis of the importance of “cross-cutting cleavages” for the 
foundations and success of democracies around the world, which was subsequently 
validated empirically a couple of decades later (Mutz, 2001; Selway, 2011). This further 
supports the need to investigate and flesh out the idea of ‘cognitive solidarity’ for 
hyperdiverse and divided democracies of the 21st century. Approaching solidarity from a 
political perspective also allows us to questions whether an ‘individuation’ based 
approach to overcoming dehumanization (Swencionis & Fiske, 2014), i.e. humanizing 
someone by perceiving them as uniquely individual is sufficient in maintaining 
exclusionary biases towards them in long-term political and institutional contexts. I argue 
that we need instead an incentive-based argument of ‘cognitive solidarity’, which should 
not merely rely on cognitive individuation strategies but also on distinctly political and 
communal incentives for people to join. This discussion goes to show that the PBP 
developed in this dissertation is useful not just for understanding exclusion and 
dehumanization, but also, for devising neuropolitical theories for other relevant problems 
in liberal democratic politics. 
In the introductory chapter, I quoted Thomas Kuhn for stating that one of the 
clearest signs that a true paradigm shift took place within a discipline is that it changes 
the problems that become available for scientific investigation and reflection. Kuhn’s 
observation is significant because, in a counterintuitive fashion, it does not place the 
emphasis on the answers that are modified through a paradigm shift but on the 
transformation of traditional questions and problems into new and different ones. Like a 
shift in the light with which the puppets in a Chinese shadow play are illuminated, a 
paradigm shift allows us to see the figures in completely new shapes, forms and 
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movement. In this spirit, this dissertation tried to present a neuropolitical perspective on 
politics that aims to help political thinkers and cognitive scientists to view their figures of 
analysis anew, not just by giving novel answers about them, but most importantly, by 
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